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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is comprised of three essays that focus on the interaction between 
exchange-mandated trading halts and short selling activity in the financial markets. In the first 
essay, the behavior of short sellers is examined surrounding interruptions in trading to 
determine if informed short sellers alter their trading patterns prior to and/or following a 
trading halt. This investigation also addresses the impact of short sales on market quality for 
halted stocks surrounding periods of interrupted trading, by examining returns, price volatility, 
and spreads. 
The second essay investigates if a short-selling contagion effect exists for contemporaries 
of firms experiencing a trading halt. Although trading suspensions represent a firm-specific 
event, they may be viewed as ‘contagious’ in the sense that they possess information relevant to 
other firms in the same industry. The potential for an intra-industry effect supports an 
examination into whether shorting levels vary significantly for organizations that are 
informationally related to a firm experiencing a trading halt. The impact of short sales on the 
market quality of these contemporary firms is also determined by examining returns, price 
volatility, and spreads surrounding interruptions in trading for an industry member. 
Market activity surrounding trading halts is examined in the third essay to determine if 
predatory trading occurs. This research establishes if predatory behavior is present surrounding 
interruptions in trading or alternatively, if trading halts eliminates the opportunity for predation. 
This investigation also determines if documented changes in market quality for halted firms are 
linked to predatory trading. 
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ESSAY 1: 
DOES SHORT-SELLER INFORMATIVENESS EXTEND TO TRADING HALTS? 
2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
We examine short selling activity surrounding trading halts to determine whether 
informed short sellers alter their trading patterns prior to and/or following a trading halt by 
changing the number, size, and/or total volume of short transactions they execute on halted 
stocks. We also study the impact of short sales on market quality for halted stocks surrounding 
periods of interrupted trading by examining their returns, price volatility and spreads.  
Our investigation contributes to microstructure literature by addressing the impact of 
short sales and trading halts together. We determine how these two trading mechanisms interact 
and whether short sellers appreciably affect market quality and contribute to the impact on 
security prices for firms experiencing a trading halt. Trading halts occur frequently in current 
financial markets. Documenting the presence and the impact of short selling surrounding 
interruptions in trading has important implications for individuals and institutions trading in the 
markets and for those providing regulatory oversight.   
 
TRADING INTERRUPTIONS 
Major financial markets throughout the world have regulations that suspend trading under 
specific, pre-specified circumstances. Kim and Yang (2004) categorize these trading 
interruptions as either 1) price limits, which are triggered when security prices impede upon 
boundaries established by market regulators, 2) firm-specific trading halts that are implemented 
to stop trading on an individual security for a predetermined period or 3) market-wide circuit 
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breakers that halt trading on the entire market when a designated index breaches a pre-specified 
level.  
Firm specific trading halts can be further classified according to their underlying cause; 
they can be either news-related or they can occur due to order imbalances. An order imbalance 
trading halt is instigated when an exchange specialist observes a large imbalance between buy 
and sell orders. A news-related trading halt is triggered by exchange officials when an 
information release is expected to have or demonstrates a significant impact on security prices.  
News-related trading halts, the focus of our investigation, are implemented to ensure that 
new information is disseminated equally among market participants and to allow participants the 
time necessary to gauge the impact of the news.
1
 Hauser, Kedar-Levy, Pilo, and Shurki (2006 
page 83) state, “Trading halts are aimed at reducing information asymmetry by granting 
investors the opportunity to reassess trades upon arrival of new, substantial information.” 
The foundation of our investigation into the interaction between short-selling and news-
related trading halts relies on previous research findings. These include the informativeness of 
short sales, the presence of asymmetric information surrounding the declaration of trading halts, 
and the increase in trading activity by investors prior to interruptions in trading (the magnet 
effect). 
  
INFORMATIVENESS OF SHORT SELLERS 
Research shows that short sellers are informed and it demonstrates that they have the 
                                                          
1
 Trading halt discussion condensed from information contained on NASDAQ website at 
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/marketwatch_faq.stm and SEC website at 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/tradinghalt.htm 
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ability to earn abnormal returns in environments with elevated levels of information asymmetry.
2
 
The foundation for this view rests upon the work of Miller (1977). He purports that in the 
presence of short sale constraints, security prices tend to reflect a more optimistic valuation than 
the average opinion of potential investors and thus prices tend to be biased upward. It follows 
from Miller’s work that short sellers possess superior private information if their absence in the 
market or their restricted ability to trade leads to overvalued security prices.  
The rationale that short sellers are informed can also be justified by the heightened risk-
return profile of a short position (potentially unlimited losses) and the additional transaction 
costs associated with shorting. For instance, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002 page 242) state, “… 
short positions can be expensive or impossible and can be involuntarily terminated.” Dechow, 
Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001) purport that short sellers will trade only if they anticipate 
that their superior knowledge will lead to gains that will compensate them for bearing elevated 
risk and costs.  
Short sellers are cross-sectionally more informed; this allows them to earn abnormal 
returns by identifying and then short selling overpriced stocks and covering their position when 
the prices on these securities drop. We suggest that the informational advantage of short sellers 
extends to trading halts; our research intent is to determine whether short sellers use this 
advantage to profit in the marketplace surrounding interruptions in trading. 
Three empirical studies have particular significance for our investigation of short seller 
behavior surrounding trading halts. In the first, Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007), examine the 
relation between changes in the supply and demand for shorting and stock prices and find that 
shorting demand is an important predictor of future stock returns. Particularly important for our 
                                                          
2
 Senchack and Starks (1993); Arnold, Butler, Crack, and Zhang (2005); Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007); Boehmer, 
Jones, and Zhang (2008); and Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009B) provide specific examples. 
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examination of shorting in markets with high asymmetric information, their results are stronger 
in trading environments with impeded public information flow.  
In the second, Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004), investigate short-selling activity prior 
to earnings announcements to determine if it differs from short selling during periods without an 
imminent announcement. They find evidence of short seller informativeness through a 
significant negative relation between pre-announcement short selling and post-announcement 
stock prices. Additionally, they find that short selling does not increase across all firms, which 
implies that short sellers are acting on firm-specific information. This result is essential to our 
research – if short sellers’ superior information pertains to specific firms, we can link short seller 
behavior to firm-specific trading halts. 
In the third, Angel, Christophe, and Ferri (2003) provide a connection between short 
seller behavior and volatile trading environments when they find that short selling is highest for 
high volatility stocks and that as volatility decreases short selling declines monotonically. These 
researchers suggest that public revelation of the negative information short sellers possess leads 
to an eventual drop in stock price; high levels of short selling therefore precede future price 
declines and increased volatility. This research also provides additional support for the notion 
that short sellers target specific firms during selected intervals when it finds that short sales are 
concentrated in a relatively small number of stocks on a subset of trading days.  
 
TRADING HALTS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
Researchers purport that trading halts customarily occur in environments with high levels 
of asymmetric information. For example, Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (2000) suggest that trading 
interruptions are more probable in environments with considerable uncertainty regarding the 
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volatility of future price movements. Hopewell and Schwartz (1978 page 1355) examine price 
behavior prior to and following firm-specific trading halts on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE). They state, “In essence, a temporary trading suspension is a signal by the Exchange that 
a temporary disequilibrium in the market for a security either currently exists or may exist in the 
near future.” They demonstrate that price adjustments occur prior to news-related suspensions 
and attribute the market’s reaction to information leakages and insider trading. They also 
determine that these price adjustments are firm specific.  
The presence of asymmetric information prior to trading halts is substantiated by other 
researchers. For instance, Ferris, Kumar, and Wolfe (1992); and Kryzanowski and Nemiroff 
(1998) find that informational asymmetries in trading activity, price volatility, and abnormal 
returns occur prior to trading halts. Similarly, Wong, Chang, and Tu (2009) find that trading 
volume and volatility increases in the Taiwan Stock Exchange for short intervals immediately 
prior to trading halts that are triggered by price limit hits. 
Kryzanowski and Nemiroff (2001 page 116) purport that trading halts are an attempt to 
discover and correct a state of asymmetric information between investors, and assert, “An 
imbalance of buy and sell orders unaccompanied by public information on that security suggests 
that uninformed traders and specialists have a larger informational disadvantage than under 
normal trading conditions.” We suggest that this environment of elevated information asymmetry 
surrounding trading halts provides the conditions essential for short sellers to exploit their 
informational advantages. 
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INVESTOR BEHAVIOR PRIOR TO TRADING HALTS 
Previous research explores the effect of trading halts on investor behavior, and finds that 
as the probability of an interruption in trading increases, market participants accelerate the timing 
of their trades, even if these transactions are not part of an optimal trading strategy. 
Subrahmanyam (1994) identifies this phenomenon, termed the magnet effect, and he develops a 
theoretical model that examines the ex ante effects of mandated trading halts. In this model, large 
traders prefer to utilize smaller trade sizes to minimize the price impact of their trades. However, 
if the costs associated with the inability to trade are greater than the costs of submitting large 
orders, these traders will advance their trades and subsequently increase price volatility.  
Ackert, Church, and Jayaraman (2001) use experimental markets to analyze the impact of 
trading halts on price behavior, trading volume, and profitability. Providing support for 
Subrahmanyam’s model, they find that trading activity is affected by trading halts: market 
participants advance trades when a halt is imminent. Du, Liu, and Ree (2005) investigate price 
limits in the Korean Stock Exchange and find evidence, prior to limit hits, of the magnet effect in 
returns, trading volume, and volatility. Similarly, Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) provide 
empirical evidence in support of the magnet effect when they examine the trading strategy of 
NYSE market participants during the market turbulence of October 1997. They find that as the 
probability of a circuit breaker increases, market participants want to avoid being constrained not 
to trade, and subsequently accelerate the timing of their trades.  
In summary, we purport that 1) short sellers possess superior information regarding 
specific firms and that they use this informational advantage to accurately forecast an impending 
trading halt, 2) trading halts occur in conditions of heightened information asymmetry and 
volatility; an environment that is conducive for short sellers, and 3) the ‘magnet effect’, which is 
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characterized by a firm-specific increase in trading volume and increased price volatility 
immediately prior to a trading suspension, provides a signal to short sellers and prompts them to 
alter their trading patterns to exploit their informational advantage.  
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HYPOTHESES (TRADING METRICS) 
Our research questions if short sellers take advantage of their superior information by 
modifying their trading patterns surrounding interruptions in trading. To document short seller 
behavior, we examine several trading metrics that may alter prior to and/or following a trading 
halt, including the number of short sales executed, the short sale trade size, and the level of short 
interest on halted firms. 
 
Number of Short Transactions 
The relation between trading volume and stock prices is explored extensively in the 
literature, and a consensus has emerged that a positive correlation between price volatility and 
trading volume exists.
3
 Trading volume is dependent on both the number and the size of trades. 
Some researchers suggest that the number of transactions is the more appropriate metric to gauge 
the impact of trading activity on market prices. For example, Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994) 
examine whether the number of transactions or the transaction size generates price volatility. 
Their findings suggest that the positive relation between volatility and volume simply reflects the 
positive relation between volatility and the number of transactions. McInish and Wood (1991), 
extricate the two components of volume, trade size and the number of trades, to determine the 
influence of each on returns. They find that the impact of the number of trades on returns 
supersedes the effect of trade size. Specifically concerning trading halts, Kryzanowski and 
                                                          
3
 Karpoff (1987) provides a review of the price volume relation and finds that volume is positively related to the 
degree of price changes. 
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Nemiroff (1998), in their examination of the price discovery process, find that the number of 
trades accurately gauges the level of informed trading prior to halts. 
 
Short Trade Size 
There is disagreement in the literature concerning the order-size preference of informed 
investors. Jones et al. (1994) describe two opposing theories: strategic and competitive models. 
With strategic models, monopolistic traders submit multiple smaller trades in an effort to 
camouflage their trading activity. Kyle (1985) develops a strategic model that examines the value 
of private information. He purports that informed traders have an incentive to conceal their 
privileged information by engaging in a number of comparatively small trades rather than a 
solitary large trade so that private information is gradually incorporated into security prices. 
Providing empirical support for this notion, Barclay and Warner (1993) examine the impact of 
trade size on cumulative price change. Based on their findings, they introduce the stealth-trading 
hypothesis, which states that price movements are caused primarily by the private information of 
informed traders and that informed traders utilize medium-sized orders. 
In competitive models, the size of the trade is positively related to the precision of 
information held by informed traders. Easley and O’Hara (1987) study the effect of trade size on 
security prices. They demonstrate that trade size biases create an adverse selection problem: 
informed traders favor larger transactions while uniformed traders do not have a trade-size 
preference. Large trade sizes are therefore interpreted as a signal of informed trading and thus 
modify the market’s perception of an asset’s value. Similarly, Seppi (1990) develops a 
theoretical model of information-based block trades in which strategic traders, by utilizing large 
trades, reveal private information.  
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Further supporting the positive relation between transaction size and subsequent price 
impact, Hasbrouck (1991) finds that price impact is a positive function of trade size, and Spiegel 
and Subrahmanyam (2000) find that price volatility subsequent to a trade is related to the size of 
the transaction and that price variance increases in trade size. Koski and Michaely (2000) 
provide an examination of trade size in environments with various information asymmetries. 
Their results suggest a significant relation between price and liquidity effects and information 
content as measured by trade size.  
The intent of short sellers when submitting their trades diverges from other types of 
strategic traders, those that would prefer stealth transactions to mask the informational content of 
their transactions. Short sellers, in line with the competitive model of order preferencing, can 
benefit from market recognition of their activity – they profit if the revelation of their private 
information through trading results in downward price movement. Empirically, the advantage 
gained by placing large short orders is demonstrated by Boehmer et al. (2008), who find that the 
largest short sale orders are the most informed – they have the most predictive power for future 
price movements. Similarly, the findings of Angel et al. (2003) suggest that the average short 
sale has a greater number of shares than nonshort sales.  
 
Short Volume 
Short selling is prevalent in financial markets. Boehmer et al. (2008) find that shorting 
represents almost 13 percent of 2000–2004 NYSE electronically submitted orders, while Deither 
et al. (2009B) report that during 2005, short selling comprises 24 percent of NYSE and 31 
percent of National Association of Securities Dealers (NASDAQ) share volume.  
Research further demonstrates that short selling increases prior to informational events. 
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For example, Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) find that seasoned equity offerings often have high 
levels of short selling, and that this short selling activity is related to lower proceeds from share 
issuance. Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan (1998) find that it is more likely that short 
transactions that execute the day prior to an informational event are informationally motivated. 
Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) examine short selling prior to the public release of analyst 
downgrades for a sample of NASDAQ stocks. Their results demonstrate abnormal levels of short 
selling in the three trading days prior to an analyst announcement and a significant price reaction 
associated with the downgrade. Karpoff and Lou (2010) investigate short-sellers’ role in 
identifying publicly traded firms that misrepresent their financial statements. They find evidence 
of increases in abnormal short interest in the 19 months preceding the public revelation of fiscal 
misconduct. They also demonstrate that levels of short selling increase according to the severity 
of the misrepresentation. 
We contend that trading halts represent a type of informational event. As such, short 
sellers will increase activity prior to the trading halt in an attempt to exploit their informational 
advantage and increase the price impact of their trades. We purport that short sellers will execute 
a larger number of short transactions and they will utilize a larger transaction size, leading to an 
increase in short volume prior to interruptions in trading: 
 
H1: Prior to a trading halt, halted stocks will experience a substantial increase in the number 
of short transactions, short sellers will utilize larger trade sizes and halted stocks will 
experience a substantial increase in their short interest ratio, relative short selling, and 
abnormal short selling measures. 
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Post-Halt Short Transaction Metrics  
Although a significant amount of research regarding short seller behavior exists, a much 
smaller body of research is available that focuses on the activities of short sellers surrounding 
informational events, particularly in describing their post-event behavior. For instance, 
Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) examine short selling around seasoned equity offerings. 
However, their focus is on short selling pre and post adoption of Rule 10b-21 (which prohibits an 
investor from covering a short position with shares purchased at the offer price) and not on firm-
specific informational events. Christophe et al. (2004) investigate short selling prior to earnings 
announcements, but their analysis does not address post-announcement short selling activity. 
A description of short seller behavior both prior to and following an informational event 
is provided by Christophe et al. (2010) in their examination of analyst downgrades. They find 
that abnormal short selling increases prior to the downgrade announcement; peaks during the 
two-day period comprised of the event day and the day following the announcement, and then 
declines over the next nine trading days.  
Because the intent of a trading halt is to reduce information asymmetry by facilitating the 
dispersion of new information to market participants and providing the time necessary to 
impound new information into stock prices, we expect that short selling will decline following 
the resumption of trading - short sellers will execute fewer and smaller short transactions: 
 
H2: Following the resumption of trading, halted stocks will experience a substantial 
decrease in the number of short transactions, short sellers will utilize smaller trade sizes 
and halted stocks will experience a substantial decrease in their short interest ratio, 
relative short selling, and abnormal short selling measures. 
14 
 
HYPOTHESES (MARKET QUALITY) 
Beyond examining changes in short sellers’ behavior surrounding trading halts, we also 
investigate the impact of short sales on market quality in the form of returns, price volatility and 
spreads for halted stocks. The intent of a trading halt is to improve market quality by providing 
the markets “… the opportunity to attract new trading interest, establish a reasonable market 
price, and resume trading in an affected stock in a fair and orderly fashion, …” (Rooney 2010). 
Short selling is also positively viewed by the SEC as, “… a healthy and necessary part of a free 
market,” a mechanism “… which can help quickly transport price signals in response to negative 
information or prospects for a company” (Cox 2008). Acting in tandem, these two trading 
procedures have the potential to significantly affect market quality for halted stocks.  
 
Returns 
Previous research establishes that stocks with high levels of short selling generally 
experience price declines. For instance, Senchack and Starks (1993) and Desai, Ramesh, 
Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002) demonstrate that increases in short interest generate 
negative abnormal returns. Angel et al. (2003) find that abnormally low returns are preceded by 
days with high levels of short selling. Boehmer et al. (2008) find that heavily shorted stocks 
underperform by a risk-adjusted 15.6 percent annually as compared to lightly shorted stocks. The 
findings of Cohen et al. (2007) suggest that an increase in the demand for shorting is associated 
with negative abnormal returns the following month. Diether et al. (2009B) find that when 
investors sell short in the market during periods of high asymmetric information, their trades are 
15 
 
followed by days with negative returns. 
In similar fashion, research demonstrates that stocks undergoing a trading halt 
customarily experience negative abnormal returns. For example, Kryzanowski (1979) tests the 
market efficiency implications of suspensions in trading and Madura, Richie, and Tucker (2006) 
analyze NASDAQ trading halts; both find significant abnormal negative returns surrounding 
halts in trading. Likewise, Howe and Schlarbaum (1986) examine the impact of trading 
suspensions on price behavior. They find that almost 80 percent of sample securities experienced 
negative abnormal returns during the suspension period.  
Because each of these trading practices, short selling and trading halts, individually 
produce negative returns, it follows that the combination of the two will lead to a larger 
cumulative impact – stocks experiencing both a trading halts and high levels of short selling will 
experience larger negative abnormal returns: 
 
H3: Halted stocks with high levels of short selling will experience a larger decline in price 
surrounding a trading halt as compared to halted stocks with lower short selling 
activity.  
 
Price Adjustment Speed 
Researchers also provide insight into the impact of trading halts on the speed of price 
discovery. For instance, Hauser et al. (2006) examine trading halts in the Tel Aviv Stock 
Exchange and find a 40 percent increase in the rate of information dissemination subsequent to a 
trading halt. Additionally, they find that the speed of adjustments in price to new information is 
positively related to increases in trading activity. Madura et al. (2006) find the price discovery 
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process is more prominent for firms with specific news events. Engelen and Kabir (2006 page 
1142) examine the impact of temporary interruptions in trading for firms listed on the Euronext 
Brussels Exchange. They find that, “stock prices adjust completely and instantaneously to the 
new information released during trading suspensions.” 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) investigate the effect of short-sale constraints on the speed 
at which security prices adjust to new information. They find that heightened levels of short 
selling (associated with reduced costs) increase the speed of adjustment for security prices, 
particularly to negative news. 
Short selling and trading halts both serve to convey information to market participants. 
Working in tandem, the two trading mechanisms should increase the rate of information 
dissemination - stocks experiencing both trading halts and high levels of short selling will 
experience a faster price discovery process: 
 
H4: Halted stocks with high levels of short selling will experience more rapid adjustments 
in price surrounding trading halts as compared to halted stocks with lower short selling 
activity. 
 
Price Volatility 
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro states, “I believe that circuit breakers for individual 
securities across the exchanges would help to limit significant volatility” (Wall Street Journal 
2010). Although research examines the impact of trading halts on market quality, a consensus 
has not been reached as to whether trading halts successfully meet their objective of reducing 
price volatility.  
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Proponents of trading interruptions subscribe to the price efficiency hypothesis of trading 
halts, which purports that trading suspensions provide market participants the time necessary to 
adjust to new information, consequently leading to smaller price dispersions and increasing the 
efficiency of reopening prices (Bacha, Mohamed, and Ramlee 2008). Hauser et al. (2006), and 
Corwin and Lipson (2000) provide empirical support for the Price Efficiency Hypothesis of 
Trading Halts - their findings suggest a substantial increase in the rate of information dispersion 
following trading halts and indicate that clearing prices upon resumption of trade serve as good 
predictors of future stock prices. Likewise, Westerhoff (2003) examines the effectiveness of 
price limits in speculative markets and finds that security prices become less volatile and more 
accurately reflect intrinsic values following an interruption in trading. 
In contrast, the volatility spillover hypothesis purports that volatility increases in the 
periods following halts due to order imbalances caused by the interruption in trading. Supporters 
of this viewpoint believe that the absence of recent transactions make market participants 
reluctant to trade. This unwillingness to trade leads to a noisier reopening price and higher price 
volatility. Support for this view is provided by Kim and Rhee (1997) whose findings suggest that 
stock volatility is not moderated by circuit breakers. Kryzanowski and Nemiroff (1998) and 
Ferris et al. (1992) find that volatility increases as new information is incorporated into asset 
prices. Similarly, Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994), who investigates firm-specific NYSE trading 
halts, find that post-halt volatility levels are elevated 50 to 115 percent.  
When examining the relation between short selling and volatility, both Wu and Guo 
(2004) and Angel et al. (2003) find that short selling levels are directly related to price volatility. 
Likewise, Chang et al. (2007) find that when short selling is allowed, the volatility of both raw 
and abnormal returns increases significantly. This increase in price movement is not unexpected 
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if short sellers are informed; security prices should fluctuate if the actions of short sellers assist 
prices in adjusting to their fundamental values.  
It follows then, that once the superior information held by short sellers is fully 
incorporated into security prices, short selling levels should fall and price volatility should 
diminish. Diether et al. (2009B) provide support for this view; they find that when investors sell 
short during periods of high asymmetric information, their trades are followed by days with 
lower volatility. Similarly, Bris (2008) examine the performance of 19 financial stocks following 
the SEC’s 2008 emergency order to limit naked short selling and find that following a reduction 
in short selling due to the imposition of short sale restrictions, affected stocks experience a 
reduction in intraday return volatility.  
The price efficiency hypothesis predicts that security prices will be more efficient after 
the resumption of trading. Short sellers, by using their superior information to move security 
prices towards their fundamental value, also serve to increase market efficiency. Relying on both 
of these notions, we purport that reopening prices for halted securities that experience a high 
level of short selling surrounding trading interruptions will demonstrate reduced volatility upon 
the resumption of trading and their reopening prices will serve as accurate predictors of future 
prices: 
 
H5: Halted stocks with high levels of short selling will have lower price volatility upon 
resumption of trade and their reopening prices will be better predictors of future prices 
as compared to halted stocks with lower short selling activity.  
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Spreads 
Copeland and Galai (1983) describe the bid-ask spread as a mechanism used by dealers to 
balance the gains they receive from investors who are willing to pay a fee for liquidity and losses 
to informed traders  who have superior information that allow them to more accurately predict 
future prices. If the market perceives that large trades have higher information content, then, as 
Hasbrouck (1991) finds, large trades should cause the spread to widen, thus providing 
compensation to dealers for their informational disadvantage.  
If we assume that short-sellers, as informed traders, utilize large trade sizes to increase 
the price impact of their trades, we expect to see a positive relation between short selling levels 
and spreads. This notion is supported by Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009A) who examine pilot 
stocks for which short-selling tests were suspended. They find that an increase in short selling 
activity leads to an increase in quoted and effective spreads. We also expect that, based on a 
positive relation between short selling and spreads, as the information held by short sellers is 
fully reflected in asset prices, short selling activity will decrease and spreads narrow. 
Trading halt literature provides insight into the impact of trading halts on the bid-ask 
spread. For instance, Ackert et al. (2001) examine the impact of trading halts on market behavior 
and find that spreads narrow after an interruption in trading. Likewise, the findings of Kim, 
Yague, and Yang (2008) suggest that the bid-ask spreads narrow after trading halts on the 
Spanish Stock Exchange. 
Taking into account the post-halt decrease in spread predicted by the trading halt 
literature and the expected decrease in spreads from a post-halt decrease in short selling, we 
purport that securities experiencing a high level of short selling prior to trading interruption will 
demonstrate narrower spreads upon the resumption of trading: 
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H6: Halted stocks with high levels of short selling will have lower spreads upon resumption 
of trading as compared to halted stocks with lower short selling activity. 
 
DATA 
We first identify NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) trading halts that occur 
during 2005–2006 by querying the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database via Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS) for stocks with a trading mode of 4, 7 or 11, indicating halts in trading 
for news dissemination, order imbalance, or news pending, respectively. From this set, we 
remove observations where multiple halts occur for the same stock on the same trading day and 
halts that occur outside normal market hours. 
D’Avolio (2002) finds that 16 percent of stocks in the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) data are potentially difficult to sell short. Of these stocks, the majority are in the 
bottom size decile and the prices of over half are under five dollars. They also find 
approximately 10 percent of stocks are never shorted – these are primarily illiquid stocks, for 
which shorting may represent a limited opportunity for profit. These researchers note that 
institutional investors, who lend stocks for shorting, are biased towards large, liquid stocks, and 
that the probability of incurring loan fees in excess of the risk free rate is inversely related to firm 
size and the level of institutional ownership. Accordingly, we, in a manner similar to Christophe 
et al. (2004), eliminate trading halts for any stock whose average daily price and trading volume 
during 2005 – 2006 was less than five dollars and 100 shares. 
Because our intent is to examine trading activity and market quality prior to and 
following trading halts, we follow the methodology of Corwin and Lipson (2000) and eliminate 
halts that occur before 10:00 a.m. We also eliminate halts with incomplete data or halts that do 
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not resolve on the same trading day. 
Rule 202T implemented the suspension of the short sale price test for a pilot list of 
stocks. The resolution was adopted in 2004 – the suspension was in effect from May 2, 2005 
through August 6, 2007. Diether et al. (2009A) find that although daily returns and volatility 
levels are unaffected for pilot stocks during the test suspension, short selling activity, spreads and 
intraday volatility increases for these stocks. Because the test suspension period covers part, but 
not all of our sample period, to mitigate confounding effects, we remove from our sample any 
firms included in the pilot list of stocks for price test exclusion. 
Finally, we remove observations where more than one trading halt occurs for the same 
firm within our event period. The event period is an 11-trading-day interval beginning five days 
prior to and ending 5 days after the halt day. Christophe et al. (2004) use a multiday pre-event 
period because short sellers may distribute their trading over several days prior to an event to 
disguise private information and because the average loan duration for equity is three days (Reed 
2007). We establish a post-halt event period to examine trading activity and market quality for 
halted stocks following the resumption of trading. The non-halt period, spanning six to 30 days 
preceding and following a trading halt, provides an estimation period. For our intraday 
examination, we identify the halt period, which begins with the interruption in trading and ends 
when trading resumes. Intraday pre-halt periods are measured backwards from the beginning of 
the halt, and post-halt periods are measured forward from the reopening of trading. 
-30                                       -6 -5                     -1 0 +1                   +5 +6                                   +30 
Non-halt pre period Pre-Halt Event Halt Day Post-Halt Event Non-halt post period 
Sample Period 
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Daily price, trading volume, return, and market capitalization data are obtained from the 
CRSP database. The Regulation SHO database, which was created in response to Rule 202T, 
provides trade size and time stamps for short-selling transactions. TAQ trade and quote data is 
used to examine intraday activity. Trade data is filtered to remove observations that occur 
outside of normal market hours, and transactions with a non-positive price, or a condition code 
other than zero. Quote data is filtered to retain observations that occur within normal market 
hours and have a positive bid or ask size, price and spread. 
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
After applying the previously described filters to refine our set of events, our remaining 
sample consists of 78 trading halts, 55 of which occur on the NYSE. Summary statistics 
describing these halts are presented in Table 1, Panels A through I. Firm names, trading halt 
mode and SIC code are listed in the Appendix E. 
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
This table contains summary statistics for trading halts that occur during 2005 – 2006 for NYSE-
listed firms. Halts have been filtered to remove observations that occur outside of market hours 
or before 10:00 a.m., where more than one halt occurs for a sample firms on the same day, halts 
that do not resolve on the same trading day and multiple halts for the same firm within the 11-
day event period, halts for Rule 202T pilot stocks, and observations for stocks whose average 
daily price and trading volume during 2005 – 2006 was less than five dollars and 100 shares.  
Panel A: Halts by Year  
Year Number of Halts Unique Firms  
2005 48 44  
2006 30 28  
Full Sample 78 68  
Panel B: Number of Halts per Year 
Number of Halts in Sample 1 2 3 4 5  
Number of Firms       
2005 42 1 0 1 0  
2006 27 0 1 0 0  
Full Sample 64 1 1 1 1  
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Panel C: Halts by Day of Week and Year 
 Day of Week 
Year Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Total 
2005 2 10 13 18 5 48 
2006 4 9 7 5 5 30 
Full Sample 6 19 20 23 10 78 
Panel D: Halts by Month and Year 
 Month 
Year Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2005 4 2 5 7 8 5 4 5 1 3 2 2 
2006 1 2 4 4 1 3 0 3 1 5 3 3 
Full Sample 5 4 9 11 9 8 4 8 2 8 5 5 
Panel E: Halts and Duration by Halt Type 
Trading Halt Type Number of Halts Mean Duration  
News Dissemination (4) 6 0:29:27  
Order Imbalance (7) 7 0:17:29  
News Pending (11) 65 0:44:46  
Full Sample 78 0:41:08  
Panel F: Halt Firm Characteristics  - Average Daily Values 
 Price Volume Return Market Cap 
Year: 2005 (N =44)     
Mean 31.89 735,803 0.0590% 3,880,142 
Max 110.65 5,902,434 0.3331% 65,755,430 
Min 4.47 1099 -0.1728% 33,149 
Std 23.90 1,295,571 0.1144% 10,371,325 
Year: 2006 (N=28)     
Mean 33.23 1,408,912 0.0438% 4,946,224 
Max 141.33 7,642,372 0.3072% 40,548,995 
Min 6.45 1,187 -0.4135% 111,400 
Std 27.81 1,856,984 0.1346% 9,403,555 
Full Sample (N=72)     
Mean 32.41 997,568 0.0531% 4,294,729 
Max 141.33 7,642,372 0.3331% 65,755,430 
Min 4.47 1099 -0.4135% 33,149 
Std 25.31 1,561,124 0.1219% 9,952,168 
Panel G: CRSP Capitalization-Based Decile 
Decile 2005 2006 Full Sample  
1 0 0 0  
2 2 0 2  
3 4 2 6  
4 4 1 5  
5 5 2 7  
6 6 8 14  
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7 2 3 5  
8 9 4 13  
9 4 3 7  
10 8 5 13  
Total 44 28 72  
Panel H: Short-sale Trading Activity Across Exchanges (2005 – 2006) 
 ADF AMEX ARCA BSE CHX NASDAQ NSX NYSE PHLX 
Mean Shares 
Sold Short (%) 
0.00 2.94 0.00 0.53 0.00 14.19 5.67 76.38 0.29 
Mean Short-
sale Trades (%) 
0.00 3.73 0.00 0.64 0.00 12.77 6.77 76.07 0.03 
Panel I: Short-selling Summary Statistics per Stock 
 Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Short Sale Daily Volume 201,427 192,125 72,895 67,124 1,285,773 
Number of Daily Short Trades 379 349 149 128 2,727 
 
Of these halts, sixty percent more occur in 2005 than in 2006 (48 as compared to 30). 
Similar to Christophe et al. (2004), we find that trading halts in our sample occur more 
frequently during the middle of the week – Tuesday through Thursday. These interruptions in 
trading occur in 23 out of the 24 sample period months, without evidence of an obvious seasonal 
pattern. We examine 68 unique firms, 64 of which experience a single halt during the sample 
period, and 4 different firms that experience 2, 3, 4, or 5 halts each. 
The halts in our study are primarily (83 percent) implemented due to pending news. The 
mean duration of all sample halts is just over 41 minutes. Although the duration of trading halts 
reported by Lee et al. (1994), Corwin and Lipson (2000), and Christie, Corwin, and Harris 
(2002) is greater on average and for each halt type, our findings coincide with previous research 
in the ranking of halt types by length: news pending halts have the longest duration and order 
imbalance halts, the shortest. 
Summary statistics suggest a substantial variation in the size of sample firms, stock price 
and trading volume with higher average values in 2006 as compared to 2005. The firms in our 
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study generally demonstrate positive returns over the two-year period examined. When the 
sample firms are categorized according to year-end capitalization portfolio assignments 
established by CRSP, we find, similar to Christophe et al. (2004) that large firms are more 
heavily represented in our sample - we have fewer firms in the lower market capitalization 
deciles. The dearth of smaller firms may be due, in part, to our data filter that eliminates trading 
halts for any stock whose average daily price during the sample period is less than five dollars. 
We examine short-selling levels for our sample firms during the 2005 – 2006 sample 
period. For each exchange, we report both short volume as a percentage of the total shares 
shorted and the number of short sale transactions as a percentage of the total number of short 
selling trades. No short transactions for our sample firms/period are reported on the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Alternative Display Facility (ADF), Archipelago (ARCA) and 
the Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX).  
In line with the findings presented by Diether et al. (2009B), approximately three-fourths 
of short volume and short trades for our sample firms are executed on the NYSE. Approximately 
14 percent of short volume and 13 percent of short trades are placed on the NASDAQ market. 
The average firm in our sample has 379 short transactions per trading day with an average daily 
short volume of just over 200,000 shares. 
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RESULTS 
Daily Short Metrics 
To describe the daily behavior of short sellers surrounding trading halts, we track the 
mean number of trades, trade size and volume for short transactions for our sample firms in the 
pre-event period (days -5 through -1), the halt day (day 0), the post-event period (days +1 
through +5), and the estimation period (days -30 through -6 and +6 through +30). We also 
calculate the short interest ratio, relative short selling, and abnormal short selling metrics for 
each of these periods. The short interest ratio is the number of shares sold short to shares 
outstanding (Angel et al., 2003). Relative short selling is computed by dividing the number of 
shares shorted by the number of shares traded (Christophe et al., 2004; and Diether et al., 
2009B). Abnormal short selling is the percentage difference between the average daily shares 
sold short during the pre, post or event period and the average daily number of shares sold short 
during the estimation period (Lee et al., 1994; Corwin and Lipson, 2000; Christie et al., 2002, 
Christophe et al., 2004; and Christophe et al., 2010). 
Our hypotheses concerning the behavior of short sellers surrounding trading halts are: 
 
H1: Prior to a trading halt, halted stocks will experience a substantial increase in the number 
of short transactions, short sellers will utilize larger trade sizes and halted stocks will 
experience a substantial increase in their short interest ratio, relative short selling, and 
abnormal short selling measures. 
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H2: Following the resumption of trading, halted stocks will experience a substantial 
decrease in the number of short transactions, short sellers will utilize smaller trade sizes 
and halted stocks will experience a substantial decrease in their short interest ratio, 
relative short selling, and abnormal short selling measures. 
 
The mean daily short number of trades, trade size and trading volume, presented in Table 
2, are lower in the pre-event period than in the estimation period, indicating that short sellers do 
not increase their activity in the days prior to a trading halt. For example, the firms in our sample 
had an average of 431 trades of 430 shares each, producing a mean short volume of 255,325 
shares in the pre-event period. These values are all less than the corresponding mean expected 
values computed for the estimation period. This finding, although in contrast to our priori, is 
similar to the results of Christophe et al. (2004) who demonstrate a decrease in short selling 
activity for firms during the five trading days preceding earnings announcements - another type 
of informational event. 
On the event day, all three of these metrics, number, size and total volume of short 
transactions, increase dramatically. The average number of trades more than doubles, from 489 
trades in the estimation period to over 1000 on the halt day. Trade size increases from 457 shares 
to 646 and subsequently volume triples to an average of nearly one million shares sold short on 
the halt day. 
During the post-halt period, these values demonstrate a distinct reduction, but they 
remain above estimation period levels. The mean number of daily short transactions falls from 
1,004 to 662, which is substantially larger than estimated 489 trades; the average trade size of 
477 shares remains elevated above the estimation size of 457 shares. The short interest ratio 
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follows a similar pattern, with a low pre-halt value of 2.09, a remarkable increase on the halt day 
to 5.29, and a marked decline to 2.80 with higher than estimation period levels (2.27) in the five 
days following an interruption in trading.   
Table 2  
Average Daily Short Metrics 
This table contains indicators of daily short selling behavior during the estimation (days -30 thru 
-6 and +6 thru +30), pre-event (days -5 thru -1), event (day 0) and post-event (days +1 thru +5) 
period surrounding interruptions in trading. The short interest ratio is the number of shares sold 
short to shares outstanding, and relative short selling is computed by dividing the number of 
shares shorted by the number of shares traded. 
N = 78 Trading Halts 
Period 
Number of 
Trades 
Trade Size Volume 
Short Interest 
Ratio 
Relative Short 
Selling 
Estimation  489 457 303,873 2.27 0.24 
Pre-Event 431 430 255,325 2.09 0.23 
Halt 1,004 646 982,050 5.29 0.23 
Post-Event 662 477 489,637 2.80 0.23 
 
The mean and median abnormal short selling values, shown in Figure 1, corroborate 
these findings. This figure demonstrates primarily negative abnormal short volume in trading 
days -5 through -1, indicating lower short selling activity in the pre-event period as compared to 
the estimation period. Abnormal short volume soars to levels over 200 percent of the estimation 
period values on the halt day. Short selling levels remain elevated on the day following the halt, 
and then decline from this exaggerated level during the post-halt period, with abnormal values 
remaining positive for the five days examined (indicating higher short selling levels in the post-
halt period than in the estimation period).  
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Figure 1 
Daily Abnormal Short Selling 
Abnormal short selling is the percentage difference between the average 
daily shares sold short during the pre, post or event period and the average 
daily number of shares sold short during the estimation period 
 
The halt-day and post-halt results are similar to the findings of Christophe et al. (2010) 
who examine short selling activity surrounding analyst downgrades. They find that abnormal 
short selling increases substantially on the event day and then declines, but remains above the 
normal level for the following nine days.  
Relative short selling however deviates from the pattern established by the other short 
selling measures: relative short selling values remain consistent, ranging from 0.24 in the 
estimation period to 0.23 for all other periods examined. These values are similar in magnitude 
to the values reported by Diether et al. (2009B) for NYSE stocks. This finding suggests that the 
increase in short volume during the halt and post-event periods are accompanied by a surge in 
trading volume.  
A contemporary increase in trading and short volume is consistent with the findings of 
Karpoff (1986), who examines the impact of informational events on trading volume. This 
research purports that information leads to an increase in trading volume if it becomes necessary 
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for investors to update their demand prices or if the information is not anticipated. Investor 
disagreement or a divergence in investor expectations can lead to increased trading volume that 
can persist after an informational event. Accordingly, Lee et al. (1994) report that trading volume 
is 230 percent higher following NYSE trading halts as compared to levels following a ‘pseudo 
halt’ and that the elevated volume persists for three days. 
If informed short sellers are able to anticipate both that a firm will experience an 
informational event and that this event will lead to a change in firm value, then we should expect 
abnormal short selling to increase prior to interruptions in trading. Using the following equation, 
we examine short selling levels while controlling for other variables that influence short selling 
levels (following Christophe et al., 2010): 
 
ABSS(-5,-1)i = αi + β1P(0i) + β2CAR(-5,-1)i + β3MOMi + β4CAR(0,1)i + εi   (1) 
 
The dependent variable, ABSS(-5,-1) represents abnormal short-selling during the five days 
preceding the halt. P(0) is the share price of the halted firm on the halt day; this variable controls 
for the positive link between a stock’s price and the willingness of market participants to short 
the stock.
4
 CAR(-5,-1) is the cumulative abnormal return during the five day pre-event period – the 
halted firm’s total return over the five days preceding the halt minus the median five-day 
cumulative total return during the non-event period. MOM represents momentum, which 
controls for long-term share price movement. Momentum is calculated as the halted firm’s six-
month cumulative return ending 30 days before the halt minus the return on the NYSE equally 
weighted portfolio during the same period. CAR(0,1) is the halted firm’s holding period return 
                                                          
4
 Refer to D’Avolio, (2002) who shows that the majority of stocks that are impossible to short are priced less than 
five dollars and that the holdings of institutional investors, who lend stocks for shorting, are biased towards large, 
liquid stocks. 
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from day 0 to day 1 minus the median holding period return during the non-event period; this 
variable represents the market’s assessment of the economic value of the news released 
surrounding a trading halt. 
Table 3, Panel A presents the correlation matrix for the regression variables. Results 
indicate that the pre-halt abnormal short selling level, ABSS(-5, -1), is significantly negatively 
correlated with short-term pre-halt returns (CAR(-5, -1)) and significantly positively correlated 
with long-term returns (MOM) prior to the trading halt. The correlation values indicates that pre-
event short selling decreases with high contemporaneous returns, but increases for stocks with 
higher returns in the months prior to a trading halt. 
Modeling a regression using ordinary least squares assumes that the error terms have 
uniform variances across all observations. To ensure that this assumption holds, we test each 
input data set using the Shapiro-Wilk test. The null hypothesis for this statistical test is that a 
population is distributed normally. If the test produces a p-value less than the designated alpha 
level, then the null hypothesis of normality can be rejected.  
For this regression, the Shapiro-Wilk statistic is 0.73, with a p-value < .001, allowing us 
to reject the assumption of a normal distribution. Accordingly, we execute our regression and 
report results using errors adjusted to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the 
residuals.  
Table 3, Panel B presents the regression results. We find that the level of abnormal short 
selling preceding a trading halt is positively associated with post-halt returns, CAR(0,1), 
suggesting that for a stock with a 1 percent increase in post-halt returns we expect a 2 to 3 
percent increase in pre-halt abnormal short selling.  
31 
 
Although an increase in short selling is often associated with subsequent low returns, 
previous research also supports a relation between short selling and positive price movements. 
Angel et al. (2003) discuss how, depending upon the investment period length, short sellers may 
use either a momentum based strategy, which generates profits if prices continue to move in the 
same direction, or a contrarian strategy, where success is dependent on price reversals. When 
these researchers examine short selling activity on NASDAQ, they find that the highest number 
of short transactions occur for stocks with the highest returns – suggesting that short sellers 
follow a contrarian strategy. This is consistent with the research of Brent, Morse, and Stice 
(1990) who reported 3 to 4 percent higher monthly returns for stocks with an increase in short 
interest. 
Table 3 
Abnormal Short Selling Regression 1 
This table contains the correlation matrix for regression variables (Panel A) with corresponding 
p-values in parentheses. Regression coefficients and associated t-values are listed in Panel B. In 
the model: ABSS(-5, -1) = α + β1 * Price0 + β2 * CAR(-5, -1) + β3 * MOM + β4 * CAR(0, 1) + є , 
ABSS(-5,-1) represents abnormal short-selling during the five days preceding the halt, P(0) is the 
share price of the halted firm on the halt day, CAR(-5,-1) is the cumulative abnormal return during 
the five day pre-event period, MOM represents momentum, and CAR(0,1) is the halted firm’s 
excess holding period return from day 0 to day . Regression results are reported using errors 
adjusted to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the residuals.  
N = 75 Halts 
 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 ABSS(-5, -1) Price(0) CAR(-5,-1) MOM CAR(0,1) 
ABSS(-5, -1) 1 0.0588 
(0.6161) 
-0.3058 
(0.0076) *** 
0.2347 
(0.0427) ** 
0.1897 
(0.1031) 
Price(0)  1 0.1911 
(0.1005) 
-0.0238 
(0.8394) 
0.0216 
(0.8544) 
CAR(-5,-1)   1 -0.2015 
(0.0831) * 
-0.10281 
(0.3801) 
MOM    1 0.04217 
(0.7194) 
CAR(0,1)     1 
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Panel B: OLS Regression Results 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Intercept 0.0054 (0.07) 0.0218 (0.25) -0.0019 (-0.02) -0.1203 (-0.91) 
CAR(-5,-1) -3.7378 (-1.22) -3.5368 (-1.26) -3.1058 (-1.27) -3.3786 (-1.39) 
CAR(0,1)   3.0178 (1.78) * 2.9454 (1.88) * 2.8576 (1.89) * 
MOM     68.6249 (1.66) 67.9963 (1.67) * 
Price(0)       0.0037 (1.12) 
R
2
 0.0935 0.1188 0.1488 0.1610 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0811 0.0943 0.1129 0.1131 
F-Value 7.53 *** 4.85 ** 4.14 *** 3.36 ** 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. 
 
Using an alternate regression model, following Christophe et al. (2004), we control for 
pre-event trading volume and returns, and focus on post-halt returns to determine if abnormal 
levels of short selling are informationally motivated. In this equation, ABSS(-5,-1) again represents 
the abnormal short-selling during the five days before the halt, and RET(0, +1) is the stock return 
from closing day -1 to +1. RET(-5, -1) represents the movement of the stock price during the five 
days prior to the halt, and ABVOL(-5, -1) is the percentage difference between the average daily 
volume in the 5-day pre-event interval and the average daily volume in the estimation period. 
 
ABSS(-5, -1) = β0 + β1RET(0, +1) + β2 RET(-5, -1) + β3ABVOL(-5, -1) + ε   (2) 
 
RET(0, +1) represents the market’s immediate reaction to the trading halt. A significant 
negative (positive) coefficient indicates that short selling increases (decreases) prior to trading 
halts imposed under negative (positive) circumstances. RET(-5, -1) controls for the possibility that 
changes in the stock price might affect the level of short selling in the days preceding the trading 
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halt. ABVOL(-5, -1) accounts for the comovement in increased short selling activity and increased 
trading volume (increased volume might make a stock easier to short). 
The correlation matrix of regression variables (Table 4 Panel A) demonstrates a 
significant positive correlation between pre-halt abnormal short selling levels and abnormal 
volume in the pre-halt period, suggesting that abnormal trading volume is linked to higher short 
selling activity.
 5
 Pre-event abnormal short selling is negatively correlated with pre-halt returns – 
stocks with higher return in the five days preceding a trading halt have lower levels of pre-halt 
shorting. 
For this regression, the Shapiro-Wilk statistic is 0.79, with a corresponding p-value < 
.001. Accordingly, we execute our regression and report results using errors adjusted to control 
for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the residuals.  
The regression results, listed in Table 4 Panel B, produce relatively high Adjusted R
2
 
values, ranging from 31.54 to 89.03 percent depending on the model specification. A significant 
relation is indicated between abnormal short selling and trading volume and return in the pre-halt 
period: pre-halt short selling levels are affected positively by stock price declines and by 
increased trading volume in the days preceding a trading halt. These results indicate that a stock 
with a one percent decrease (increase) in pre-halt returns (trading volume) we expect 
approximately a (0.70) two percent increase in pre-halt abnormal short selling. However, the 
coefficient for return over the halt day, RET(0, +1), is insignificant; this result fails to provide 
support for our hypothesis of informed trading by short sellers prior to a trading halt.  
                                                          
5
 Bris (2008) finds that short-sales ratios are affected by substantial increases in trading volume 
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Intraday Short Metrics 
The significant increase in short selling metrics on the halt day evidenced in our daily 
tests prompts us to examine further short-selling behavior on the day the trading halt is called. 
We begin by first computing the 1) average number of short transactions, 2) average size of the 
short transactions, 3) short interest ratio, 4) relative short selling and 5) abnormal short selling 
Table 4  
Abnormal Short Selling Regression 2 
This table contains the correlation matrix for regression variables (Panel A) with corresponding 
p-values in parentheses. Regression coefficients and associated t-values are listed in Panel B. In 
the model: ABSS(-5, -1) = α + β1RET(0, +1) + β2 RET(-5, -1) + β3ABVOL(-5, -1) + ε, ABSS(-5,-1) 
represents the abnormal short-selling during the five days before the halt, and RET(0, +1) is the 
stock return from closing day -1 to +1. RET(-5, -1) represents the movement of the stock price 
during the five days prior to the halt, and ABVOL(-5, -1) is the percentage difference between the 
average daily volume in the 5-day pre-event interval and the average daily volume in the 
estimation period. Regression results are reported using errors adjusted to control for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the residuals. 
N = 77 Halts 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 ABSS(-5, -1) ABVOL(-5, -1) RET(0, +1) RET(-5, -1) 
ABSS(-5, -1) 1 0.73674 
(< .0001) *** 
-0.06004 
(0.6039) 
-0.28236 
(0.0128) ** 
ABVOL(-5, -1)  1 -0.03914 
(0.7354) 
-0.18791 
(0.1017) 
RET(0, +1)   1 0.31322 
(0.0055) *** 
RET(-5, -1)    1 
Panel B: OLS Regression Results 
 [1] [2] [3] 
Intercept -0.17194 (-3.45) *** -0.17303 (-3.47) *** -0.17288 (-3.44) *** 
ABVOL(-5, -1) 0.74815 (7.76) *** 0.71968 (10.97) *** 0.71935 (11.08) *** 
RET(-5, -1)  -2.27965 (-2.26) ** -2.35715 (-2.00) ** 
RET(0, +1)   0.10841 (0.24) 
R
2
 0.5428 0.5643 0.5645 
Adjusted R
2
 0.5367 0.5525 0.5466 
F-Value 89.03 *** 47.91 *** 31.54 *** 
*** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. 
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measures for the halted stocks in the eight 30-minute periods prior to a halt and following the 
resumption of trading.  
Our investigation reveals that the number of trades, the transaction size, the overall short 
volume and the short interest ratio remain relatively stable throughout the periods leading up to 
the halt (Table 5). The pre-halt short interest ratio varies from 0.162 to 0.313. The number of 
short transactions ranges from 59 to 94 per period and mean period trade size is between 544 and 
841 shares, producing short volume for the pre-halt periods ranging from 36,795 to 65,965 
shares. A slight increase in pre-halt short activity, with volume breaching 60,000, is noted two 
periods preceding the halt. 
Table 5  
Average Intraday Short Metrics 
Mean values, which are computed for eight 30-minute periods prior to trading halts and 
following the resumption of trading, are on a per halt basis; they are adjusted for the number of 
halts with short transactions each period. The short interest ratio is the number of shares sold 
short to shares outstanding, and relative short selling is computed by dividing the number of 
shares shorted by the number of shares traded. 
Period 
Number 
of Halts 
Number of 
Trades 
Trade Size Volume 
Short Interest 
Ratio 
Relative Short 
Selling 
-8 21 94 692 65,338 0.313  0.259  
-7 25 83 544 45,241 0.163  0.203  
-6 32 59 628 36,795 0.185  0.240  
-5 43 81 704 56,985 0.311  0.242  
-4 49 63 613 38,790 0.162  0.220  
-3 50 66 792 52,046 0.294  0.242  
-2 55 73 841 61,604 0.207  0.247  
-1 61 87 757 65,965 0.220  0.245  
Halt       
1 68 162 1,293 209,182 1.601  0.238  
2 56 120 1,126 135,328 0.777  0.223  
3 53 99 855 84,429 0.611  0.253  
4 43 63 998 63,200 0.472  0.286  
5 38 76 1,011 77,129 0.560  0.288  
6 32 81 1,145 92,495 0.479  0.266  
7 25 93 1,191 111,295 0.363  0.266  
8 14 31 339 10,470 0.236  0.245  
 
36 
 
Upon the resumption of trading, these metrics are all sharply elevated, and they remain 
inflated for at least three periods (seven periods for trade size) into the post-halt examination. 
During period +1, an average of 162 trades occur, with an mean trade size of 1,293 shares, 
resulting in a short volume of over 200,000 shares - an increase by a factor of four over the 
average pre-halt volume. The short interest ratio peaks at 1.60 in the first post-halt period, and its 
value remains elevated above pre-halt levels for six periods following the resumption of trading. 
Abnormal short selling, shown in Figure 2, provides equivalent findings, with low or 
negative mean and median values preceding the halt, a slight increase in mean values three 
periods before the halt is implemented, and a spike to nearly 1200 percent upon the resumption 
of trading. Abnormal short selling levels then decline gradually, but remain positive through the 
eight post-halt periods examined.  
 
Figure 2 
Intraday Abnormal Short Selling 
Abnormal short selling is the percentage difference between the average 
daily shares sold short during 30-minute pre, post and event periods and the 
average daily number of shares sold short during the estimation period 
 
The relative short selling levels, as with the daily examination, remain relatively constant 
throughout the halt day, ranging from 0.203 in period -7 to 0.288 in period +5. The constancy of 
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the relative short selling ratio suggests that elevated short selling levels are accompanied by 
corresponding increases in trading volume. To explore further, we plot both short selling and 
trading volume for our sample firms across the halt day. The graphic produced, Figure 3, depicts 
a contemporaneous increase in both trading and short selling volume immediately preceding the 
halt, peaking upon the continuation of trading and remaining elevated for several periods post-
halt. This pattern coincides with significant increases in trading volume reported by Christie et 
al. (2002) one period preceding and several periods following the resumption of trade for a 
sample of NASDAQ firms experiencing a trading halt. 
 
Figure 3 
Halt Day Trading and Short Selling Volume 
 
The results of our empirical investigation do not provide solid support for Hypothesis 1. 
Although an increase in each of the metrics we used to describe short seller behavior was 
anticipated during the pre-halt period, we found instead, at the daily level, that short selling 
activity did not increase substantially prior to the implementation of a trading halt. Our intraday 
examination provides evidence of only a modest increase in short selling immediately preceding 
an interruption in trading. 
-
200,000 
400,000 
600,000 
800,000 
1,000,000 
1,200,000 
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Sh
ar
e
s
30-Minute Periods Relative to Trading Halt
Halt Day Trading and Short Selling Volume Per Period
Short Selling Volume
Trading Volume
38 
 
However, it does appear that short sellers significantly modify their behavior surrounding 
trading halts, as each of our short metrics, with the exception of relative short selling, 
demonstrates substantial increases on the event day, upon the resumption of trading. Support is 
provided for Hypothesis 2; average trade size, number of trades and volume for short 
transactions, short interest ratio and abnormal short selling all decrease markedly in the post-
event period. 
 
Daily Return Behavior 
We next turn our investigation to the price behavior of stocks experiencing a trading halt 
by examining daily post-halt prices and subsequent returns. To help quantify the impact of short 
selling, we sort sample halts into quintiles according to mean pre-halt abnormal short selling 
(ABSS) and abnormal relative short selling (ABRELSS) levels. Abnormal relative short selling 
is calculated by subtracting the estimation period relative short selling from the relative short 
selling in the pre-halt period. We examine and report, in Table 6,  daily mean and median post-
announcement returns (each stock’s two-day percentage return following the trading halt, 
measured from the close of the day preceding the halt day to the close of the following day) for 
the highest and lowest quintiles (following Christophe et al. 2004). 
Our hypothesis concerning the return earned by sample firms surrounding interruptions in 
trading states that: 
 
H3: Halted stocks with high levels of short selling will experience a larger decline in price 
surrounding a trading halt as compared to halted stocks with lower short selling 
activity. 
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We find that the median and mean returns for the high and low quintiles determined by 
abnormal relative short selling levels are similar in sign (both positive) and magnitude. This 
result is consistent with Lee et al. (1994), who report a positive mean and median return for the 
halted firm as compared to a pseudo halt period (a corresponding trading period on a nonhalt 
day). The mean return differs by only 1.1 percent and median returns are nearly identical at 5.07 
and 5.10 percent for the lowest and highest short selling quintiles respectively. This result is not 
surprising, as our examination of relative short selling through the sample period and on the 
event day finds this metric to be relatively stable.  
However, we find that the post-halt returns for firms in the highest abnormal short selling 
quintile is a positive value of approximately two percent, as compared to a negative return of 
2.56 percent for those firms with the lowest abnormal short selling levels. For the median return, 
both groups demonstrate positive values, but the return for firms with the highest short selling 
levels is more than double that of the lowest short selling category.  
Table 6  
Post-halt Daily Returns  
Sample halts are sorted into quintiles according to mean pre-halt abnormal short selling and 
abnormal relative short selling levels. Mean and median post-announcement returns, each 
stock’s two-day percentage return following the trading halt, measured from the close of the day 
preceding the halt day to the close of the following day, are reported for the highest and lowest 
short-selling quintiles 
Short Selling Metric / Group Mean Return Median Return 
Abnormal Short Selling   
Low Short Selling -0.0256 0.0044 
High Short Selling 0.0199 0.0108 
Abnormal Relative Short Selling   
Low Short Selling 0.0448 0.0507 
High Short Selling 0.0335 0.0510 
 
To further test the association between high levels of short selling in the pre-event period 
and post-halt stock returns, we perform a non-parametric Chi-square test. For each of our 
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abnormal short selling metrics, ABSS and ABRELSS, we split the sample into two groups, the 
highest quintile of each measure for days -5 thru -1, and all other sample halts. We then examine 
how these groups are distributed across three categories of return from closing day -1 to +1. If 
short selling is randomly dispersed the halts should have the following distribution: 20 percent in 
the low return quintile, 20 percent in the high return quintile and 60 percent in the moderate 
return quintile (following Dechow et al., 2001; and Christophe et al., 2004). Accordingly, with 
77 trading halt observations, 15 observations each (approximately 19 percent) should fall into the 
low and high return categories, and the remaining 47 observations (≈ 61 percent) should be 
designated as moderate.  
Table 7 presents these findings, with quintiles established according to ABSS and 
RELABSS levels presented in Panel A and Panel B respectively. We find that the highest short-
selling quintile for ABSS has the anticipated 20 percent of its observations in the low return 
category. However, nearly 27 percent of the halts in the highest short-selling quintile are 
associated with high returns – this result coincides with our findings from Table 6 (positive 
returns for high short selling stocks) and suggests that stocks with the highest levels of pre-halt 
abnormal short selling have higher post-halt returns. The other short-selling quintile category 
demonstrates a distribution that is in line with expected values.  
When categorizing the stock according to levels of ABRELSS, we see a more 
pronounced shift of the high short-selling stocks (40 percent) into the high return category with 
the remaining short selling quintiles demonstrating a pattern similar to the expected values. The 
ABRELSS Chi-Square test produces a X
2
 statistic that is significant at the 10 percent level, 
which allows us to reject the null hypothesis of independence between short selling and post-
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announcement returns. However, because of the small sample size (over one third of the cells 
have expected counts with less than 5 observations), the Chi-Square test may not be valid. 
Table 7  
Daily Chi-Square Test  
Samples halts are divided, using Abnormal Short selling and Relative Abnormal Short Selling, 
into two groups, the highest quintile of each measure for the five days preceding the halt and all 
other sample halts. This test examines how these groups are distributed across three categories of 
return on stock from closing day -1 to +1.  
  Return Quintiles  
  
Low 
Return 
Moderate 
Return 
High 
Return 
Total 
Sample Observations  15 47 15 77 
Expected Percent  19.48% 61.04% 19.48% 100% 
Panel A: Abnormal Short Selling, ABBS(-5,-1) 
Highest Short Selling Quintile     
 Observations 3 8 4 15 
 Percentage 20.00% 53.33% 26.67% 100% 
Other Short Selling Quintiles    
 Observations 12 39 11 62 
 Percentage 19.35% 62.90% 17.74% 100% 
    X
2 
statistic 0.6776 
    Probability 0.7126 
Panel B: Abnormal Relative Short Selling, ABRELSS(-5,-1) 
Highest Short Selling Quintile     
 Observations 2 7 6 15 
 Percentage 13.33% 46.67% 40.00% 100% 
Other Short Selling Quintiles     
 Observations 13 40 9 62 
 Percentage 20.97% 64.52% 14.52% 100% 
    X
2 
statistic 5.0182 
    Probability 0.0813 * 
33% of cells have expected counts < 5. Chi-Square test may not be valid 
* indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
Intraday Return Behavior 
We repeat our price behavior tests on an intraday basis. For each of four 30-minute pre-
event periods, we sort the firms into quintiles according to preannouncement abnormal short 
selling (ABSS) and abnormal relative short selling (ABRELSS) and examine mean post-
announcement returns for the highest and lowest quintile. We examine three different intraday 
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returns: 1) the close of the period preceding the halt to the reopen, 2) the reopen to the close of 
the period following resumption of trading, and 3) the period spanning the halt from the close of 
the period prior to the halt to the close of the period following the halt. Return values are 
reported only for stocks in the lowest and highest short selling quintiles.  
 
The return data, shown in Table 8, categorized by abnormal short selling indicates that 
for the halt period (Return 1), both the highest and lowest short selling quintiles experience 
positive returns, with the high short-selling stocks earning the highest gains (1.12 percent). This 
result is consistent with Corwin and Lipson (2000), who find that a majority of firms 
experiencing a trading halt have a positive price change from the last trade prior to the halt to the 
reopening price. 
Immediately following the resumption of trading (Return 2), firms in both short-selling 
quintiles demonstrate negative returns, with a larger negative impact noted for the highest short 
selling quintile (-1.37 percent). The overall halt return (Return 3) for both groups is modest; the 
lowest short-selling firms earn a positive .23 percent while the highest short-selling firms earn a 
negative .27 percent return.  
These results suggest that that the price reaction to the trading halts is greater in 
magnitude for the firms with high levels of short activity and that the negative reaction on the 
part of market participants appears to be incorporated into prices only after trading resumes. 
When we examine the returns for firms classified according to levels of relative abnormal 
short selling, a different picture emerges. For the low short-selling quintile, the return in each of 
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the periods is negative (ranging from -0.36 percent to -1.7 percent), while the high short-selling 
quintile demonstrates consistently positive returns.  
Table 8 
Intraday Post-halt Returns  
Firms are divided into quintiles according to preannouncement abnormal short selling and 
abnormal relative short selling for four 30-minute pre-event periods. Return1 is from the close of 
the period preceding the halt to the reopen, Return2 is from the reopen to the close of the period 
following the resumption of trading, and Return3 is from the close of the period prior to the halt 
to the close of the period following the halt. Return values are reported only for stocks in the 
lowest and highest short selling quintiles. 
N = 10 or 11 halts per quintile 
 Mean Return1 Mean Return2 Mean Return3 
Abnormal Short Selling    
Low Short-Selling Quintile 0.0069 -0.0046 0.0023 
High Short-Selling Quintile 0.0112 -0.0137 -0.0027 
Abnormal Relative Short Selling    
Low Short-Selling Quintile -0.0036 -0.0150 -0.0170 
High Short-Selling Quintile 0.0068 0.0028 0.0094 
 
We repeat the Chi-square test at the intraday level to determine the relation between high 
levels of abnormal short selling (ABSS-5,-1) in the pre-event period and post-halt stock returns 
(Table 9). For Return 1, which targets the change in price over the halt period, 40 percent of the 
high short-selling firms report elevated returns. This shift of firms into the high return category 
coincides with the positive return of 1.12 percent reported in Table 8. Return 2, which is earned 
between the resumption of trading and the close of day +1, demonstrates, for the high short-
selling quintile, a substantial increase, to 30 percent, in the number of firms categorized with low 
returns. Again, this finding adds support to the values reported in Table 8, in which the prices of 
high short selling firms decline 1.37 percent. The overall return, Return 3, has a perfectly 
expected distribution, indicating that the overall price impact from the trading halt is not 
significantly impacted by abnormal short selling levels. For each of our return categories, the 
distribution of the other quintile firms approximates the expected values. 
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Table 9 
Intraday Chi-Square Test  
Samples halts are divided, using Abnormal Short selling into two groups, the highest quintile of 
short selling for the five days preceding the halt and all other sample halts. This test examines 
how these groups are distributed across three categories of returns:  Return1 is from the close of 
the period preceding the halt to the reopen, Return2 is from the reopen to the close of the period 
following the resumption of trading, and Return3 is from the close of the period prior to the halt 
to the close of the period following the halt.  
  Return Quintiles  
  Low Return Moderate 
Return 
High Return Total 
Sample Observations  10 32 10 52 
Expected Percent  19.23% 61.54% 19.23% 100% 
Panel A: Return1 
Highest Short Selling Quintile    
 Observations 1 5 4 10 
 Percentage 10% 50% 40% 100% 
Other Short Selling Quintiles    
 Observations 9 27 6 42 
 Percentage 21.43% 64.29% 14.29% 100% 
    X
2 
statistic 3.59 
    Probability 0.1658 
Panel B: Return2 
Highest Short Selling Quintile    
 Observations 3 6 1 10 
 Percentage 30.00% 60.00% 10.00% 100% 
Other Short Selling Quintiles    
 Observations 7 26 9 42 
 Percentage 16.67% 61.90% 21.43% 100% 
    X
2 
statistic 1.30 
    Probability 0.5220 
Panel C: Return3 
Highest Short Selling Quintile    
 Observations 2 6 2 10 
 Percentage 20.00% 60.00% 20.00% 100% 
Other Short Selling Quintiles    
 Observations 8 26 8 42 
 Percentage 23.81% 59.52% 16.67% 100% 
    X
2 
statistic 3.2717 
    Probability 0.1948 
33% of cells have expected counts < 5. Chi-Square test may not be valid 
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Diether et al. (2009B) provide insight into this return pattern: a sizeable negative return in 
the immediate 30-minute post-halt period and a positive average daily post-halt return. These 
researchers suggest that if short sellers increase their activity to provide liquidity at times when 
buyers are willing to pay a premium for immediacy, then after an initial negative reaction, stock 
prices will revert to normal levels when the buying pressure diminishes. Alternatively, if an 
increased level of shorting activity is in response to liquidity demands in periods of heightened 
uncertainty, due to either divergent opinions or informed trading, prices will return to normal 
levels when the cause of the uncertainty is resolved.  
Hypothesis 3 states that halted stocks with higher levels of short selling will experience a 
larger decline in price surrounding a trading halt as compared to halted stocks without a 
significant level of short selling. At the daily level, however, we find evidence of the opposite 
effect – firms with higher shorting activity earn higher gains than do halted firms with lower short 
selling levels. On an intraday basis, our findings suggest that firms with elevated levels of 
shorting experience larger positive gains during the halt period and a substantial price decrease 
immediately after trading resumes.  
 
Speed of Price Adjustment 
Short selling and trading halts both have the potential to convey information to market 
participants, and thus affect the price discovery process. Accordingly, we investigate the rate at 
which the price of our sample firms’ stock adjusts under the combined impact of these trading 
activities. 
Our hypothesis concerning the impact of short selling on stock prices surrounding trading 
halts states: 
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H4: Halted stocks with high levels of short selling will experience more rapid adjustments 
in price surrounding trading halts as compared to halted stocks with lower short selling 
activity. 
 
To measure the impact of trading halts on the speed of price adjustment (SOAdj) we 
follow the methodology of Hauser et al. (2006) and calculate: 
 
       
         
          
          (3) 
 
Where:  CR(-10,T) is the cumulative return starting ten intervals before trading halts are 
implemented to interval T, where T = -10, -9, … 10. Each interval is five minutes long. CR(-10,10) 
is the cumulative return over an approximate two-hour window.  
We first present the speed of price adjustment for all firms on the halt day as compared to 
the same relative 5-minute periods during the estimation period (Figure 4 Panel A). There is a 
discernible difference – during the estimation period, the speed of price adjustment is uniform 
throughout the twenty-one periods. On the halt day, in contrast, there is a sharp increase in the 
speed of price adjustment immediately following the resumption of trading, particularly in period 
+1. This finding coincides with results reported by Hauser et al. (2006) that the majority of price 
change occurs in the first ten minutes following the resumption of trading. 
The speed of adjustment test is repeated, for both the halt day (Panel B) and over the 
estimation period (Panel C), with the additional step of separating firms into terciles according to 
halt-day abnormal short selling levels. For the estimation period, there is no difference in the 
speed of price adjustment for high and low short-selling firms. On the halt day, we note that the 
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stocks with the lowest short selling levels evidence a gradual increase in the speed of price 
adjustment starting several periods before the halt with a noticeable increase immediately 
following trade resumption. However, the high short-selling stocks demonstrate a larger 
proportion of their price response in period +1, immediately following the resumption of trading.  
  
Panel A: Halt Day and Estimation Period Price 
Adjustment 
Panel B: Halt Day Speed Adjustement by 
Short Selling Levels 
  
Panel C: Estimation Period Adjustement by Short 
Selling Levels 
Panel D: Difference in Adjustement by Short 
Selling Levels 
Figure 4 
Speed of Price Adjustment 
Speed of price adjustment is calculated on the halt and estimation period for ten five-minute 
intervals before trading halts are implemented and following the resumption of trading. Price 
adjustment speeds and differences between halt and estimation period values are also reported for 
the highest and lowest short selling quintiles, as determined by halt-day abnormal short selling 
levels.  
 
To examine further the difference in behavior between categories of firms by short 
selling, we calculate the difference in the speed of price adjustment for each group against a 
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benchmark that assumes 4.76 percent of the price change occurs in each 5-minute period (100 
percent / 21 periods). These results, shown in Figure 4 Panel D, suggest that stocks with high 
levels of short selling demonstrate a larger increase in price adjustment than do stocks in the 
lowest short selling group (23 percent as compared to 15 percent) in the periods immediately 
following the resumption of trading.   
 
Weighted Price Contribution 
To investigate further the price discovery process for halted stocks, we identify the 
cumulative price change at the daily and intraday level in each sample interval (pre-halt, halt, 
post-halt) by calculating the weighted price contribution estimate, following Madura et al. 2006: 
 
       
     
      
 
   
   
     
   
           (4) 
 
Where: i є each interval (pre-halt, halt, post-halt) and       is the price change over 
interval i for halt j. 
As presented in Table 10, nearly 60 percent of the price contribution at the daily level 
occurs on the halt day, with 28 percent occurring in the 5 days preceding the halt and only 11 
percent in the post-halt period. This finding indicates that, although a significant price reaction 
occurs prior to the trading halt event, the majority of the market’s reaction is confined to the halt 
day. Our results are similar to those of Madura et al. (2006), who report the majority of price 
change in the halt period (≈ 79 percent) and the least amount of price change in the post halt 
period in their examination of NASDAQ trading halts. 
 
49 
 
Table 10  
Weighted Price Contribution 
Cumulative price change is calculated at the daily and intraday level in each sample interval 
(pre-halt, halt, post-halt) by calculating the weighted price contribution estimate:     
  
     
      
 
   
   
     
   
      where: i є each interval (pre-halt, halt, post-halt) and       is the price 
change over interval i for halt j. Intraday periods are five minutes in length and are measured 
prior to the halt and following the resumption of trading. Halts are divided into quintiles (daily) 
and terciles (intraday) according to pre-halt abnormal short selling levels; cumulative price 
change is reported for stocks in the highest and lowest tercile. 
 Pre-Halt(-5,-1) Halt(0) Post-Halt(1,5) 
Panel A: Daily 
All Halts (N = 78) 0.2807 3.59*** 0.5968 5.42*** 0.1143 1.35 
High Short Selling Quintile 
(N = 15) 
0.1159 1.03 0.7579 3.13*** 0.1261 0.97 
Low Short Selling Quintile 
(N = 15) 
0.5202  3.57*** 0.7114 1.5 -0.2768 -0.84 
Panel B: Intraday 
All Halts (N = 29) 0.0514 2.02* 0.4591 2.27** 0.4896 3.36*** 
High Short Selling Tercile 
(N = 11) 
0.0307 0.73 0.0853 0.71 0.8841 3.17** 
Low Short Selling Tercile 
(N = 9) 
0.0586 1.16 0.6557 1.41 0.2857 2.70** 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. 
 
When we categorize daily weighted price contribution according to pre-halt abnormal 
short selling levels, we find that the majority of price change occurs on the halt day for both the 
highest and lowest short selling quintiles. However, the lowest short selling quintile 
demonstrates a significant positive price contribution in the pre-halt period and a negative 
contribution following the resumption of trading. This finding corroborates earlier findings of a 
negative mean post-announcement return (from day 0 to +1) for firms with low short selling 
levels (Table 6). 
 When we concentrate our examination of price contribution to the event day, we find 
that only five percent of price adjustment occurs in the five, five-minute periods immediately 
before the trading halt is implemented. The remaining price contribution is split between the halt 
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period and the five periods following the resumption of trading. Segmenting our results 
according to short selling levels confirms that only a small percentage of price contribution, three 
to six percent, occurs directly preceding the trading halts. However, it appears that price behavior 
is much different between firms with high and low levels of short selling. The majority, 88 
percent, of price change for firms in the highest short selling tercile occurs in the post-halt 
period. For firms in the lowest short selling tercile, the largest price contribution, 66 percent, 
transpires while trading is halted.  
Hypothesis 4 states that halted firms with high short selling will experience a more rapid 
adjustment in price prior to a trading halt as compared to halted stocks without a significant level 
of short selling. Our results, from both the speed of price adjustment and weighted price 
contribution tests suggest that effect of the trading halt on equity prices is more pronounced 
following the resumption of trading, not before the halt is implemented. However, both tests 
indicate a discernible difference between firms according to short selling activity; a larger price 
impact is reported in the post-halt period for stocks with the highest shorting levels. 
 
Volatility 
To explore the relation between trading halts and short selling activity, we examine, on 
both the daily and intraday level, price volatility surrounding interruptions in trading.  
Our hypothesis concerning the effect of short selling on price volatility for firms 
experiencing a trading halt is: 
H5: Halted stocks with high levels of short selling will have lower price volatility upon 
resumption of trade and their reopening prices will be better predictors of future prices 
as compared to halted stocks with lower short selling activity. 
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Following the methodology of Diether et al. (2009A), we calculate daily volatility 
measures for the pre-halt period (days -5 through -1), the halt day (day 0), and a post-halt period 
(days +1 through +5). CRSP data is used to determine a daily mean transaction price range 
[(high price – low price)/ high price] and close-to-close volatility (by squaring the absolute daily 
return). TAQ data is used to calculate a daily quote range [(high quote – low quote) / high quote] 
as well as close-to-close and open-to-close volatility using absolute squared return. The 
difference between the pre and post measures for each of these metrics is the coefficient obtained 
by regressing each volatility measure on a post-halt period dummy variable (which equals one 
for observations during the five-day post-halt period); the difference is tested to determine if it is 
significantly different from zero. We repeat each test, after dividing our sample halts into 
quintiles according to levels of abnormal short selling. Results are reported in Table 11 – Panel 
A and Panel B for CRSP and TAQ data respectively. 
 
 
Table 11  
Daily Mean Volatility Measures 
Daily volatility measures are calculated for the pre-halt period (days -5 through -1), the halt day (day 0), 
and a post-halt period (days +1 through +5). CRSP data is used to determine a daily mean transaction 
price range [(high price – low price)/ high price] and close-to-close volatility (by squaring the absolute 
daily return). TAQ data is used to calculate a daily quote range [(high quote – low quote) / high quote] 
and close-to-close and open-to-close volatility using absolute squared return. The difference between the 
pre and post measures for each of these metrics is the coefficient obtained by regressing each volatility 
measure on a post-halt period dummy variable, which equals one for observations during the five-day 
post-halt period. The difference is tested to determine if it is significantly different from zero, t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. After dividing our sample halts into quintiles according to levels of abnormal 
short selling, we repeat each test and report values for the highest and lowest short-selling quintiles. 
Panel A: CRSP Data 
Periods/Volatility Metric Pre(-5,-1) Event(0) Post(1,5) Difference Difference N = 
All Halts (N = 78) 
Transaction Price Range 2.5988 7.8411 3.0990 0.4952 (3.14) *** 947 
Volatility (Close to Close) 0.0009 0.0110 0.0016 0.0007 (1.71) * 948 
By Short Selling (N = 15 Halts per Quintile) 
Low Short-Selling Quintile       
Transaction Price Range 2.0370 5.3540 2.4200 0.3826 (1.39) 180 
Volatility (Close to Close) 0.0004 0.0060 0.0010 0.0001 (0.95) 180 
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High Short-Selling Quintile 
Transaction Price Range 2.4690 11.092 3.1770 0.7088 (2.96) *** 180 
Volatility (Close to Close) 0.0003 0.0115 0.0010 0.0006 (1.72) * 180 
Panel B: TAQ Data  
All Halts (N = 78)  
Quote Range 10.99 15.39 11.29 0.3050 (0.7) 936 
Volatility (Open to Close) 0.0005 0.0091 0.0008 0.0003 (1.73)* 923 
Volatility (Close to Close) 0.0006 0.0100 0.0012 0.0006 (2.41)** 923 
By Short Selling (N = 15 Halts per Quintile) 
Low Short-Selling Quintile       
Quote Range 8.19 11.04 8.15 -0.0430 (-0.05) 180 
Volatility (Open to Close) 0.0003 0.0036 0.0005 0.0001 (0.86) 167 
Volatility (Close to Close) 0.0010 0.0059 0.0007 0.0001 (0.41) 167 
High Short-Selling Quintile       
Quote Range 13.44 20.16 13.08 -0.3617 (-0.41) 180 
Volatility (Open to Close) 0.0003 0.0124 0.0007 0.0004 (1.71)* 180 
Volatility (Close to Close) 0.0003 0.0112 0.0008 0.0005 (1.43) 180 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. 
 
At the daily level, the transaction price range of 7.84 is substantially higher on the event 
day, as compared to either the pre or the post-event period values of 2.59 and 3.09. The 
difference value of 0.4952 indicates that price variance in the post-halt period is significantly 
higher, at the one percent level, than during the five days preceding the halt.  
When segmented according to short selling levels, the transaction price range is less in all 
three periods for the lowest short selling quintile as compared to values for all halts. The 
difference variable is not significant, suggesting there is not a measureable difference in 
transaction price range between the pre and post period for stocks in the lowest short-selling 
quintile. In contrast, the transaction price range is relatively larger in each period for the highest 
short selling stocks – increasing to 11.092 on the event day, with a large difference variable 
(0.7088). These results suggest a positive relation between pre-halt short selling and price 
movement throughout the event period. In contrast to our hypothesized relation, it appears that a 
high level of pre-halt short selling appears to increased post-halt price volatility. 
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A similar pattern, for all halts and for both short selling categories, is identified with 
close-to-close volatility: a sharp increase on the halt day and a reduction in the days following, 
with post-halt values exceeding pre-halt values. The difference variable is statistically significant 
for all firms and for high short-selling firms at the ten percent level; volatility appears mitigated 
for stocks with low levels of short activity. 
These results indicate that price variance for all sample firms increases substantially on 
the halt day, then decrease considerably but remain elevated from pre-halt levels during the post-
halt period. This effect appears to be stronger for firms with higher levels of short selling, 
suggesting that short selling activity translates into heightened price variability. 
TAQ data is used to calculate daily quote ranges and open-to-close and close-to-close 
volatility measurements (reported in Panel B). A substantial increase in the quote range (15.39) 
is reported for all firms on the halt day; however, the pre and post halt quote range values are 
similar in magnitude and the difference between them is not statistically different from zero. A 
similar pattern is noted after segmenting halts according to short selling levels – high halt day 
values, with quote ranges lower following the resumption of trading and insignificant differences 
between the pre and post periods. However, the quote range during the event day for the highest 
short selling stocks is nearly twice the quote range for the lowest quintile, and corresponding 
quote range values are substantially higher during the pre and post halt periods. 
Both volatility metrics demonstrate heightened levels on the event day, with open to close 
volatility increasing by a factor of ten over both the pre and post halt periods. The difference 
between the pre and post halt period is significant and positive. This result coincides with 
Christie et al. (2002), who find that volatility increases to more than nine times normal levels for 
NASDAQ halts that reopen after a five-minute quotation period. 
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When differentiating according to levels of short selling, volatility remains highest on the 
halt day, but a significant difference remains only for open-to-close volatility for firms with the 
highest levels of short selling. These findings coincide with our earlier results and suggest that 
short selling activity surrounding trading halts positively impacts price variability. 
At the intraday level, we use TAQ data to calculate median and abnormal measures (as 
compared to the estimation period) for volume, number of quote revisions, absolute return and 
transaction price range during the four 30-minute periods preceding the halt and following the 
resumption of trading (following Corwin and Lipson, 2000). Significance is determined using the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which allows us to compare measurements on our sample without 
relying on an assumption of normality. 
The results of these tests, presented in Table 12, indicate significant increases in 
abnormal volume, the number of quote revisions and transactional price range in the four 30-
minute periods preceding trading interruptions. More pronounced increases are noted in the post-
halt periods, where most median values double and each of the abnormal metrics increases 100 – 
300 times their corresponding estimation period values.  
Table 12 
Mean Interval Intraday Volatility Measures 
TAQ data is used to calculate median and abnormal measures (as compared to the estimation 
period) for volume, number of quote revisions, absolute return and transaction price range during 
the four 30-minute periods preceding the halt and following the resumption of trading. Mean 
values are reported for the four 30-minute period preceding a trading halt (pre) and the four 30-
minute periods following resumption of trading (post). Significance is determined using the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Panel A: All Halts (78) 
Period Volume Quote Revisions Absolute Return Transaction Price Range 
 Median 
Pre(-4,-1) 35,000  416.5  0.2598  0.140  
Post(1,4) 71,550  539.0  0.5655  0.335  
 Abnormal Percentage 
Pre(-4,-1) 3.58   *** 5.97  *** -16.50  4.35  ** 
Post(1,4) 326.71  *** 104.50  *** 102.28  *** 186.27  *** 
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Panel B:  By short-selling levels (15 halts per quintile) 
Lowest Short-selling Quintile 
 Median 
Pre(-4,-1) 1,350  64  0.4491  0.100  
Post(1,4) 2,650  41  0.5102  0.210  
 Abnormal Percentage 
Pre(-4,-1) -24.10  -9.55  9.26  19.51  
Post(1,4) 162.75 *** 15.77 ** 63.58 *** 149.11 *** 
Highest Short-selling Quintile 
 Median 
Pre(-4,-1) 469,650  2232  0.4115  0.245  
Post(1,4) 1,285,800  3621  1.1645  0.600  
 Abnormal Percentage 
Pre(-4,-1) 82.37 *** 53.98 *** 28.18 *** 40.70 *** 
Post(1,4) 782.60 *** 233.32 *** 353.52 *** 393.29 *** 
*** and **  indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. 
 
Each of these measures, when computed by short selling levels, demonstrates (in Panel 
B) values that are more prominent for firms with high levels of short selling. Median and 
abnormal values are large and consistently significant across all metrics in the pre and post 
periods for firms with the highest levels of short selling. Volume is particularly impacted: 
median short volume in the post-halt period is over a million shares with trading levels 
representing 782 percent of normal levels.  
In contrast, firms with low levels of short selling show no significant abnormal values in 
the pre-halt period, and the median and abnormal values in the post-halt periods are smaller than 
corresponding values for firms with high short selling activity. These findings suggest that short 
selling has a distinct and measureable impact on volatility surrounding trading halts. 
We further decompose our examination of each of our volatility measures by 30-minute 
periods and report the results in Table 13 Panel A. It appears that the largest increase for each of 
these metrics occurs in the period immediately following the resumption of trading. Abnormal 
values range from 222 percent for quote revisions to over 950 percent for trading volume. Each 
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of these metrics remains elevated through the four post-halt periods examined. There is little 
evidence of a significant impact on these measures during the pre-halt periods.  
When categorized according to short selling levels (Table 13 Panel B), the difference 
between firms with high and low short-selling activity becomes quite evident. Firms in the high 
short-selling quintile have median and abnormal values that are larger in magnitude and are 
generally significant at a high level. Volatility levels upon resumption of trading for these firms 
demonstrate a monumental increase over pre-halt values and each of the measurements remain 
elevated through the four periods examined.  
Table 13 
Mean Period Intraday Volatility Measures 
TAQ data is used to calculate median and abnormal measures (as compared to the estimation 
period) for volume, number of quote revisions, absolute return and transaction price range during 
the four 30-minute periods preceding the halt and following the resumption of trading. Panel A 
presents findings for all halts; results for the highest and lowest quintiles according to levels of 
abnormal short selling are presented in Panel B. Significance is determined using the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test. 
Panel A: All Halts (78) 
Period Volume Quote Revisions Absolute Return Transaction Price Range 
 Median 
-4 34,800  497  0.3279  0.190  
-3 40,000  404  0.2192  0.125  
-2 27,600  400  0.2200  0.145  
-1 37,300  383  0.2575  0.140  
+1 174,400  987  2.1635  0.850  
+2 73,100  516  0.4438  0.310  
+3 56,100  481  0.4594  0.260  
+4 31,800  411  0.3867  0.200  
 Abnormal Percentage 
-4 -12.01  5.76  8.05  0.51  
-3 -4.68  * 5.44  -25.43  5.63  
-2 16.29  * 8.53  -19.79  -12.38  
-1 2.41  ** 6.95 ** -6.81  11.36 ** 
+1 950.06  *** 222.13 *** 483.04 *** 756.52 *** 
+2 372.08  *** 116.53 *** 53.78 *** 196.74 *** 
+3 162.37  *** 70.29 *** 64.68 *** 129.85 *** 
+4 106.66  *** 47.93 *** 20.41 ** 83.08 *** 
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Panel B:  By short-selling levels (15 halts per quintile) 
Lowest Short-selling Quintile 
 Median 
-4 1,300  116  0.9814  0.090  
-3 1,150  17  0.3617  0.100  
-2 1,350  56  0.2683  0.130  
-1 1,450  101  0.6045  0.090  
+1 6,250  62  0.8189  0.540  
+2 3,550  26  0.4119  0.110  
+3 1,050  42  0.3617  0.130  
+4 1,550  41  0.5024  0.185  
 Abnormal Percentage 
-4 -21.17  5.76  199.32  69.18  
-3 -38.15  -11.11  9.26  -6.07  
-2 56.89  -34.92  -32.81  -12.93  
-1 -1.22  -11.11  53.49  59.43  
+1 471.92 *** 143.16 ** 152.43 ** 1,126.99 *** 
+2 96.60 ** -8.38  15.45  27.16  
+3 41.82  6.93  67.18  86.99 * 
+4 120.79  22.53  69.10  172.32 *** 
Highest Short-selling Quintile 
 Median 
-4 505,500  2276  0.3098  0.260  
-3 527,550  2169  0.5376  0.275  
-2 429,000  2016  0.2462  0.195  
-1 470,400  2495  0.6388  0.310  
+1 3,986,750  6397  3.4341  1.246  
+2 1,214,200  3367  0.4555  0.420  
+3 1,057,300  2752  0.5747  0.370  
+4 1,128,200  2307  0.7648  0.300  
 Abnormal Percentage 
-4 39.46 ** 25.11 * 25.98  14.03  
-3 96.43 *** 40.38 *** 59.91 ** 47.32 *** 
-2 58.40 *** 46.47 *** -9.63  28.25 * 
-1 199.10 *** 92.70 *** 156.15 *** 216.74 *** 
+1 2,012.91 *** 532.47 *** 1,347.97 *** 1,068.83 *** 
+2 905.34 *** 274.85 *** 65.62 ** 258.00 *** 
+3 429.02 *** 166.84 *** 170.83 *** 178.69 *** 
+4 476.33 *** 145.14 *** 154.04 * 181.38 ** 
*** and **  indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. 
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A significant increase is noted for the low short-selling firms for each metric during the 
period when trading resumes. However, few significant values are noted outside period +1, and 
the magnitude of the median and abnormal values are generally less than for firms in the high 
short selling quintile. In addition, high short-selling firms demonstrate a considerable impact in 
the pre-halt periods; firms in the lowest short-selling category fail to evidence a pre-halt effect. 
Figure 5 graphs values for each volatility dimension, for all halts and for the high and low 
short selling quintiles. This representation confirms the disparity both between the pre and post 
halt periods, and between the behaviors of firms based on their short-selling activity. It also 
demonstrates that volatility levels at the resumption of trading are substantially larger for high 
short selling stocks, suggesting less efficient reopening prices for these firms.  
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Figure 5 
Intraday Volatility Measures  
TAQ data is used to calculate median and abnormal measures (as compared to the estimation 
period) for volume, number of quote revisions, absolute return and transaction price range during 
the four 30-minute periods preceding the halt and following the resumption of trading. Results are 
reported for all halts, and for the highest and lowest quintiles of halts as determined by halt-day 
levels of abnormal short selling. 
 
Hypothesis 5, which suggests that halted stocks with high short-selling levels will have 
lower price volatility and more efficient reopening prices, is not supported by our findings. 
Instead, we find that sample firms have increased volatility in the post-halt period and that 
reopening prices are less efficient. Short selling activity appears to increase instead of decrease 
volatility levels surrounding a halt in trading. 
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Spreads 
To clarify the combined effect of short selling and trading halts on the bid-ask spread, we 
examine mean and median dollar spreads at several intervals preceding the halt and following the 
resumption of trading. 
Our hypothesis concerning the impact of short selling on spreads surrounding trading 
halts purports that: 
H6: Halted stocks with high levels of short selling will have lower spreads upon resumption 
of trading as compared to halted stocks with lower short selling activity. 
 
To compare halt-day values to the values expected during non-halt trading periods, we 
compute spreads using three different intervals: 30 minutes, 1 minute, and 15 seconds (following 
Corwin and Lipson, 2000). When we examine the 30-minute pre and post periods, we find, 
shown in Figure 6, that for both the mean and median spread, values in the pre-halt period are 
nearly identical to estimation period values. However, during the halt period, the spread more 
than triples; spreads remain elevated one period after the resumption of trading before reverting 
to normal levels.  
  
Figure 6 
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Halt and Estimation Period Mean and Median Spreads 
Mean and median spreads are computed for 30-minute periods preceding the interruption of 
trading and following the resumption of trading on the halt day and during corresponding periods 
in the estimation period. 
 
We categorize firms into quintiles according to abnormal short selling levels and repeat 
our examination for 30-minute periods. Our findings, presented in Figure 7, suggest that for 
firms with low levels of sort selling, spreads are measurably elevated in pre-halt periods -4 
through -2. The spreads for these firms decrease immediately prior to the halt and remain at a 
relatively stable level during the remainder of the examination period. Firms in the high short 
selling quintile, however, demonstrate small spreads prior to the halt in trading, a dramatic 
increase during the halt period and a reduction immediately after trading resumes. 
  
Figure 7 
Mean Intraday Spreads: 30-Minute Periods 
Mean and median spreads are computed for 30-minute periods preceding the interruption of 
trading and following the resumption of trading. Results are reported for firms in the highest and 
lowest quintiles of short selling according to halt-day abnormal short selling levels 
 
Spreads are then examined for all halted stocks at one-minute (Figure 8 Panel A) and 15-
second intervals (Figure 8 Panel B). We find that spreads are relatively stable leading up to the 
halt - they show a modest increase during the periods immediately preceding the break in 
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trading, a sharp increase during the halt period, and a gradual reduction during the post-halt 
periods. Spreads are near estimation period levels twenty minutes after the resumption of trade. 
 
Panel A: 1-minute Spreads 
 
Panel B: 15-Second Spreads 
Figure 8 
Mean Intraday Spreads: 1-Minute and 15-Second Periods 
Mean and median spreads are computed for 1-minute (Panel A) and 15-second (Panel B) 
periods preceding the interruption of trading and following the resumption of trading on the halt 
day and during corresponding periods in the estimation period.  
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Evaluating 1-minute and 15-second spreads according to short selling levels again 
demonstrates an observable difference in the spreads of high versus low short selling firms 
(Figure 9). The spreads for all firms and firms categorized by short selling levels vacillate around 
the 8 – 14 cent range in the pre-halt examination period. However, upon the reopening of trade, 
the spread for stocks in the high short-selling quintile increases to over 60 cents, then quickly 
declines, converging to a normal level in two to three minutes. For stocks classified with low 
short selling levels, the reopening spread is approximately 15 cents. The reaction on the part of 
these stocks appears delayed, occurring several periods after the resumption of trade, and spreads 
remain higher than for other stocks during the post-halt periods examined. 
 
Panel A: 1-minute Spreads 
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Panel B: 15-Second Spreads 
Figure 9 
Mean Intraday Spreads by Short Selling Levels 
Mean and median spreads are computed for 1-minute (Panel A) and 15-second (Panel B) 
periods preceding the interruption of trading and following the resumption of trading on the halt 
day. Halts are then categorized according to halt-day abnormal short selling levels, and results 
are reported for all halts, and the highest and lowest short-selling quintiles. 
 
We calculate the difference between the mean spread on the halt day and the estimation 
period for each pre and post halt period for all stocks and by short-selling levels. These results 
are reported in Table 14 (30-minute periods), Figure 10 (1-minute and 15-second periods) and 
Table 15 (15-second periods).  
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Panel A: 1-minute Spreads 
 
Panel B: 15-Second Spreads 
Figure 10 
Differences in Spreads by Short Selling Levels 
Differences in mean spreads are computed for one minute (Panel A)  and 15-second (Panel B) 
periods between halt day means period spreads and and corresponding mean values for each 
period during the estimation interval. 
 
We find that the difference in spreads is positive and significant in the period 
immediately preceding the halt for all stocks during the 30-minute periods (Table 14). However, 
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the most dramatic change occurs during the halt period, with the spread difference increasing 
from 0.04 to 0.50. The spread difference drops to 0.08 in the second post-halt period; the spread 
difference remains positive throughout the remainder of the post-halt periods examined.  
Table 14  
Spread Differences: 30-Minute Periods 
For all stocks and by short-selling levels, the difference between the mean spread on the halt 
day and the estimation period is calculated for each 30-minute period. Results are reported for 
only the highest and lowest short selling quintiles, as established by halt-day abnormal short 
selling levels. Differences are tested to determine if they are statistically difference than zero. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses.  
Period All Halts High Short Selling Low Short Selling 
-4 0.02 (1.27) 0.00 (-0.37) 0.10 (0.94) 
-3 0.01 (0.38) 0.00 (0.19) 0.02 (0.18) 
-2 0.03 (1.59) 0.01 (0.94) 0.09 (0.98) 
-1 0.04 (3.75) *** 0.03 (2.64) ** 0.07 (2.46) ** 
Halt 0.50 (6.99) *** 0.53 (4.15) *** 0.43 (1.61) 
+1 0.08 (7.01) *** 0.06 (3.31) *** 0.09 (2.74) ** 
+2 0.03 (2.94) *** 0.03 (2.00) * 0.01 (0.18) 
+3 0.02 (2.73) *** 0.01 (1.34) 0.01 (0.21) 
+4 0.03 (2.62) ** 0.03 (1.59) 0.01 (0.42) 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. 
 
When we examine the difference in means for the 30-minute periods according to short 
selling levels, the differences, for the high short selling quintile, are positive and significant for 
periods -1 through +2, with a spread difference of 0.53 during the halt period. In contrast, stocks 
in the lowest sort selling quintile are significant only in periods -1 and +1. 
The difference values, shown in Table 15, for all halts by 15-second periods suggest that 
an increase in spreads begins five periods before trading is halted (75 seconds) with a measurable 
increase in period -1. Spread differences remain elevated for the twenty post-halt periods 
examined.  
The high and low short selling groups both demonstrate an increase in spread difference 
in period -1 (immediately preceding the cessation of trading), elevated values during the halt 
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period, and reduction of spread differences in the post-halt periods. However, the difference 
value for high short selling stocks is quite large in period +1, and each of the difference values 
are larger than corresponding values for low short selling stocks for periods 0 through +4. Figure 
10 displays this pattern for both the one-minute (Panel A) and 15-second (Panel B) examination 
periods. 
We hypothesize that stocks with high levels of short selling will have lower spreads upon 
resumption of trade as compared to halted stocks without a significant level of short selling. Our 
findings suggest however that for all halted firms in our sample, spreads increase dramatically 
during the interruption in trading and they remain elevated following the resumption in trading. 
When we differentiate our halts according to abnormal short selling, we find that short selling 
activity appears to increase the spread during the halt period, but that spreads seem to recover to 
anticipated levels more quickly.  
Table 15 
Spread Differences: 15-Second Periods 
For all stocks and by short-selling levels, the difference between the mean spread on the halt 
day and the estimation period is calculated for each 15-second period. Results are reported for 
only the highest and lowest short selling quintiles, as established by halt-day abnormal short 
selling levels. Differences are tested to determine if they are statistically difference than zero. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Period All Halts High Short Selling Low Short Selling 
-20 0.02 (1.16) 0.04 (1.96) * 0.05 (1.38) 
-19 0.05 (2.38) ** 0.02 (1.06) 0.12 (1.79) 
-18 0.06 (2.39) ** 0.03 (1.85) * 0.14 (2.10) * 
-17 0.06 (2.32) ** 0.01 (0.68) 0.12 (2.82) ** 
-16 0.01 (1.04) 0.02 (1.57) 0.04 (0.81) 
-15 0.08 (2.70) *** 0.05 (1.59) 0.07 (1.78) 
-14 0.06 (2.35) ** 0.05 (1.56) 0.08 (2.27) * 
-13 0.06 (2.28) ** 0.00 (0.08) 0.03 (0.54) 
-12 0.03 (1.25) 0.02 (0.69) 0.04 (0.92) 
-11 0.01 (0.36) 0.03 (1.17) -0.02 (-0.67) 
-10 0.02 (1.25) 0.05 (1.24) -0.01 (-0.34) 
-9 0.02 (0.96) 0.03 (0.71) 0.01 (0.16) 
-8 0.03 (1.41) 0.02 (0.81) 0.05 (1.04) 
-7 0.06 (1.98) * 0.02 (0.77) -0.02 (-2.61) * 
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-6 0.04 (1.49) 0.07 (1.84) * -0.03 (-0.54) 
-5 0.05 (2.39) ** 0.04 (1.29) 0.13 (1.08) 
-4 0.09 (2.49) ** 0.09 (1.7) 0.09 (1.60) 
-3 0.05 (1.88) * 0.05 (1.41) 0.16 (2.40) * 
-2 0.06 (1.76) * 0.06 (1.11) 0.07 (0.99) 
-1 0.19 (3.54) *** 0.10 (2.10) * 0.15 (0.82) 
Halt 0.50 (6.99) *** 0.53 (4.15) ***  0.43  (1.61) 
1 0.22 (5.65) *** 0.40 (2.95) ** 0.08 (1.27) 
2 0.19 (6.98) *** 0.20 (5.73) *** 0.13 (2.41) ** 
3 0.21 (8.09) *** 0.25 (6.25) *** 0.06 (2.84) ** 
4 0.18 (7.38) *** 0.15 (3.05) ** 0.10 (2.30) * 
5 0.15 (5.25) *** 0.12 (3.81) *** 0.19 (1.86) 
6 0.17 (7.37) *** 0.16 (5.50) *** 0.15 (3.39) ** 
7 0.13 (6.29) *** 0.13 (4.72) *** 0.11 (1.60) 
8 0.14 (5.71) *** 0.15 (2.88) ** 0.15 (2.29) * 
9 0.11 (5.15) *** 0.15 (2.46) ** 0.11 (2.53) ** 
10 0.13 (4.74) *** 0.17 (2.00) * 0.10 (1.58) 
11 0.11 (4.48) *** 0.16 (2.58) ** 0.04 (1.05) 
12 0.09 (3.56) *** 0.17 (2.25) ** -0.07 (-0.78) 
13 0.08 (3.77) *** 0.13 (1.90) * -0.01 (-0.20) 
14 0.15 (5.41) *** 0.18 (2.63) ** 0.13 (2.69) ** 
15 0.12 (5.57) *** 0.12 (2.72) ** 0.03 (0.46) 
16 0.12 (5.87) *** 0.11 (3.45) *** 0.13 (1.60) 
17 0.12 (4.20) *** 0.08 (3.19) *** 0.15 (1.86) 
18 0.13 (5.81) *** 0.09 (3.37) *** 0.07 (1.00) 
19 0.09 (4.28) *** 0.08 (2.50) ** 0.11 (1.98) * 
20 0.11 (4.07) *** 0.06 (2.80) ** 0.03 (0.69) 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. 
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CONCLUSION 
Our research intent is to establish if short selling activity is altered surrounding trading 
halts and determine if short sellers noticeably influence market quality and impact security prices 
for halted firms. We hypothesize that short selling activity increases prior to a trading halt and 
decreases following the resumption of trading. We further purport that halted firms with high 
short selling activity, as compared to firms with lower levels of short selling, will experience a 
larger price decline and a more rapid adjustment in price surrounding halts, and lower price 
volatility and spreads after trading resumes. 
 We find little evidence at the daily level to support our proposition that short sellers 
increase their activity prior to the implementation of a trading halt. We are unable to identify 
increases in daily short trade size, number of trades or short volume prior to the event day. 
However, our findings suggest that short sellers substantially modify their trading behavior 
surrounding halts, as shorting metrics increase markedly on the halt day. An intraday 
examination of shorting levels suggests a modest increase in activity in the two 30-minute 
periods prior to the interruption in trading and a substantial increase in short selling in the 
periods immediately following the reopening of trading. As anticipated, short selling values 
decline in the post-halt period, but they remain elevated above estimation period levels during 
the post-halt daily examination and for several periods following the resumption of trading on 
the halt day itself. 
Based on previous findings, our priori is that firms simultaneously undergoing a halt and 
high levels of short selling will experience negative returns. However, at the daily level, when 
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categorized according to abnormal short selling levels, firms in the highest shorting category 
demonstrate positive post-announcement returns. Chi-square test supports this conclusion by 
demonstrating a shift of high short selling firms in the high return category; regression results 
also indicate that pre-halt short selling increases for stocks with positive returns in the immediate 
post-halt period. 
At the intraday level, the highest and lowest short selling (ABSS) quintiles of firms 
demonstrate positive returns during the trading interruption and negative returns immediately 
following the reopening of trading. Short selling appears to amplify these returns, as values for 
the high short-selling quintile are greater in magnitude. These findings suggest that relevant 
information is primarily incorporated into prices after trading resumes and that short selling 
assists the market in the price discovery process. 
Results suggest that both trading halts and short selling activity affect the speed of price 
adjustment. A comparison between halt day and estimation period speeds identify heightened 
price movement in the period directly following the post-halt continuation of trading. Providing 
support for Hypothesis 4, differentiating between the lowest and highest short selling stocks 
indicates that the increase in the post-halt speed of price adjustment is more pronounced for 
firms with higher shorting activity. 
The majority of price contribution at the daily level occurs on the halt day, for all stocks 
and for both the high and low short selling categories. At the intraday level, the weighted price 
contribution for all halts occurs primarily during the halt and post-halt periods – very little 
contribution is from the periods preceding the interruption in trading. However, for high short 
selling firms, almost ninety percent of price impact occurs after the resumption of trading. In 
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contrast, the firms in the lowest short selling category demonstrate the highest price impact while 
trading is halted. 
When examining all firms, we find that intraday volatility measures fail to demonstrate a 
substantial impact preceding the halt. However, volatility increases markedly following the 
resumption of trading and it remains elevated through the post-halt periods examined. Short 
selling activity, in contrast to our expected findings,  appears to increase volatility surrounding 
trading halts, as firms with high levels of short selling evidence both an impact prior to the 
implementation of a halt and substantially larger values (as compared to firms with low levels of 
short selling) in all periods. 
Intraday spreads for all halts are relatively stable in the pre-halt periods, but they exhibit a 
modest increase two periods before trading is interrupted. Spreads are highest during the halt 
period and then gradually return to normal values. Upon the reopening of trading, the spreads for 
stocks in the high short-selling category are substantially elevated, but return to expected values 
within 20 minutes. For firms with the lowest short selling levels, reopening spreads do not show 
as large of an increase, but they remain above normal values for the remainder of the periods 
examined. Diether et al. (2009B) provides a rationale for the observed spread and volatility 
behavior, stating that if short sellers act as opportunistic risk bearers during periods of 
heightened uncertainty triggered by short-lived asymmetric information, then elevated levels of 
short selling might occur in conjunction with high intraday volatility and wide spreads.  
Although our empirical investigation yields findings that do not fully support our 
proposed hypotheses, our results strongly indicate that short sellers modify their behavior 
surrounding exchange-mandated halts in trading. The market quality of halted firms, in terms of 
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price, volatility and spreads, is impacted not only by the interruption in trading, but also by levels 
of shorting activity. 
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ESSAY 2: 
CONTAGIOUS SHORT SELLING SURROUNDING TRADING HALTS
79 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to determine if a short-selling contagion effect exists for 
contemporaries of firms experiencing a trading halt. Although trading suspensions represent a 
firm-specific event, they may be viewed as ‘contagious’ in the sense that they contain 
information relevant to other firms in the same industry. Recent studies demonstrate the presence 
of a contagion effect surrounding trading halts and they describe the associated impact on the 
market quality of related firms.
6
 However, research does not establish whether interruptions in 
trading affect short selling activity for industry contemporaries. Our examination addresses this 
research issue; the potential for an intra-industry effect prompts us to examine if shorting levels 
vary significantly for organizations that are informationally related to a firm experiencing a 
trading halt. We also measure the impact of short sales on the market quality of these 
contemporary firms by examining their returns, price volatility, and spreads surrounding 
interruptions in trading for an industry member.  
 
TRADING HALTS 
Financial markets have regulations that suspend trading under specified conditions. These 
interruptions in trading can take the form of price limits, which are implemented when security 
prices cross boundaries established by market regulators, firm-specific trading halts that suspend 
trading on an individual security for a predetermined period, or market-wide circuit breakers that 
halt trading on the entire market when a designated index exceeds a pre-specified level. Firm- 
                                                          
6
 Refer to Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (2000); and Jiang, McInish, and Upson (2009) 
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specific trading halts can be further categorized according to their underlying cause; halts can be 
either news-related or they can be prompted by an order imbalance. A news-related trading halt 
is triggered by exchange officials when an information release is expected to have or 
demonstrates a significant impact on security prices. In contrast, an order imbalance trading halt 
is instigated when an exchange specialist observes a large imbalance between buy and sell orders 
(Kim and Yang 2004). 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Research describes the impact of informational events on the affected firm. Previous 
researchers establish the presence of financial contagion and commonality in order flow for firms 
in the same industry and they demonstrate the impact, in terms of market quality and short 
selling activity, of an informational event on related firms. Our literature review describes this 
body of research and discusses how it pertains to our examination of short selling activity for 
informationally related firms surrounding interruptions in trading.  
 
The Impact of Informational Events on the Affected Firm 
Market Quality 
A significant price, volatility, and liquidity impact on the securities of firms experiencing 
an informational event, such as earnings announcements, dividend declarations, bankruptcy 
announcements, stock splits, and trading halts, is demonstrated by prior research. These findings 
provide an important contribution to our current study; namely, that corporate events contain 
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information and subsequently they have a measurable impact on the market quality of the 
affected firm.
7
 
In addition, this body of research provides evidence that informed market participants 
play a crucial role in the dynamic trading environment surrounding informational events. For 
instance, Bajaj and Vijh (1995) purport that excess returns surrounding dividend announcements 
represents compensation for the risk accepted by informationally motivated traders. Desai, 
Nimalendran, and Venkataraman (1998) report increases in volatility and spreads surrounding 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) stock splits; their 
findings suggest that changes in trading activity are due, in part, to the actions of informed 
traders.  
 
Short Selling 
Microstructure literature shows that short sellers are informed traders that have the ability 
to earn abnormal returns in environments with elevated levels of information asymmetry.
8
 This 
research stream also demonstrates that short selling increases prior to informational events – 
suggesting that short sellers possess important private information prior to its public revelation.
9
  
Two examinations of short selling behavior preceding informational events hold 
particular importance for our investigation of firm-specific trading halts. In the first, Aitken, 
Frino, McCorry, and Swan (1998), suggest a higher probability of informed trading for short 
                                                          
7
 Beaver (1968); Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993); Aharony and Swary (1980); Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1995); 
Dawkins, Bhattacharya, and Bamber (2007); Lamoureux and Poon (1987); Conroy, Harris, and Benet (1990); 
Madura, Richie, and Tucker (2006); Kryzanowski (1979); Howe and Schlarbaum (1986); Ferris, Kumar, and Wolfe 
(1992); Christie, Corwin and Harris  (2002); Corwin and Lipson (2000); Lee, Ready, and Senguin (1994); Bacha, 
Mohamed, and Ramlee (2008); Engelen and Kabir (2006); Hauser, Kedar-Levy, Pilo, and Shurki. (2006); Kim and 
Rhee (1997); and Kryzanowski and Nemiroff (1998), provide specific examples. 
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 Specific examples are provided by Senchack and Starks (1993); Arnold, Butler, Crack , and Zhang (2005); Chang, 
Cheng, and Yu (2007); Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008); and Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009B). 
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 Refer to Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996); Karpoff and Lou (2010); Blau, Fuller, and Van Ness. (2011); and 
Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010). 
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transactions that execute the day prior to a trading halt. In the second, Christophe, Ferri, and 
Angel (2004) demonstrate that short selling activity preceding earnings announcements reflects 
firm-specific information.  
The above-mentioned literature purports that certain firm-specific events provide a source 
of information for the market. It establishes that these events are associated with a measureable 
impact on the market quality of the corporation experiencing the event and it demonstrates that 
short sellers, who are deemed informed market participants, appear to recognize the potential 
information content of the announcements and to their advantage, successfully anticipate the 
market’s reaction. 
 
Financial Contagion and Commonality 
Financial contagion, in a broad interpretation, refers to increases in volatility and the 
comovement of financial asset markets between countries (Kodres and Pritsker 2002), 
particularly following an economic shock to one country. Our research relies on a more narrow 
definition of contagion, one that refers to this same comovement and increase in volatility, but 
restricts itself to firms in the same or related industries surrounding an informational event for 
one company. Supporting this view, Kaufman (1994, page 123) describes contagion as “… the 
spillover of the effects of shocks from one or more firms to others,” Alli, Thapa, and Yung 
(1994, page 1059) as “the transmission mechanism of stock price formation of industrial firms 
within a particular national market,” and Ghosh, Guttery, and Sirmans (1998, page 592) as the 
market’s use, “… of information about one firm’s poor performance to infer that similar 
problems exist with other firms …” 
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Research into industry contagion establishes the commonality of returns, order flow, and 
transaction costs between related firms. For instance, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) 
find that the components of liquidity for a firm are closely associated with market and industry 
liquidity. Similarly, Huberman and Halka (2001) demonstrate the existence of a systematic 
component of liquidity. In their examination of Dow Jones Stocks, Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) 
find the presence of common factors in both order flow and returns. Subrahmanyam (1991, page 
44) examines market liquidity and price informativeness for baskets of securities. His research 
implies the, “strong tendency for both movements in the price of the basket and movements in 
the price of the portfolio to provide predictive information about subsequent price movements in 
the other.”  
Contagion is examined extensively in the banking and finance industry. For example, 
Lang and Stulz (1992) examine the impact of bankruptcy announcements on the value of firms 
operating within an industry and find support for the presence of industry contagion. However, 
their research also identifies the presence of a competitive effect – a gain in wealth by the rivals 
of the firm announcing bankruptcy. This gain is attributed to the information conveyed through 
the announcement regarding the potential redistribution of wealth from the bankrupt firm to its 
competitors and the anticipated improved competitive posture of other industry firms. 
Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhja (1997) extend Lang and Stulz’s research and attempt to 
identify which related firms will experience a contagion or competitive effect. In line with Lang 
and Stulz, they find that bankruptcy announcements generate contagion. They further purport 
that the inability of their research to detect a competitive effect might be attributed to the fact 
that prior to Chapter 11 filing, the impact of the bankruptcy announcement is already 
incorporated into the stock prices of related firms. This notion suggests the presence of informed 
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trading – select investors are able to predict accurately both the impending bankruptcy and its 
impact, either positive or negative, on informationally related firms.  
Bessler and Nohel (2000) examine bank stock returns surrounding dividend 
announcements to test for the presence of a contagion effect in environments with high levels of 
information asymmetry (bank insiders hold extensive amounts of confidential information). They 
find that dividend reductions induce negative abnormal returns for non-announcing banks. 
Additionally, they find that these contagion effects seem to be consistent with informed trading – 
the presence of contagion is related to firm characteristics that are common amongst affected 
institutions.  
The results of Ferris et al. and Bessler and Nohel emphasize the import role that informed 
market participants play surrounding firm-specific informational events. Their findings regarding 
contagious informed trading, particularly in environments with high information asymmetry, 
provide support for our inquiry into potential changes in the levels of short selling for the 
industry competitors of halted firms. 
 
The Impact of Informational Events on the Related Firm 
Market Quality 
Solidifying the relation between industry contemporaries, Tookes (2008) examines 
earnings announcements, and develops a model of informed trading that demonstrates how 
informational events can affect multiple firms in the same industry. This model predicts that it is 
advantageous for informed traders to execute information-based trades in securities for 
competitors and it demonstrates that competitors’ trading levels and returns contain information 
beyond that of the order flow and returns of the firm experiencing an informational event.  
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Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (2000) demonstrate that a contagion or commonality effect 
occurs surrounding interruptions in trading. They construct a multi-security model that describes 
how a trading halt for a security can decrease liquidity and increase price volatility for stocks in 
the same industry. They purport that trading halts signal a state of information asymmetry for 
informationally related firms. 
Building upon Spiegel and Subrahmanyam’s research and Tookes’ model of informed 
trading, Jiang, McInish, and Upson (2009, page 704) examine the relation between financial 
contagion and interruptions in trading. They state, “Under the Tookes model, an informational 
event in one stock in an industry can instigate informed and insider trading in related stocks in 
that industry …” Jiang et al. offer evidence of contagion by demonstrating the impact of New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) trading halts, including increases in spreads, price impact, and 
trading volume, on firms that are informationally related.  
 
Short Selling 
Previous research purports that short sellers are informed market participants. Building 
upon this notion, a theoretical justification for an increase in short selling for related firms 
surrounding an informational event is provided by Tookes (2008). She suggests that when the 
informed insiders of a halted firm are restricted from shorting their own stocks, they or their 
proxies take advantage of their superior industry knowledge and submit informed trades on 
informationally related securities (Jiang et al. 2009).  
Providing empirical support for Tookes’ proposition, Efendi, Kinney, and Swanson 
(2005) examine changes in short selling levels for corporations that announce they will restate 
financial statements due to accounting irregularities. These researchers find evidence of a 
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contagion effect – increases in levels of short interest for corresponding industry firms. Further, 
they purport that short sellers have superior knowledge; the majority of short-selling increases 
were for firms related to companies restating major irregularities. This research supports the 
notion that short sellers are informed and provides an essential link between informational events 
and short selling for related firms. 
Our investigation differs from the work of Efendi et al. (2005) in two significant ways. 
First, their examination demonstrates increases in short interest for industry and size matched 
counterpart firms after the announcement of a restatement. We purport that short seller expertise 
will allow short sellers to increase their activity prior to the implementation of a trading halt; we 
anticipate heightened short selling preceding an informational trading halt event. Second, Effendi 
et al. focus on how short sellers utilize accounting information to identify over-valued firms, 
whereas our investigation relies on short sellers responding to short-term changes in market 
activity.   
We rely on the Tookes’ model and the findings of Efendi et al. (2005) to hypothesize that 
short sellers will increase their trading activity for industry contemporaries surrounding 
interruptions in trading. Further, we extend the demonstrated relation between firm specific 
trading halts and a market response for informationally related firms provided by Jiang et al. 
(2009), and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (2000), to examine whether changes in short selling 
activity for related firms substantially alter their market quality. 
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HYPOTHESES 
Existing literature demonstrates that informational events have a significant impact on the 
market quality of affected firms and that short selling for these firms increases prior to firm-
specific informational events. It also establishes that a contagious reaction, consisting of changes 
in market quality and increases in short selling, occurs for industry contemporaries surrounding 
an informational event. These findings provide a cornerstone for our assertion that an 
informational event for one firm can significantly influence related firms. We extend this 
research to determine if this contagion effect includes short selling activity surrounding 
interruptions in trading.  
 
Short Selling 
Market microstructure literature establishes that short sellers possess superior private 
information. It also demonstrates the presence of intra-industry contagion surrounding 
informational events, including trading halts, and it demonstrates that short selling increases 
prior to informational events for both affected and informationally related firms. We build upon 
these findings and suggest that industry contemporaries of a firm subject to a trading halt will 
experience increases in short-selling activity. To document short seller behavior, we examine 
several trading metrics that quantify the level of short sales for these related firms: 
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H1: Surrounding a trading halt, securities that are informationally related to a halted stock 
will experience a significant increase in the number of short transactions, short interest 
ratio, relative short selling, and abnormal short selling measures. 
 
Market Quality - Returns, Price Volatility and Spreads 
Interruptions in trading have a significant effect on the market quality of halted firms. 
Madura et al. (2006), provide an overview of the literature’s findings regarding the impact of 
trading halts on returns, price volatility, and spreads. They summarize, stating that in general, 
stocks undergoing a trading halt: (1) experience abnormal negative returns, and (2) following a 
trading halt, volatility is elevated and spreads remain wide. Jiang et al. (2009, page 705) state, “a 
firm-specific trading halt is an informational event that impacts the market beyond that of the 
halted company.” In the presence of contagion and commonality of returns, order flow, and 
transaction costs, it follows that informationally related firms will experience similar changes in 
their market quality. 
 
Returns 
Securities with high short-selling levels typically experience price declines. Providing 
empirical support for this assertion, Senchack and Starks (1993), Desai, Ramesh, and 
Thiagarajan (2002), and Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) demonstrate that increases in short 
interest generate negative abnormal returns. Boehmer et al. (2008) find that heavily shorted 
stocks underperform annually by a risk-adjusted 15.6 percent as compared to lightly shorted 
stocks, and Diether et al. (2009B) find that during periods of high asymmetric information, short 
sale transactions are followed by negative returns. 
89 
 
 Providing support for the asserted negative relation between trading halts and returns, 
Kryzanowski (1979) finds significant abnormal negative returns surrounding halts in trading, and 
Howe and Schlarbaum (1986) report that almost 80 percent of halted securities experience 
negative abnormal returns during the suspension period.  
Demonstrating the impact of informational events on related firms, Lang and Stulz 
(1992) examine the impact of bankruptcy announcements and find that the market value of a 
portfolio containing the common stock of a bankrupt firm’s competitors experiences a 
considerable decrease following a firm’s bankruptcy announcement. Bessler and Nohel (2000) 
examine bank stock returns surrounding dividend announcements and find that dividend 
reductions induce negative abnormal returns for non-announcing banks. In addition, Jiang et al. 
(2009) find, consistent with the informed trading model of Tookes, an increase in the price 
impact of trades for informationally related firms during halts in trading. 
Based on the findings of negative abnormal returns surrounding both trading halts and 
high short selling levels, and the increased impact of trades for related firms surrounding 
informational events, specifically trading halts, we purport that firms with higher levels of short 
selling will experience a larger price decline: 
 
H2: Securities that are informationally related to a halted stock and have high short selling 
levels will experience a larger decline in price surrounding a trading halt as compared 
to informationally related stocks with lower short selling activity.  
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Price Volatility 
Chang et al. (2007) examine the relation between short selling and volatility and find that 
when short selling is permitted, the volatility of both raw and abnormal returns increases 
substantially. Likewise, Wu and Guo (2004) and Angel, Christophe, and Ferri (2003) find that 
short selling levels are directly related to price volatility. 
The findings of Kim and Rhee (1997), Kryzanowski and Nemiroff (1998), and Ferris et 
al. (1992) provide support for the notion that stock volatility is not mitigated by interruptions in 
trading. Similarly, Christie et al. (2002) find elevated volatility following NASDAQ trading 
halts, and Lee et al. (1994), who investigate firm-specific NYSE trading halts, find that post-halt 
volatility levels are elevated 50 to 115 percent. We purport that surrounding interruptions in 
trading, informationally related stocks experience a similar increase in volatility as halted stocks. 
Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (2000, page 388) state, “… high volatility of price changes in one 
stock should be followed by a high volatility in another stock with a positively correlated private 
information variance (e.g. another stock in the same industry).”  
Considering the increase in volatility described by both the trading halt and the short 
selling literature and the anticipated contagion of volatility from halted stocks to industry 
contemporaries, we predict that informationally related stocks with increased short selling 
activity will experience higher volatility levels:  
 
H3: Securities that are informationally related to a halted stock and have high short selling 
levels will have higher price volatility surrounding trading halts as compared to 
informationally related securities with lower levels of short selling activity.  
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Spreads 
The bid-ask spread is used by dealers to balance the gains they receive from liquidity 
traders with losses suffered to informed traders who are better able to forecast future prices 
(Copeland and Galai 1983). If large transactions are viewed as having higher information 
content, as purported by Easley and O’Hara (1987), they should cause the spread to widen to 
provide compensation to dealers for their informational disadvantage (Hasbrouck 1991). If 
informed short-sellers submit large transaction in an attempt to increase the price impact of their 
trades, we would expect to see a positive relation between short selling levels and spreads. 
Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009A) find support for this notion; they examine pilot stocks, for 
which short-selling tests are suspended, and find that increases in short selling activity lead to 
increases in quoted and effective spreads. 
Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (2000) suggest that during the trading suspension, the ask 
(bid) price of an informationally related security will be greater (less) than during a non-halt 
period. They explain that liquidity traders withdraw from the market after observing high levels 
of information asymmetry. Subsequently, the market maker observes both the increased 
asymmetry and the decrease in liquidity and widens spreads to compensate for losses to informed 
traders. Providing empirical support for this belief, Jiang et al. (2009) find that firm-specific 
trading halts increase spreads significantly for informationally related firms. 
Spreads widen surrounding trading halts and with increases with short selling activity. It 
follows then, that a firm that is both informationally related to a halted firm and experiences high 
levels of shorting will evidence wider spreads: 
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H4: Securities that are informationally related to a halted stock and have high short selling 
levels will have wider spreads surrounding trading halts as compared to informationally 
related securities with lower levels of short selling activity.   
 
DATA  
We first identify NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) trading halts that occur 
during 2005–2006 by querying the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database via Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS) for stocks with a trading mode of 4, 7 or 11, indicating halts in trading 
for news dissemination, order imbalance, or news pending, respectively. From this set, we 
remove observations where multiple halts occur for the same stock on the same trading day and 
halts that occur outside normal market hours. 
D’Avolio (2002) finds that 16 percent of stocks in the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) data are potentially difficult to sell short. Of these stocks, the majority are in the 
bottom size decile and the prices of over half are under five dollars. They also find 
approximately 10 percent of stocks are never shorted – these are primarily illiquid stocks, for 
which shorting may represent a limited opportunity for profit. These researchers note that 
institutional investors, who lend stocks for shorting, are biased towards large, liquid stocks, and 
that the probability of incurring loan fees in excess of the risk free rate is inversely related to firm 
size and the level of institutional ownership. Accordingly, we, in a manner similar to Christophe 
et al. (2004), eliminate trading halts for any stock whose average daily price and trading volume 
during 2005 – 2006 was less than five dollars and 100 shares. 
Because our intent is to examine trading activity and market quality prior to and 
following trading halts, we follow the methodology of Corwin and Lipson (2000) and eliminate 
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halts that occur before 10:00 a.m. We also eliminate halts with incomplete data or halts that do 
not resolve on the same trading day. 
Rule 202T implemented the suspension of the short sale price test for a pilot list of 
stocks. The resolution was adopted in 2004 – the suspension was in effect from May 2, 2005 
through August 6, 2007. Diether et al. (2009A) find that although daily returns and volatility 
levels are unaffected for pilot stocks during the test suspension, short selling activity, spreads and 
intraday volatility increases for these stocks. Because the test suspension period covers part, but 
not all of our sample period, to mitigate confounding effects, we remove from our sample any 
firms included in the pilot list of stocks for price test exclusion. 
Finally, we remove observations where more than one trading halt occurs for the same 
firm within our event period. The event period is an 11-trading-day interval beginning five days 
prior to and ending 5 days after the halt day. Christophe et al. (2004) use a multiday pre-event 
period because short sellers may distribute their trading over several days prior to an event to 
disguise private information and because the average loan duration for equity is three days (Reed 
2007). We establish a post-halt event period to examine trading activity and market quality 
following the resumption of trading. The non-halt period, spanning six to 30 days preceding and 
following a trading halt, provides an estimation period. For our intraday examination, we identify 
the halt period, which begins with the interruption in trading and ends when trading resumes. 
Intraday pre-halt periods are measured backwards from the beginning of the halt, and post-halt 
periods are measured forward from the reopening of trading. 
-30                                       -6 -5                     -1 0 +1                   +5 +6                                   +30 
Non-halt pre period Pre-Halt Event Halt Day Post-Halt Event Non-halt post period 
Sample Period 
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Daily price, trading volume, return, and market capitalization data are obtained from the 
CRSP database. The Regulation SHO database, which was created in response to Rule 202T, 
provides trade size and time stamps for short-selling transactions. TAQ trade and quote data is 
used to examine intraday activity. Trade data is filtered to remove observations that occur 
outside of normal market hours, and transactions with a non-positive price, or a condition code 
other than zero. Quote data is filtered to retain observations that occur within normal market 
hours and have a positive bid or ask size, price and spread. 
 
REFERENCE GROUPS 
We model our selection criteria for stocks related to halted firms on the methodology 
implemented by Jiang et al. (2009). These researchers select a reference group for each of the 
firms experiencing a trading halt by first identifying securities with the same 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code. To define further the informational relationship, they 
develop a scheme based on four dimensions: daily returns, trading volume, price volatility and 
spreads.  
 
Daily Returns 
For each candidate stock, one with a SIC code that matches a halted stock, we obtain 
daily returns from CRSP, regress them on the CRSP value-weighted return (the market model) 
and capture the residual. A Pearson correlation is estimated between the residuals for the halted 
stock and its industry contemporary stocks. Informational relatedness is established if the 
correlation of the residuals is significant at the ten percent level. 
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Price Volatility 
Highly correlated volatility measurements suggest a substantial degree of comovement in 
informed trading between two stocks (Jiang et al. 2009). Daily volatility is estimated as the 
squared residual from the market model (previously described for returns). Stocks are considered 
a related firm if their squared residual has a Pearson correlation with that of a halted stock at or 
above the ten percent significance level. 
 
Trading Volume  
We next apply a model developed by Ferris, Haugen, and Makhija (1988) and utilized by 
Jiang et al. (2009) to separate the effects of firm or industry events from the effects produced by 
market-wide, macro-economic conditions:   
vi,t = αI + βivm,t + γi,t          (1) 
Where vi,t is the daily trading volume divided by the outstanding shares for stock i on day 
t, vm,t is the total market volume divided by the total number of shares outstanding for all 
securities on day t, and γi,t is the residual of the regression. For each stock, the regression is 
estimated once for each sample year. Informationally related stocks are those whose Pearson 
correlation is statistically significant at the ten percent level with the regression residual of the 
halted stock.  
 
Spreads 
Using daily closing bid and ask prices, we estimate the average percentage spread {(ask – 
bid) / share price} over 5-day increments for each year of the sample – producing approximately 
50 spread measurements per year for each stock. Stocks are designated as informationally related 
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if their spread measurement is statistically correlated with that of the halted stock at the ten 
percent level. 
Industry counterpart firms are removed from the sample if they do not pass all four 
information relatedness tests. Related firms are also eliminated if their average daily price and 
trading volume during 2005 – 2006 is less than five dollars and 100 shares. Halts without a 
related firm demonstrating statistically significant correlation for all four measures are dropped 
from the sample. For halted firms with more than twenty related firms remaining after the 
relatedness tests are applied, we select the fifteen most similar firms, based on market 
capitalization, to retain in our sample of contemporary firms.  
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The previously described filters produce a sample of 78 trading halts. Forty-seven of 
these halts have reference firms that show significant correlation for daily returns, price 
volatility, trading volume, and spreads. Table 1, Panels A through E, contains descriptive statics 
for the trading halts; Table 2 and Table 3, Panels A through D, describe firm characteristics and 
short selling activity for the halted and related firms, respectively. The sample of related firms 
contains 172 unique firms, representing 188 related firm observations.  
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics - Halts 
This table describes our sample of 2005-2006 trading halts for NYSE-listed firms. Halts have 
been filtered to remove observations that occur outside of market hours or before 10:00 a.m., 
where more than one halt occurs for a sample firms on the same day, halts that do not resolve on 
the same trading day and multiple halts for the same firm within the 11-day event period, halts 
for Rule 202T pilot stocks, observations for stocks whose average daily price and trading volume 
during 2005 – 2006 was less than five dollars and 100 shares, and halts without a significantly 
correlated reference firm.  
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Panel A: Halts by Year  
Year Number of Halts Unique Firms  
2005 31 30  
2006 16 14  
Full Sample 47 42  
Panel B: Number of Halts per Year 
Number of Halts in Sample 1 2 3 4   
Number of Firms       
2005 29 1 0 0   
2006 13 0 1 0   
Full Sample 40 0 1 1   
Panel C: Halts by Day of Week and Year 
 Day of Week 
Year Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Total 
2005 1 8 10 9 3 31 
2006 3 4 4 3 2 16 
Full Sample 4 12 14 12 5 47 
Panel D: Halts by Month and Year 
 Month 
Year Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2005 4 1 3 5 5 4 2 3 0 2 1 1 
2006 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 3 1 4 2 2 
Full Sample 4 2 3 6 6 5 2 6 1 6 3 3 
Panel E: Halts and Duration by Halt Type 
Trading Halt Type Number of Halts Mean Duration  
News Dissemination (4) 5 34:56  
Order Imbalance (7) 4 20:17  
News Pending (11) 38 46:45  
Full Sample 47 43:14  
 
Of the 47 halts, almost twice as many occur in 2005 than in 2006 (31 as compared to 16). 
Similar to the research of Christophe et al. (2004), we find that trading halts in our sample occur 
more frequently during the middle of the week – Tuesday through Thursday. These interruptions 
in trading occur in 20 out of the 24 sample period months, with the highest single monthly value 
of five halts occurring in the months of April and May 2005. We examine 42 unique halt firms, 
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40 of which experience a single halt during the sample period and 2 different firms that 
experience 3 or 4 halts each. 
The halts in our study are primarily (81 percent) implemented due to pending news. The 
mean duration of all sample halts is just over 43 minutes. Although the duration of trading halts 
reported by previous research, including Lee et al. (1994), Corwin and Lipson (2000), and 
Christie et al. (2002), is greater on average and for each halt type, our findings coincide with the 
ranking of halt types by length: news pending halts have the longest duration and order 
imbalance halts, the shortest. 
Summary statistics for both halted and related firms suggest a substantial variation in the 
size of sample firms, stock prices, and trading volume, with generally higher average values in 
2006 as compared to 2005. However, the range in average security prices, trading volume, and 
returns is substantially larger for the sample of related firms as compared to halted firms, and the 
variability in volume and market capitalization is much higher for both samples in 2006. The 
firms, on average, demonstrate positive returns over the two-year period examined. When both 
sets of firms are categorized according to the year-end capitalization portfolio assignments 
established by CRSP, we find, similar to Christophe et al. (2004) that large firms are more 
heavily represented in our sample of halt firms. There are fewer halt firms in the lower market 
capitalization deciles, perhaps due, in part, to our data filter that eliminates trading halts for any 
stock whose average daily price during the sample period is less than five dollars. In contrast, the 
related firms are distributed throughout all ten of the market capitalization deciles. Both samples 
demonstrate the largest number of firms, over 20 percent of observations, in decile six. 
We examine short-selling levels for our halt and related stocks during the 2005 – 2006 
sample period. For each exchange, we report both short volume as a percentage of the total 
99 
 
shares shorted and the number of short sale transactions as a percentage of the total number of 
short selling trades. No short transactions for our sample firms/period are reported on the 
National Association of Securities Dealers Alternative Display Facility (ADF), Archipelago 
(ARCA) and the Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX).  
In line with the findings presented by Diether et al. (2009B), approximately three-fourths 
of short volume (72 – 79 percent) and short transactions (76 percent) for our sample halt and 
related firms are executed on the NYSE. Approximately 15 - 18 percent of short volume and 13 - 
17 percent of short transactions are placed on the NASDAQ market. On average, a much smaller 
percentage of short selling occurs on AMEX for the related firms as compared to the halted 
firms. The average halt firm in our sample has 306 short transactions per trading day with an 
average daily short volume of nearly 140,000 shares, as compared to only 214 short transactions 
and approximately 100,000 shares for our related firms. 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics – Halted Firms 
This table contains summary statistics for our sample of NYSE-listed firms experiencing a 
trading halt during 2005 – 2006. Halts have been filtered to remove observations that occur 
outside of market hours or before 10:00 a.m., where more than one halt occurs for a sample 
firms on the same day, halts that do not resolve on the same trading day and multiple halts for 
the same firm within the 11-day event period, halts for Rule 202T pilot stocks, observations for 
stocks whose average daily price and trading volume during 2005 – 2006 was less than five 
dollars and 100 shares, and halts without a significantly correlated reference firm. 
Panel A: Halt Firm Characteristics  - Average Daily Values 
 Price Volume Return % Market Cap 
Year: 2005 (N =30)     
Mean 32.41 388,030 0.0698 1,948,666 
Max 110.65 2,752,299 0.3119 18,124,822 
Min 4.47 2,199 -0.1728 33,181 
Std 24.23 591,165 0.1030 3,410,900 
Year: 2006 (N=14)     
Mean 36.47 1,126,753 0.0253 6,043,945 
Max 96.10 3,866,092 0.3072 40,548,995 
Min 11.12 1,007 -0.4135 179,914 
Std 22.29 1,373,142 0.1734 11,819,955 
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Full Sample (N=44) 
Mean 33.70 623,078 0.0556 3,251,709 
Max 110.65 3,866,092 0.3119 40,548,995 
Min 4.47 1,007 -0.4135 33,181 
Std 23.45 962,743 0.1292 7,335,372 
Panel B: CRSP Capitalization-Based Decile 
Decile 2005 2006 Full Sample  
1 0 0 0  
2 2 0 2  
3 4 2 6  
4 3 0 3  
5 3 1 4  
6 5 4 9  
7 2 0 2  
8 5 2 7  
9 2 2 4  
10 4 3 7  
Total 30 14 44  
Panel C: Short-sale Trading Activity Across Exchanges (2005 – 2006) 
 ADF AMEX ARCA BSE CHX NASDAQ NSX NYSE PHLX 
Mean Shares 
Sold Short (%) 
0.00 4.11 0.00 0.21 0.00 17.44 6.18 71.81 0.26 
Mean Short-
sale Trades (%) 
0.00 4.65 0.00 0.12 0.00 13.09 6.10 76.02 0.01 
Panel D: Short-selling Summary Statistics per Stock 
 Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Short Sale Daily Volume 139,362 129,313 58,674 52,639 1,034,216 
Number of Daily Short Trades 306 276 131 105 2,472 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics – Related Firms 
This table contains summary statistics for our sample of 172 unique firms (188 related firm 
observations) that demonstrate informational relatedness to a filtered sample of NYSE-listed 
firms experiencing a trading halt during 2005 – 2006. Information relatedness is demonstrated 
by the same SIC code and significant correlations in daily returns, price volatility, trading 
volume and spreads. Stocks with no significant informational relatedness or whose average daily 
price and trading volume during 2005 – 2006 was less than five dollars and 100 shares were 
dropped from the sample. 
Panel A: Related Firm Characteristics  - Average Daily Values 
 Price Volume Return % Market Cap 
Year: 2005 (N =142)     
Mean 24.19 339,829 0.0175 1,879.353 
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Max 211.88 4,846,502 0.5471 35,625,501 
Min 5.03 852 -0.3233 1,979 
Std 22.56 722,150 0.1168 4,893,932 
Year: 2006 (N=46)     
Mean 31.44 489,523 0.0514 3,286,848 
Max 205.98 4,619,097 0.2142 35,217,897 
Min 5.95 1,953 -0.1681 13,630 
Std 33.24 1,064,233 0.0759 7,461,652 
Full Sample (N=188)     
Mean 25.97 376,456 0.0258 2,223,740 
Max 211.88 4,846,502 0.5471 35,625,501 
Min 5.03 852 -0.3233 1,979 
Std 25.68 818,492 0.1090 5,641,374 
Panel B: CRSP Capitalization-Based Decile 
Decile 2005 2006 Full Sample  
1 14 3 17  
2 12 4 16  
3 11 0 11  
4 13 4 17  
5 15 3 18  
6 30 15 45  
7 8 6 14  
8 9 1 10  
9 17 2 19  
10 13 8 21  
Total 142 46 188  
Panel C: Short-sale Trading Activity Across Exchanges (2005 – 2006) 
 ADF AMEX ARCA BSE CHX NASDAQ NSX NYSE PHLX 
Mean Shares 
Sold Short (%) 
0.00 0.76 0.00 0.39 0.00 15.37 4.83 78.28 0.38 
Mean Short-
sale Trades (%) 
0.00 0.67 0.00 0.43 0.00 16.62 5.70 76.55 0.03 
Panel D: Short-selling Summary Statistics per Stock 
 Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Short Sale Daily Volume 101,967 96,957 41,641 37,008 856,838 
Number of Daily Short Trades 214 195 92 74 1,818 
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RESULTS 
Daily Short Metrics 
To detect changes in the daily activity of short sellers surrounding trading halts, we track 
the average number of trades, trade size, and volume for short transactions for our sample of 
informationally related firms in the pre-halt period (days -5 through -1), the halt day (day 0), the 
post-halt period (days +1 through +5), and the estimation period (days -30 through -6 and +6 
through +30). We also calculate the short interest ratio, relative short selling, and abnormal short 
selling metrics for each of these periods. The short interest ratio is described by Angel et al. 
(2003), as the number of shares sold short to shares outstanding. Relative short selling is 
calculated by dividing the number of shares shorted by the number of shares traded (Christophe 
et al., 2004; and Diether et al., 2009B). Abnormal short selling is the percentage difference 
between the average daily shares sold short during the pre, halt, or post period and the average 
daily number of shares sold short during the estimation period (Lee et al., 1994; Corwin and 
Lipson, 2000; Christie et al., 2002, Christophe et al., 2004; and Christophe et al., 2010). For each 
short selling metric, a difference value is computed to determine if corresponding pre-halt, halt, 
and post-halt values differ from estimation period levels. Significance is determined using the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which allows us to compare measurements on our sample without 
relying on an assumption of normality. 
Our hypothesis concerning the behavior of short sellers surrounding trading halts states: 
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H1: Surrounding a trading halt, securities that are informationally related to a halted stock 
will experience a significant increase in the number of short transactions, short interest 
ratio, relative short selling, and abnormal short selling measures. 
 
For our sample of related firms, the daily short volume, number of trades, and the short 
interest ratio, listed in Table 4 Panel A, are elevated on the halt day, as compared to all other 
periods examined. Short volume increases for related firms approximately 19 percent on the 
event day over the average short volume computed during the five days prior to the halt. The 
average trade size during the event period ranges from 446 shares on the halt day to 484 shares 
in the pre-halt period; these values are similar to the estimation-period average trade size of 478 
shares. Average relative short selling values are comparatively stable throughout the event 
period; their magnitude of 0.2504 to 0.2697 is similar to the results of Diether et al., 2009B, 
who report an average relative short selling value for NYSE large firms of 0.2339.  
Table 4 
Average Daily Short Metrics and Differences 
Panel A contains measurements of average daily short selling levels for related stocks during the 
estimation (days -30 thru -6 and +6 thru +30), pre-event (days -5 thru -1), event (day 0), and 
post-event (days +1 thru +5) periods surrounding interruptions in trading for informationally 
related stocks. The short interest ratio is the number of shares sold short to shares outstanding, 
and relative short selling is computed by dividing the number of shares shorted by the number of 
shares traded. Abnormal short selling is the percentage difference between the average daily 
shares sold short during the pre, post, or event period and the average daily number of shares 
sold short during the estimation period. 
Panel B contains the mean difference for each of our short selling metrics between estimation 
period levels and levels in the pre, halt, and post periods. The Signed Rank Test is used to 
determine significance. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
N = 188 Related Firm Observations 
Panel A: Short Selling Measurements 
Period 
Number 
of Trades 
Trade 
Size 
Volume 
Short Interest 
Ratio 
Relative Short 
Selling 
Abnormal 
Short Selling 
Estimation  192 478 95,848 1.18 0.2966 -- 
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Pre-Event 187 484 89,233 1.13 0.2697 0.0274 
Halt 204 446 106,171 1.22 0.2613 0.0896 
Post-Event 183 472 86,401 1.02 0.2504 0.0629 
Panel B: Differences Between Event and Estimation Periods 
Metric Pre-Halt Halt Post-Halt 
Number of Trades -3.31 (0.0676) * 15.40 (0.7437) -7.21 (0.0002) *** 
Trade Size  3.75 (0.2061) -30.21 (0.0003)*** -11.25 (0.0069) *** 
Volume -7,089 (0.0084) *** 9,733 (0.5024) -9,851 (<.0001) *** 
Short Interest Ratio -0.0530 (0.0057) *** 0.0440 (0.1554) -0.1546 (<.0001)*** 
Relative Short Selling -0.0184 (0.3216) -0.0307 (0.9287) -0.0367 (0.1200) 
Abnormal Short Selling 0.0234 (0.0059) *** 0.0896 (0.2790) 0.0580 (<.0001) *** 
*** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.10 level respectively. 
 
On average, abnormal short selling is elevated in all event periods, with increases of 
2.74, 8.96, and 6.29 percent in the pre, halt, and post periods, respectively. Abnormal short 
selling values, viewed at the daily level, are displayed in Figure 1. Abnormal sort selling 
appears to vary substantially throughout the event period, ranging from a minimum of -15.29 
percent two trading days following the halt (day +2) to a maximum in excess of 18 percent the 
following day (day +3). Consecutive increases in abnormal short selling are demonstrated on 
the halt day and again on day +1; this increase is followed by a marked decrease in short selling 
on day +2.  
 
Figure 1 
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Daily Abnormal Short Selling 
Abnormal short selling is listed for each day of the event period. Abnormal short selling is 
the percentage difference between the average short volume during the pre, halt or post 
period and the average daily number of shares sold short during the estimation period 
 
We calculate the percentage of stocks on each day of the event period that have a 
positive abnormal short selling value; a positive value indicates that the daily short selling 
volume is greater on this day than during an average day in the estimation period. Resulting 
values, shown in Figure 2, demonstrate that on each day of the event period, approximately one 
third of our sample firms have positive abnormal short selling. On the halt day, however, in 
excess of forty percent of the sample firms have higher short volume than on an average, 
estimation period, trading day. 
 
Figure 2 
Percent of Stocks with Daily Positive Abnormal Short Selling 
The number of stocks with positive abnormal short selling values as a percent of all sample 
stocks is computed for the event period. Abnormal short selling is the percentage difference 
between the average daily shares sold short during the pre, halt, or post period and the 
average daily number of shares sold short during the estimation period 
 
Panel B of Table 4 contains mean values that describe by how much pre, halt, and post 
periods levels for each short selling metric differ from corresponding values during the 
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estimation period. A significant decrease in the number of trades, short volume, and the short 
interest ratio occurs in both the pre- and post-halt periods (the five days preceding and 
following the event day). This result indicates that short sellers modify their behavior in regards 
to our sample of firms in the days leading up to and following a halt in trading for a related 
industry member by submitting fewer and smaller short transactions. The only short-selling 
measurement that demonstrates a significant difference on the halt day is trade size, which on 
average is thirty shares smaller than the mean trade size during the estimation period. Difference 
values for relative short selling are insignificant for all three of the event periods; a lack of 
significance suggests that for our sample of related firms, the trading halt event does not 
substantially alter the relation between their short and overall trading volume. An increase in 
short selling for related firms is substantiated by the difference statistic for abnormal short 
selling – this measurement is two to six percent higher during the pre- and post-halt intervals. 
However, no significant increase in abnormal short selling over estimation period levels is 
identified on the halt day.  
Market microstructure research demonstrates that short sellers use their superior 
knowledge to extract gains in the market surrounding informational events. We build upon this 
finding to determine, by examining the relation between pre- and post-event returns and pre-
event short selling levels, if informed market participants increase their short selling activity for 
related firms prior to interruptions in trading. Using the following equation, we examine short 
selling levels while controlling for other variables that might influence short selling activity 
(following Christophe et al., 2010): 
 
ABSS(-5,-1)i = αi + β1Log(P0)i + β2CAR(-5,-1)i + β3MOMi + β4CAR(0,1)i + εi   (2) 
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The dependent variable, ABSS(-5,-1) represents abnormal short-selling during the five 
days preceding the halt. LogP(0) is the natural logarithm of a related firm’s share price on the 
event day; this variable controls for the positive link between a stock’s price and the willingness 
of market participants to short the stock.
10
 CAR(-5,-1) is the cumulative abnormal return earned 
during the five day pre-halt period – the halted firm’s total return over the five days preceding 
the halt minus the median five-day cumulative return during the estimation period. MOM 
represents momentum, which controls for long-term share price movement. Momentum is 
calculated as the related firm’s six-month cumulative return ending 30 days before the halt, 
minus the return on the NYSE equally weighted portfolio during the same period. CAR(0,1) is 
the related firm’s holding period return from day 0 to day 1, minus the median holding period 
return during the estimation period; this variable represents the market’s assessment of the 
economic value of the information associated with an interruption in trading. 
Using ordinary least squares to model a regression equation relies on the assumption that 
the error terms have uniform variances across all observations. We use the Shapiro-Wilk test on 
each regression input data set to ensure that the assumption of normality holds. The null 
hypothesis for this statistical test is that a population is distributed normally. If the test produces 
a p-value less than the designated alpha level of 0.10, then the null hypothesis of normality can 
be rejected. When this occurs, we report results using errors adjusted to control for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the residuals. 
Table 5, Panel A displays the correlation matrix for the regression variables. The 
correlation values demonstrate two significant relations between returns and short selling. 
Returns in the five-day pre-halt period are inversely related to pre-halt abnormal short selling 
                                                          
10
 Refer to D’Avolio, (2002) who shows that the majority of stocks that are difficult to short are priced less than five 
dollars and that the holdings of institutional investors, who lend stocks for shorting, are biased towards large, liquid 
stocks. 
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activity. However, a positive correlation between CAR(0,1) and ABSS(-5, -1) indicates that prior to 
a halt, short selling increases with positive post-halt returns. Although the regression results, 
reported in Table 5, Panel B, produce coefficients for CAR(-5,-1) and CAR(0,1) with signs that 
agree with the direction demonstrated by the correlation matrix, the regression fails to 
demonstrate a significant relation between any of the independent variables and pre-event 
abnormal short selling levels.  
Table 5 
Abnormal Short Selling Regression 1 
This table contains the correlation matrix for regression variables (Panel A) with corresponding 
p-values in parentheses. Regression coefficients and associated t-statistics are listed in Panel B. 
In the model: ABSS(-5, -1) = α + β1 * Price0 + β2 * CAR(-5, -1) + β3 * MOM + β4 * CAR(0, 1) + є , 
ABSS(-5,-1) represents abnormal short-selling during the five days preceding the halt, LogP(0) is 
the share price of the related firm on the halt day, CAR(-5,-1) is the cumulative abnormal return 
during the five day pre-event period, MOM represents momentum, and CAR(0,1) is the related 
firm’s holding period return from day 0 to day 1 . Regression results are reported using errors 
adjusted to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the residuals. 
N = 173 Related firm observations 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 Log Price(0) ABSS(-5, -1) CAR(0,1) CAR(-5,-1) MOM 
Log Price(0) 1 -0.1198 
(0.1164) 
-0.0642 
(0.4012) 
0.0131 
(0.8646) 
0.2704 
(0.0003) *** 
ABSS(-5, -1)  1 0.1306 
(0.0868) * 
-0.1500 
(0.0489) ** 
0.0028 
(0.9708) 
CAR(0,1)   1 -0.1928 
(0.0110) ** 
0.0395 
(0.6061) 
CAR(-5,-1)    1  
MOM     1 
Panel B: OLS Regression Results 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Intercept 0.0419  
(0.65) 
0.0480 
(0.67) 
0.4819  
(1.25) 
0.5108  
(1.35) 
CAR(0,1) 6.8141  
(1.01) 
5.5103 
(1.34) 
5.1365  
(1.30) 
5.0681  
(1.25) 
CAR(-5,-1) 
 
-2.6916  
(-0.47) 
-2.6900  
(-0.48) 
-2.6716  
(-0.48) 
 Log Price(0) 
  
-0.1451  
(-1.29) 
-0.1543  
(-1.40) 
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MOM 
   
0.1393  
(0.38) 
R
2
 0.0171 0.0332 0.0457 0.0463 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0113 0.0219 0.0287 0.0236 
F-Value 2.07 * 2.92 * 2.70 ** 2.04 * 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. 
 
Following Christophe et al. (2004), we next implement a regression model that controls 
for pre-event trading volume and returns, and focuses on post-halt returns to determine if 
abnormal levels of short selling are informationally motivated. In this equation, ABSS(-5,-1) again 
represents abnormal short-selling during the five days preceding the halt, and RET(0, +1) is the 
stock return from closing day -1 to +1. RET(-5, -1) represents the movement of the stock price 
during the five days prior to the halt, and ABVOL(-5, -1) is the percentage difference between the 
average daily volume in the 5-day pre-halt interval and the average daily volume in the 
estimation period. 
 
ABSS(-5, -1) = β0 + β1RET(0, +1) + β2 RET(-5, -1) + β3ABVOL(-5, -1) + ε  (3) 
 
The variable of interest is RET(0, +1), which represents the market’s immediate reaction to 
the trading halt. A significant negative (positive) coefficient indicates that short selling increases 
(decreases) prior to trading halts imposed under negative (positive) circumstances. RET(-5, -1) 
controls for the possibility that changes in the stock price might affect the level of short selling in 
the days preceding the trading halt. ABVOL(-5, -1) accounts for the comovement in increased short 
selling activity and trading volume in the pre-event period, as increased volume might make a 
stock less difficult to short. 
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Table 6 contains, in Panel A, the correlation matrix between the regression variables and, 
in Panel B, the regression results. Similar to the correlation matrix from the previous regression, 
a significant negative correlation is demonstrated between abnormal short selling and returns in 
the pre-event period. A positive relation is noted between pre-event abnormal short selling and 
trading volume prior to the halt. The association between trading volume and short volume in the 
pre-halt period is substantiated by the regression results: the coefficient for ABVOL(-5,-1) is 
positive, and the explanatory power of the equation (R
2
) increases considerably from .0566 to 
.4517 when the ABVOL(-5,-1) variable is added to the model. However, no significance is found 
for the Ret(0,+1) variable: this test fails to provide support at the daily level for our assertion that 
short selling activity for related firms prior to a trading halt for an industry counterpart is 
informationally motivated. 
  
Table 6  
Abnormal Short Selling Regression 2 
This table contains the correlation matrix for regression variables (Panel A) with corresponding 
p-values in parentheses. Regression coefficients and associated t-statistics are listed in Panel B. 
In the model: ABSS(-5, -1) = α + β1RET(0, +1) + β2 RET(-5, -1) + β3ABVOL(-5, -1) + ε, ABSS(-5,-1) 
represents the abnormal short-selling during the five days before the halt, and RET(0, +1) is the 
stock return from closing day -1 to +1. RET(-5, -1) represents the movement of the stock price 
during the five days prior to the halt, and ABVOL(-5, -1) is the percentage difference between the 
average daily volume in the 5-day pre-halt interval and the average daily volume in the 
estimation period. Regression results are reported using errors adjusted to control for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the residuals. 
N = 188 Related firm observations 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 ABSS(-5, -1) RET(0, +1) RET(-5, -1) ABVOL(-5, -1) 
ABSS(-5, -1) 1 0.0394 
(0.5819) 
-0.1845 
(0.0093)*** 
0.6376 
(<.0001)*** 
RET(0, +1)  1 0.4938 
(4.39)*** 
0.0192 
(0.7889) 
RET(-5, -1)   1 -0.0231 
(0.7468) 
ABVOL(-5, -1)    1 
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Intraday Short Metrics 
Our examination of short selling activity for informationally related firms surrounding a 
halt in trading for an industry member is repeated at the intraday level. We compute, on the event 
day, the 1) average number and size of short transactions, 2) short interest ratio, 3) relative short 
selling, and 4) abnormal short selling measures for the related stocks in eight 30-minute periods 
prior to and following the trading halt interval.   
The results from our intraday examination of short selling activity, contained in Table 7, 
provide considerable support for the notion that short sellers increase their activity for 
informationally related stocks surrounding halts in trading for an industry member.
11
 An increase 
in the number of short transactions is noted for sample firms beginning two periods prior to the 
halt, when the number of short trades increases from 1,536 to 2,031. The number of short 
transactions continues to increase, with 2,491 short trades in the 30 minutes prior to the halt; the 
                                                          
11
 The number of short transactions, trading volume, and short volume has been adjusted in period zero to 
compensate for the variable period length (halt in trading). Each of these metrics has been converted by finding the 
average value per minute and multiplying by 30 minutes. 
Panel B: OLS Regression Results 
 [1] [2] [3] 
Intercept 0.0257  
(0.42) 
0.0428  
(0.59) 
0.0636  
(1.09) 
RET(0, +1) 0.8589  
(0.81) 
3.7654  
(1.00) 
3.2108  
(1.28) 
RET(-5, -1) 
 
-4.720  
(-0.91) 
-4.246  
(-1.25) 
ABVOL(-5, -1) 
  
0.9244  
(4.39) *** 
R
2
 0.0015 0.0566 0.4517 
Adjusted R
2
 -0.0035 0.0469 0.4432 
F-Value 0.30 5.85 ** 53.27 *** 
*** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. 
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number of short transactions then declines to 2,303 during the halt period and 2,189 following 
the resumption of trading for the halted firm. 
In our intraday examination, the relative short selling measures range from 0.260 to 
0.492, with the highest level occurring during the break in trading for the halted firm. These 
values, particularly during the halt period, are generally larger than the average daily halt-day 
value of 0.263 listed in Table 4. This finding suggests that on average, short selling comprises a 
higher percentage of trading volume during the eight intraday periods surrounding the halt than 
on the event day as a whole.  
Of the metrics calculated, short volume provides the most remarkable increase: short 
volume more than doubles from period -2 to period -1 (667,701 to 1,367,705). A modest decline 
occurs during the halt period (1,007,887), but short volume remains elevated, with over one 
million shares shorted in the interval immediately following the halt period. Abnormal short 
selling levels vary considerably throughout the periods examined, but evidence negative values 
in the three periods preceding the halt, near estimation levels during the halt period, and a 
substantial increase following the resumption of trading for the halted firm.  
Table 7  
Intraday Short Metrics 
Short selling values for related stocks are computed for eight 30-minute periods prior to trading 
halts and following the resumption of trading for halted firms. The short interest ratio is the 
number of shares sold short during the 30-minute period to shares outstanding, and relative short 
selling is computed by dividing, for each period, the number of shares shorted by the number of 
shares traded. Abnormal short selling is the percentage difference between the number of shares 
sold short during the intraday halt-day period and the average number of shares sold short during 
corresponding intervals in the estimation period. 
Period 
Number of 
Trades 
Average 
Trade Size 
Volume 
Short Interest 
Ratio 
Relative 
Short Selling 
Abnormal 
Short Selling 
-8  987  533 525,725 0.216 0.298 0.207 
-7  1,019  401 408,616 0.116 0.277 -0.186 
-6  1,243  389 483,667 0.120 0.307 -0.062 
-5  1,311  397 520,361 0.134 0.348 0.248 
-4  1,373  390 535,461 0.135 0.396 0.207 
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-3  1,536  327 502,240 0.079 0.299 -0.256 
-2  2,031  329 667,701 0.119 0.260 -0.011 
-1  2,491  549 1,367,705 0.113 0.302 -0.163 
Halt  2,303  377 1,007,887 0.113 0.492 0.001 
1  2,189  476 1,042,413 0.139 0.355 0.176 
2  1,536  518 795,893 0.105 0.315 -0.008 
3  1,662  437 726,633 0.109 0.338 0.034 
4  1,126  393 442,139 0.093 0.282 -0.159 
5  1,260  523 658,813 0.122 0.337 0.070 
6  1,344  511 687,336 0.146 0.341 0.181 
7  928  633 587,865 0.126 0.342 0.162 
8  410  476 195,334 0.116 0.360 0.003 
 
For each short selling metric, we compute and test for significance the mean difference 
between the period value on the halt day and the corresponding period value during the 
estimation interval. Resulting values, listed in Table 8, suggest a measurable change in short 
selling activity for our sample of related firms immediately surrounding the break in trading for 
the halted firm. Although the number of trades submitted by short sellers shows no significant 
change, the difference value for average trade size, volume, short interest ratio, and abnormal 
short selling measures are generally negative during the three periods preceding the halt and 
during the halt period, suggesting that short selling is lower than estimation period levels during 
these intervals. In contrast, the difference in trade size, short volume, and abnormal short selling 
are positive following the halt interval, as short selling increases to above estimation period 
levels. 
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Table 8  
Intraday Short Metric Differences 
This table contains, for each short selling metric, the mean difference between estimation period 
(days -30 to -6, and 6 to 30) and halt day short selling levels. The difference value is computed for 
the eight 30-minute periods prior to the halt in trading and following the resumption of trading for 
halted firms. The short interest ratio is the number of shares sold short to shares outstanding, and 
relative short selling is computed by dividing the number of shares shorted by the number of shares 
traded. Abnormal short selling is the percentage difference between the average daily shares sold 
short during the event period and the average daily number of shares sold short during the estimation 
period. The Signed Rank Test is used to determine significance. p-values are in parentheses. 
Period 
Number of 
Trades 
Average 
Trade Size 
Volume 
Short Interest 
Ratio 
Relative 
Short Selling 
Abnormal 
Short Selling 
-8 
1.89 
 (0.9896) 
16.13 
 (0.5557) 
2492.29  
(0.2611) 
-0.0589 
(0.0986) * 
0.0072 
(0.7818) 
0.2075  
(0.1538) 
-7 
5.29 
 (0.7647) 
-70.31  
(0.0481) ** 
231.731  
(0.1070) 
-0.0259  
(0.0639) * 
-0.0239  
(0.3232) 
-0.1862  
(0.0511) * 
-6 
2.27  
(0.6295) 
-4.27 
 (0.0940) * 
-248.87  
(0.4523) 
-0.0258  
(0.0695) * 
-0.0233  
(0.1826) 
-0.06238  
(0.0272) ** 
-5 
3.49  
(0.4313) 
24.61 
 (0.5389) 
1053.83  
(0.9659) 
0.0115  
(0.7213) 
0.0189  
(0.7428) 
0.24814  
(0.4365) 
-4 
1.93 
 (0.4539) 
-28.07  
(0.1369) 
-373.27  
( 0.8199) 
0.0250  
(0.8153) 
0.0681  
(0.1875) 
0.2069  
(0.2453) 
-3 
-1.08  
(0.4169) 
-62.42  
(<.0001) *** 
-2902.16 
 (<.0001) *** 
-0.0360  
(0.0001) *** 
-0.0213  
(0.2636) 
-0.2559  
(<.0001) *** 
-2 
3.18  
(0.5135) 
-125.60 
 (<.0001) *** 
-1558.11 
 ( 0.0934) * 
-0.0180  
(0.0091) *** 
-0.0497  
(0.0098) *** 
-0.0112  
(0.0062) *** 
-1 
1.88  
(0.4805) 
-38.18  
(0.0001) *** 
2372.11  
(0.0057) *** 
-0.0276  
(0.0005) *** 
-0.0119  
(0.5434) 
-0.1630  
(<.0001) *** 
Halt 
0.75 
(0.5408) 
-122.81 
(<.0001) *** 
-3694.45 
(0.0028) *** 
-0.1333 
(0.0037) *** 
-0.0010 
(0.6213) 
0.00107 
(0.0002) *** 
1 
0.81 
 (0.1280) 
60.76 
 (0.027) ** 
132.62  
(0.0544) * 
0.0010  
(0.2288) 
0.0272  
(0.5038) 
0.17614  
(0.0148) ** 
2 
0.56  
(0.4450) 
-7.02 
 (0.0452) ** 
888.98  
(0.0241) ** 
-0.0042  
(0.0859) * 
0.0036  
(0.5190) 
-0.0081  
(0.0005) *** 
3 
1.48  
(0.8083) 
34.40  
(0.0343) ** 
319.70  
(0.1632) 
-0.0291  
(0.1045 
0.0277  
(0.9888) 
0.0345  
(0.0057) *** 
4 
0.82  
(0.8220) 
-51.01  
(0.0023) *** 
-595.63  
(0.0287) ** 
-0.0057  
(0.0283) ** 
-0.0051  
(0.5293) 
-0.1594  
(0.0005) *** 
5 
3.76  
(0.1914) 
12.36  
(0.0105) ** 
2800.29  
(0.2482 
0.0054  
(0.08137) * 
0.00294  
(0.8948) 
0.07031  
(0.1147) 
6 
4.90  
(0.1889) 
-152.15 
 (0.1249) 
3142.46  
(0.5457) 
0.0224  
(0.8901) 
-0.4888  
(0.4835) 
0.1808  
(0.2361) 
7 
0.11 
 (0.0419) ** 
334.68 
(0.3913) 
1943.80  
(0.0124) ** 
-0.0167 
 (0.0133) ** 
0.0169  
(0.3970) 
0.1623  
(0.0029) *** 
8 
-2.96  
(0.1080) 
-71.54  
(0.1202) 
-1360.59 
(0.0532) * 
-0.0103  
(0.0769) * 
0.0660  
(0.4545) 
0.0031  
(0.0816) * 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Hypothesis 1 purports that short sellers increase their activity for informationally related 
firms surrounding a halt in trading for an industry member. Our investigation of daily and 
intraday short metrics evidences a measurable change in short seller behavior for our sample of 
related firms. However, instead of the anticipated increase, it appears that short sellers reduce 
their activity surrounding the halt event. During the 5-day pre- and post-halt periods, short sellers 
submit fewer trades at a smaller average trade size, resulting in a decrease in short volume during 
these intervals. A decline is short activity is also detected at the intraday level, as short selling 
metrics, including average trade size, volume, the short interest ratio and abnormal short selling, 
decrease prior to the halt period. An increase in shorting is identified in the intraday period 
immediately following the resumption of trading for the halted firm, as the average short trade 
size, volume, and abnormal short selling levels are significantly above estimation period values. 
 
Daily Return Behavior 
Price behavior for our sample of related stocks is examined at the daily level; post-halt 
prices and subsequent returns are measured to help quantify the impact of short selling. Our 
hypothesis concerning the returns earned by related firms surrounding interruptions in trading for 
an industry member states: 
 
H2: Securities that are informationally related to a halted stock and have high short selling 
levels will experience a larger decline in price surrounding a trading halt as compared 
to informationally related stocks with lower short selling activity.  
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Related firms are sorted into quintiles according to mean pre-halt abnormal short selling 
(ABSS) and abnormal relative short selling (ABRELSS) levels. Abnormal relative short selling 
is calculated by subtracting the estimation period relative short selling measurement from the 
relative short selling value in the pre-halt period. We examine and report, in Table 9,  daily mean 
and median post-halt returns (each stock’s two-day percentage return following the trading halt, 
measured from the close of the day preceding the halt day to the close of the following day) for 
the highest and lowest short selling quintiles (following Christophe et al. 2004).  
Table 9  
Post-halt Daily Returns  
Related stocks are sorted into quintiles according to mean abnormal short selling and abnormal 
relative short selling levels during the five days preceding a trading halt. Mean and median post-
announcement returns, each stock’s two-day percentage return following the trading halt, 
measured from the close of the day preceding the halt day to the close of the following day, are 
reported for the highest and lowest short-selling quintiles. Differences (low short selling – high 
short selling) between the returns for each short selling category are computed and tested for 
significance using the Signed Rank Test. p-values are listed in parentheses.  
Short Selling Metric / Group Mean Return Median Return Difference 
Abnormal Short Selling   
Low Short Selling 0.0032 0.0012 -0.0061 
High Short Selling 0.0095 0.0041 (0.2821) 
Abnormal Relative Short Selling   
Low Short Selling -0.0009 0.0015 -0.0096 
High Short Selling 0.0088 0.0024 (0.3490) 
 
The mean and median post-halt returns for the highest short selling quintile, formed 
according to both ABSS and ABRELSS levels, are positive and larger in magnitude than 
corresponding returns for stocks in the lowest short selling group. For instance, the mean return 
of 0.95 percent for the ABSS high short selling category is almost three times as large as the 0.32 
percent earned by the stocks in the lowest short selling quintile. This finding suggests that 
heightened levels of short selling preceding a trading halt lead to higher post-halt returns. 
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However, when the difference between returns for high and low quintile firms for both short 
selling category are tested for significance, no evidence is found to support the assertion that 
short selling activity for related firms surrounding halts for an industry member impacts post-halt 
returns. 
We perform a non-parametric Chi-square test to examine more closely the relation 
between high levels of short selling in the pre-event period and post-halt stock returns. For each 
of our abnormal short selling metrics, ABSS and ABRELSS, we split the sample into two 
groups, the highest quintile of each measure for the 5-day pre-event period and all other sample 
halts. We then examine how these groups are distributed across three categories of return from 
closing day -1 to +1. If short selling is randomly distributed, the halts should evidence the 
following pattern: 20 percent in the low return quintile, 20 percent in the high return quintile and 
60 percent in the moderate return quintile (following Dechow et al., 2001; and Christophe et al., 
2004). Accordingly, 39 observations each (approximately 20 percent) should fall into the low 
and high return categories, and the remaining 119 observations (approximately 60 percent) 
should be designated as moderate. Table 10 lists the results of the Chi-square examination. 
For the highest short selling quintile, we note a measurable increase in the number of 
stocks assigned to the high return category, 23.08 percent for the ABSS group and 25.64 percent 
for the ABRELSS group. The number of high short selling stocks assigned to the low return 
category, for each short selling metric, is below the expected value of 19.80 percent. The return 
distribution for the stocks in the other short selling quintiles is similar to the expected pattern, 
with only a slight shift of stocks from the high to the low return category noted. The Chi-square 
statistics produced for each of the short selling groups, however, are not statistically significant 
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and therefore fail to provide support for the anticipated relation between short selling activity and 
returns for related firms.  
Table 10  
Daily Chi-Square Test  
Samples halts are divided, using pre-halt abnormal short selling and relative abnormal short 
selling levels, into two groups, the highest quintile of each measure for the five days preceding 
the halt and all other sample halts. This test examines how these groups are distributed across 
three categories of return on stock from closing day -1 to +1.  
  Return Quintiles 
  
Low 
Return 
Moderate 
Return 
High 
Return 
Total 
Sample Observations  39 119 39 197 
Expected Percent  19.80% 60.41% 19.80% 100% 
Panel A: Abnormal Short Selling, ABBS(-5,-1) 
Highest Short Selling Quintile     
 Observations 6 24 9 39 
 Percentage 15.38% 61.54% 23.08% 100% 
Other Short Selling Quintiles    
 Observations 33 95 30 158 
 Percentage 20.89% 60.13% 18.99% 100% 
    X
2 
statistic 0.7528 
    Probability 0.6863 
Panel B: Abnormal Relative Short Selling, ABRELSS(-5,-1) 
Highest Short Selling Quintile     
 Observations 7 22 10 39 
 Percentage 17.95% 56.41% 25.64% 100% 
Other Short Selling Quintiles     
 Observations 32 97 29 158 
 Percentage 20.25% 61.39% 18.35% 100% 
    X
2 
statistic 1.0513 
    Probability 0.5912 
 
Intraday Return Behavior 
Using average abnormal short selling (ABSS) and abnormal relative short selling 
(ABRELSS) levels in the eight 30-minute pre- and post halt event-day periods, related stocks are 
sorted into quintiles and the mean and median post-halt returns for the highest and lowest 
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quintiles  are examined (Christophe et al. 2004). We calculate three different intraday returns: 1) 
from the close of the period preceding the halt to the reopen, 2) from the reopen to the close of 
the period following resumption of trading, and 3) the interval spanning the halt, from the close 
of the period prior to the halt to the close of the period following the halt. Return values are 
reported only for stocks in the lowest and highest short selling quintiles.  
 
Results, listed in Table 11, show that returns for the highest short selling quintile in each 
period, with the exception of ABRELSS return1, are positive. For the stocks with the highest 
levels of short selling, each return is larger than the corresponding return for stocks in the lowest 
short selling quintile. For each short selling metric, differences between returns for the low and 
high short quintiles is calculated and tested for significance. None of the difference values are 
statistically different from zero - these results fail to provide support for our hypothesis that for 
informationally related stocks, increased short selling activity surrounding interruptions in 
trading is associated with negative price movements.  
  
120 
 
Table 11 
Intraday Post-halt Returns  
Related firms are divided into quintiles according to average halt day abnormal short selling and 
abnormal relative short selling levels in the eight 30-minute pre- and post-event periods. Return1 
is from the close of the period preceding the halt to the reopen, Return2 is from the reopen to the 
close of the period following the resumption of trading, and Return3 is from the close of the 
period prior to the halt to the close of the period following the halt. Return values are reported 
only for stocks in the lowest and highest short selling quintiles. Differences between each of the 
returns for each short selling category are computed and tested for significance using the Signed 
Rank Test. P-values are listed in parentheses.  
N = 26 or 27 stocks per quintile 
 Mean Return1 Mean Return2 Mean Return3 
Abnormal Short Selling    
Low Short-Selling Quintile -0.0004 0.0014 0.0010 
High Short-Selling Quintile 0.0011 0.0027 0.0038 
Mean Difference (Low – High) -0.0018 
(0.1707) 
-0.0012 
(0.5542) 
-0.0030 
(0.1430) 
Abnormal Relative Short Selling    
Low Short-Selling Quintile -0.0015 0.0005 -0.0009 
High Short-Selling Quintile -0.0004 0.0020 0.0016 
Mean Difference (Low – High) -0.00110 
(0.4755) 
-0.0015 
(0.4524) 
-0.0026 
(0.2536) 
 
To examine further the relation between event day short selling and returns, we repeat 
our Chi-square distribution test at the intra-day level, for all three return periods, using the 
average abnormal short selling levels over the eight 30-minute pre- and post-halt periods to sort 
our stocks into quintiles. Results are listed in Table 12.  
If sample stocks are evenly distributed amongst the return categories, i.e. intraday short 
selling levels have no impact on returns, 26 stocks will be assigned to the low and the high return 
categories (approximately 20 percent) each, and 79 stocks will be categorized as moderate. In 
contrast, we find that for all three returns, there is a substantial shift into the high return category 
for stocks in the highest abnormal short selling quintile. For return3, which represents the overall 
return associated with the event, an excess of 42 percent of stocks with the highest abnormal 
short selling levels are assigned to the high return group. In contrast, for each return, the stocks 
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in the other short selling quintiles have fewer (more) stocks in the high (low) return category 
than the expected distribution. The Chi-square statistic for each of the returns is significant at the 
ten percent level or higher, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis that short selling levels and 
post-announcement returns are independent.   
Table 12 
Intraday Chi-Square Test  
Samples stocks are divided, using Abnormal Short selling, into two groups, the highest quintile of 
short selling for the eight 30-minute pre- and post-halt day periods and all other sample stocks. 
This test examines how these groups are distributed across three categories of returns:  Return1 is 
from the close of the period preceding the halt to the reopen, Return2 is from the reopen to the 
close of the period following the resumption of trading, and Return3 is from the close of the 
period prior to the halt to the close of the period following the halt.  
  Return Quintiles 
  Low Return Moderate 
Return 
High Return Total 
Sample Observations  26 79 26 131 
Expected Percent  19.85% 60.31% 19.85% 100% 
Panel A: Return1 
Highest Short Selling Quintile    
 Observations 1 18 7 26 
 Percentage 3.85% 69.23% 26.92% 100% 
Other Short Selling Quintiles    
 Observations 25 61 19 105 
 Percentage 23.81% 58.10% 18.10% 100% 
    X
2 
statistic 5.4314 
    Probability 0.0662 * 
Panel B: Return2 
Highest Short Selling Quintile    
 Observations 3 14 9 26 
 Percentage 11.54% 53.85% 34.62% 100% 
Other Short Selling Quintiles    
 Observations 23 65 17 105 
 Percentage 21.90% 61.90% 16.19% 100% 
    X
2 
statistic 4.9173 
    Probability 0.0856 * 
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Panel C: Return3 
Highest Short Selling Quintile    
 Observations 2 13 11 26 
 Percentage 7.69% 50.00% 42.31% 100% 
Other Short Selling Quintiles    
 Observations 24 66 15 105 
 Percentage 22.86% 62.86% 14.29% 100% 
    X
2 
statistic 11.2309 
    Probability 0.0036*** 
*** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.10 level respectively. 
 
Our second hypothesis predicts that related stocks with high short selling levels 
surrounding a trading halt for an industry counterpart will experience lower returns than related 
stocks with less short selling activity. Our findings from testing this hypothesis are mixed. At 
both the daily and intraday level, the difference variable between returns for high and low short 
selling stocks is insignificant. The daily Chi-square examination also fails to produce evidence of 
a relation between returns and short selling activity for our sample stocks. However, the Chi-
square distribution test at the intraday level provides support for the notion that high short selling 
levels are associated with higher post-halt returns. One possible explanation for the positive 
returns earned by related firms surrounding a halt in trading for an industry contemporary is 
identified by Lang and Stultz (1992). This research predicts a competitive effect surrounding 
informational events for related firms, a gain in value for related firms due to the potential 
redistribution of wealth and improved competitive position. 
 
Volatility 
Our investigation into the impact of short selling on stocks that are informationally 
related to firms experiencing a trading halt now addresses price volatility, which we examine on 
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both the daily and intraday level. Our hypothesis concerning the effect of short selling on price 
volatility for our sample of related stocks states: 
 
H3: Securities that are informationally related to a halted stock and have high short selling 
levels will have higher price volatility surrounding trading halts as compared to 
informationally related securities with lower short selling activity.  
 
We calculate daily volatility measures for our related stocks for the pre-halt period, the 
halt day, and the post-halt period following the methodology of Diether et al. (2009A). CRSP 
data is used to compute a daily mean transaction price range [(high price – low price)/ high 
price] and close-to-close volatility (by squaring the absolute daily return). The daily quote range 
[(high quote – low quote) / high quote] and close-to-close and open-to-close volatility, using 
absolute squared return, is calculated using TAQ data. We regress each volatility metric on a 
post-halt dummy variable (which equals one for observations during the five-day post-halt 
period); the coefficient obtained represents the difference between the pre- and post-halt 
volatility measurements. The difference is tested, using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, to 
determine if it is significantly different from zero. We repeat each test, after dividing our sample 
of related firms into quintiles according to levels of abnormal short selling in the eight 30-minute 
pre- and post-halt intraday periods. Results are reported in Table 13 – Panel A and Panel B for 
CRSP and TAQ data, respectively. 
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Table 13  
Daily Mean Volatility Measures 
Daily volatility measures are calculated for the pre-halt period (days -5 through -1), the halt day 
(day 0), and a post-halt period (days +1 through +5). CRSP data is used to determine a daily 
mean transaction price range [(high price – low price)/ high price] and close-to-close volatility 
(by squaring the absolute daily return). TAQ data is used to calculate a daily quote range [(high 
quote – low quote) / high quote] and close-to-close and open-to-close volatility using absolute 
squared return. The difference between the pre and post measures for each of these metrics is the 
coefficient obtained by regressing each volatility measure on a post-halt period dummy variable, 
which equals one for observations during the five-day post-halt period. The difference is tested, 
using the signed rank test to determine if it is significantly different from zero, t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. After dividing our sample halts into quintiles according to average 
intraday levels of abnormal short selling, we repeat each test and report values for the highest 
and lowest short-selling quintiles. 
Panel A: CRSP Data 
Periods/ 
Volatility Metric 
Pre(-5,-1) Event(0) Post(1,5) Difference 
All Related Stocks (N = 171) 
Transaction Price Range 2.24 2.42 2.12 -0.12039 (-1.31) 
Volatility (Close to Close) 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 -0.00001 (-0.15) 
By Short Selling Levels 
Low Short-Selling Quintile      
Transaction Price Range 2.50 2.62 2.44 -0.05943 (-0.25) 
Volatility (Close to Close) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.00014 (1.06) 
High Short-Selling Quintile 
Transaction Price Range 2.45 2.75 1.99 -0.45406 (-2.45) 
** 
Volatility (Close to Close) 0.0005 0.0010 0.0002 -0.00028 (-1.97) 
** 
Panel B: TAQ Data  
All Related Stocks (N = 171)  
Quote Range 0.6548 0.6860 0.6766 0.0218 (0.24) 
Volatility (Open to Close) 0.0006 0.0006 0.0011 0.0000 (-0.52) 
Volatility (Close to Close) 0.0013 0.0005 0.0011 -0.0001 (-1.51) 
By Short Selling  
Low Short-Selling Quintile      
Quote Range 0.5998 0.6597 0.6613 0.0615 (0.54) 
Volatility (Open to Close) 0.0003 0.0010 0.0003 -0.0000 (-0.26) 
Volatility (Close to Close) 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0001 (-0.66) 
High Short-Selling Quintile      
Quote Range 0.7626 0.8041 0.6515 -0.1110 (-1.58) 
Volatility (Open to Close) 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0003 (-1.89) * 
Volatility (Close to Close) 0.0005 0.0011 0.0002 -0.0003 (-1.85) * 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Volatility metrics based on CRSP data demonstrate that the transaction price range for 
sample stocks is larger on the event day as compared to the average price range in the pre- and 
post-halt intervals. With the exception of the high short selling quintile, the event-day price range 
is 18 to 30 percent larger than price ranges during the 5-day periods preceding and following the 
halt day. The close-to-close volatility measurement for the all stocks and the low short selling 
categories are nearly identical for the three examination periods, varying by only 0.0001. 
Volatility measurements for the high short selling group demonstrate the largest amount of 
variation. For this category, the halt day transaction price range is 30 percent greater than the 
pre-halt value and 76 percent larger than the average price range in the post-halt period. Close-
to-close volatility increases by a factor of two (five) over pre-halt (post-halt) levels. For the high 
short selling quintile, the difference value, comparing pre- and post-halt volatility measurements, 
are negative for both the transaction price range and close-to-close volatility, indicating a 
significant decrease in volatility for these related firms on the five trading days following a 
trading halt event. Differences for the all stocks and low short selling quintile are not significant. 
These results suggest that increased short selling activity for firms related to an industry member 
experiencing a trading halt results in lower post-halt volatility. 
The daily quote range and volatility metrics calculated with TAQ data provide similar 
findings. Modest changes in the quote range are noted for the all stocks and the low short selling 
quintile. However, close-to-close and open-to-close volatility appears elevated for all stocks in 
the post-halt period and the event-day open-to-close volatility for stocks in the low short selling 
category. None of the difference variables for the all sample stocks category and the quintile of 
low short selling stocks are significant. In contrast, the high short selling quintile of stocks has 
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elevated volatility measurements on the halt day, and significantly lower volatility differences 
for both open-to-close and close-to-close metrics. 
At the intraday level, we use TAQ data to calculate median and abnormal measures (as 
compared to the estimation period) for volume, number of quote revisions, absolute return and 
transaction price range during the four 30-minute periods preceding the halt and following the 
resumption of trading for the halted firm (following Corwin and Lipson, 2000). Significance is 
determined using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The results are first presented, in Table 14, as 
averages for the pre-halt (periods -4 through -1), halt (period 0), and post-halt periods (periods 
+1 though +4). Table 15 list volatility metrics for each 30-minute period separately. For each 
presentation, we present values for all related stocks (Panel A) and then differentiate the 
volatility measurements for stocks according to levels of short selling (Panel B). Short selling 
quintiles are established using average halt-day abnormal short selling levels in the eight 30-
minute pre- and post-event periods. Results are shown for the highest and lowest quintiles. 
Table 14 
Mean Interval Intraday Volatility Measures 
TAQ data is used to calculate median and abnormal measures (as compared to the estimation period) for 
volume, number of quote revisions, absolute return and transaction price range during the four 30-minute 
periods preceding the halt and following the resumption of trading. Mean values are reported for the four 
30-minute period preceding a trading halt (pre) and the four 30-minute periods following resumption of 
trading (post). To differentiate between firms according to short selling levels (Panel B), we divide firms 
into quintiles according to average halt day abnormal short selling levels in the eight 30-minute pre- and 
post-event periods. Results are shown for the highest and lowest quintile. Significance is determined using 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Panel A: All Related Stocks (188) 
Period Volume Quote Revisions Absolute Return Transaction Price Range 
 Median 
Pre(-4,-1) 5,000  62  0.2040  0.080  
Event(0) 4,839  74  0.2048  0.070  
Post(1,4) 6,008  60  0.1639  0.070  
 Abnormal Percentage 
Pre(-4,-1) -1.97 *** 6.17  4.62 ** 0.41 *** 
Event(0) 1.55 ** 14.39  20.70  13.09 * 
Post(1,4) 8.56 ** 14.02  5.06 *** 9.36 ** 
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Panel B  By short-selling levels (38 Halts per Quintile) 
Lowest Short-selling Quintile 
 Median 
Pre(-4,-1) 3,050  55  0.1640  0.055  
Event(0) 3,429  78  0.1920  0.060  
Post(1,4) 2,872  71  0.1524  0.040  
 Abnormal Percentage 
Pre(-4,-1) -21.16 *** 5.70 * -15.23 *** -6.70 ** 
Event(0) -12.55 ** -3.57  32.50  -17.16  
Post(1,4) -33.41 *** 15.73  -9.95 ** -21.94 *** 
Highest Short-selling Quintile 
 Median 
Pre(-4,-1) 12,300  73  0.2536  0.110  
Event(0) 8,219  94  0.1221  0.070  
Post(1,4) 10,116  82  0.2189  0.095  
 Abnormal Percentage 
Pre(-4,-1) 53.30 *** 22.66 ** 16.06  6.98  
Event(0) 47.80 * 34.52  -19.70 ** -5.79  
Post(1,4) 75.31 *** 36.19 *** 28.26  35.87 ** 
*** and **  indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. 
Abnormal trading volume, for all stocks, is significantly different from trading volume in 
the estimation period - levels are lower than normal (negative) preceding the halt and above 
estimation period levels (positive) during and following the halt period. Our examination of 
abnormal volume for each of our short selling quintiles demonstrates that abnormal trading 
volume is negative (12 to 33 percent lower) for stocks in the low short selling quintile. For stocks 
in the high short selling category, median period values are substantially larger and abnormal 
volume is positive (47 to 75 percent) in each of the periods examined. This finding suggests that 
short selling has a positive relation with trading volume and subsequent volatility.  
For the all stocks category, the number of quote revisions is not statistically different 
from the level generated during the estimation period. However, when segmented according to 
short selling levels, stocks in the low short selling group demonstrate a higher than normal 
number of quote revisions in the pre-halt period. Stocks with the highest level of short selling 
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appear to have an increased number and significantly elevated abnormal quote revisions in both 
the pre- and post-halt periods.  
Increased volatility, in the form of absolute returns, is noted for all stocks in the pre- and 
post-halt periods. However, when examining this metric for stocks segmented by shorting 
activity, both quintiles experience negative abnormal absolute returns, stocks with low levels of 
shorting during the pre- and post-halt periods, and stocks in the high short selling quintile during 
the halt interval.  
The transaction price range is larger than estimation period levels for all stocks in the pre, 
halt, and post–halt periods. This positive relation is also evident during the post-halt period for 
stocks with the highest level of short selling. In contrast, stocks with low shorting levels 
demonstrate a substantially lower price range immediately preceding and following the halt in 
trading for an industry member. 
Table 15 presents the volatility metrics for each period separately (Panel A) and then 
separates firms according to short selling levels (Panel B). For all related firms, abnormal 
volume is negative in periods -4 and -3; this metric is positive in the two periods immediately 
preceding the halt and the during the halt period. Although median values appear larger in the 
four post-halt periods, there is no statistical difference between halt and estimation period levels 
for these intervals. When segmented according to levels of short selling, a general pattern 
emerges; stocks with the lowest (highest) levels of short selling demonstrate negative (positive) 
abnormal volume.  
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Table 15 
Mean Period Intraday Volatility Measures 
TAQ data is used to calculate median and abnormal measures (as compared to the estimation period) for 
volume, number of quote revisions, absolute return and transaction price range during the four 30-minute 
periods preceding the halt and following the resumption of trading. Panel A presents findings for all 
related stocks; results for the highest and lowest quintiles according to levels of intraday abnormal short 
selling are presented in Panel B. Significance is determined using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Panel A: All Related Firms (188) 
Period Volume Quote Revisions Absolute Return Transaction Price Range 
 Median 
-4 2,700  46  0.1900  0.055  
-3 5,650  62  0.2112  0.070  
-2 5,000  80  0.2531  0.090  
-1 6,000  59  0.1929  0.080  
0 4,839  74  0.2048  0.070  
+1 6,500  70  0.1507  0.070  
+2 6,000  56  0.1876  0.070  
+3 5,362  59  0.1777  0.070  
+4 6,400  59  0.1345  0.060  
 Abnormal Percentage 
-4 -8.72 *** 2.50  -2.26  -14.66 *** 
-3 -12.66 *** -5.17 * 11.07  -7.13 ** 
-2 9.31 * 10.30  11.56  24.13  
-1 0.59 ** 13.22  -1.05  -3.14 ** 
+1 1.55 ** 14.39  20.70  13.09 * 
0 9.28  11.42  3.14  3.98  
+2 11.08  15.08  13.79  13.05  
+3 4.25  20.50  2.01  14.82  
+4 9.87  78.08  -0.36 ** 4.65  
Panel B: By Short-Selling Quintile (38 Halts per Quintile) 
Lowest Short-selling Quintile 
 Median 
-4 1,940  45  0.1013  0.040  
-3 3,000  47  0.2036  0.050  
-2 3,500  67  0.0822  0.060  
-1 4,617  68  0.2114  0.060  
0 3,429  78  0.1920  0.060  
+1 1,600  76  0.1422  0.030  
+2 3,670  63  0.1580  0.035  
+3 2,872  74  0.1728  0.060  
+4 5,700  55  0.1384  0.040  
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 Abnormal Percentage 
-4 -35.98 *** 3.28  -23.11  -28.72  
-3 -37.80 ** -12.54  -2.15  -25.44 ** 
-2 -8.07  14.84  -46.48 *** 4.30  
-1 -13.61 ** 12.54  -2.46  7.84  
0 -12.55 *** -3.57  32.50  -17.16  
+1 -33.40 *** 10.00  -13.60  -26.24 *** 
+2 -35.02 *** 4.95  -20.15  -19.86 ** 
+3 -29.28 ** 52.54  -7.29  -27.11 ** 
+4 -37.29 ** -14.78  11.51  -7.75  
Highest Short-selling Quintile 
 Median 
-4 8,841  70  0.2884  0.080  
-3 14,790  62  0.2010  0.105  
-2 12,300  81  0.2934  0.150  
-1 13,200  96  0.2128  0.110  
0 8,200  94  0.1221  0.070  
+1 10,500  97  0.2430  0.080  
+2 10,300  77  0.2628  0.080  
+3 9,666  82  0.2188  0.120  
+4 10,100  92  0.1451  0.070  
 Abnormal Percentage 
-4 10.19  14.68  29.36  -19.76  
-3 35.80  1.18  -16.92  -4.04  
-2 96.49 ** 26.61  45.10  43.56  
-1 58.16 ** 38.79  2.77  2.33  
0 47.80 * 34.52  -19.70 ** -5.79  
+1 77.06 *** 33.67  21.80  31.24  
+2 92.68 ** 45.71  30.11  48.37  
+3 47.85  38.83 ** 27.17  40.34 ** 
+4 86.49 ** 24.13  35.41  21.20  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. 
 
Although our examination of volatility metrics at the period level reports a positive 0.41 
percent abnormal transaction price range for all stocks in the pre-halt period (Table 14), we find 
that this metric, when examined on a period-by-period basis, is generally negative in the periods 
leading up to the halt, ranging from a -3.14 percent to -14.66 percent. The all stocks group 
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reports a positive 9.36 percent abnormal price range in the post-halt period, yet a significant 
increase in abnormal price range is not supported when reporting by periods - the lowest short 
selling quintile demonstrates negative abnormal transaction price ranges following the 
resumption in trading for the halted firm (periods +1 through +3).  
Based on the findings of previous literature, we hypothesize that short selling activity has 
a positive impact on volatility for stocks related to an industry member experiencing a trading 
halt. Our examination of volatility, however, provides mixed results. At the daily level, we find 
evidence, in the form of a lower transaction price range and close-to-close and open-to-open 
volatility measurements, those stocks with the highest short selling levels demonstrate lower 
post-halt volatility – short selling appears to reduce these metrics in our sample of related stocks. 
However, at the intraday level, our findings suggest that stocks with the lowest level of short 
selling activity have reduced volatility (negative abnormal volume and abnormal transaction 
price range) as compared to stocks with higher short selling (positive abnormal volume).  
 
Spreads 
Previous research has established that short selling and trading halts both impact the bid-
ask spread. To investigate the combined effect of these two market activities, we examine mean 
and median dollar spreads for related firms at several intervals preceding the halt period and 
following the resumption of trading for the halted firm. 
Our hypothesis concerning the effect of short selling activity on spreads surrounding 
interruptions in trading purports: 
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H4: Securities that are informationally related to a halted stock and have high short selling 
levels will have wider spreads surrounding trading halts as compared to informationally 
related securities with lower short selling activity.  
 
Following Corwin and Lipson (2000), we compute spreads using three different intervals: 
30 minutes, 1 minute, and 15 seconds. We categorize firms into quintiles according to average 
abnormal short selling levels in the eight 30-minute pre- and post-halt periods and repeat our 
examination for each time interval. The difference between each spread measurement and its 
corresponding estimation period value is calculated and tested, using the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test, to determine if it is statically different from zero. 
Thirty-minute median spreads for the event day and estimation period, and for the highest 
and lowest short selling quintiles for this time interval, are displayed in Figure 3 and Figure 4, 
respectively. Median spreads during the estimation period are generally three cents; event day 
median spreads are similar in size, with the exception of periods +2 and +4, when they increase 
to four cents.  
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Figure 3 
Halt and Estimation Period Median Spreads 
Median spreads are computed for 30-minute periods preceding the interruption of trading and 
following the resumption of trading on the halt day and during corresponding periods in the 
estimation period. 
 
 
Figure 4 
Intraday Spreads: 30-Minute Periods 
Median spreads are computed for 30-minute periods preceding the interruption of trading and 
following the resumption of trading. Results are reported for firms in the highest and lowest 
quintiles of short selling according to halt-day abnormal short selling levels. 
 
The difference in each 30-minute mean spread measurement from estimation period 
values, listed in Table 16, confirms that spreads on the event day do not differ significantly from 
estimation period spreads – the difference statistic is only significant in period +3. When 
examined according to short selling levels, median spreads for stocks with the highest levels of 
abnormal short selling appear substantially smaller than corresponding spreads for stocks in the 
lowest short selling quintile. However, the difference statistic for 30-minute spreads for both 
short selling quintiles does not provide evidence that either spread measurement varies 
significantly from estimation period levels. At 30-minute intervals, it appears that spreads for 
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
30-Minute Periods Relative to the Trading Halts
Median Spread by Short Selling Levels
High SS Low SS 
134 
 
related stocks surrounding a trading halt for an industry counterpart are not substantially 
impacted by the either the interruption is trading or short selling activity. 
Table 16  
Spread Differences: 30-Minute Periods 
For all related stocks and by short-selling levels, the difference between the mean spread on the 
halt day and the estimation period is calculated for each 30-minute period. Results are reported 
for only the highest and lowest short selling quintiles, as established by halt-day abnormal short 
selling levels. Differences are tested, using the signed rank test, to determine if they are 
statistically difference than zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
Period All Related Stocks High Short Selling Low Short Selling 
-4 0.00 (-1.13) 0.00 (-0.11) -0.01 (-1.53) 
-3 -1.13 (-1.82) * -0.01 (-2.54) ** 0.00 (-0.38) 
-2 0.00 (0.63) -0.01 (-1.55) 0.01 (0.70) 
-1 0.00 (-0.25) 0.00 (0.67) 0.00 (0.72) 
Halt 0.00 (0.62) -0.01 (-1.30) 0.01 (0.77) 
+1 0.00 (-0.53) 0.00 (0.27) 0.00 (0.56) 
+2 0.00 (0.12) 0.00 (0.38) 0.01 (1.33) 
+3 0.00 (1.37) 0.01 (1.65) 0.01 (2.01) * 
+4 0.00 (0.87) 0.01 (1.47) 0.01 (1.26) 
 ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
Median spreads are shown for 1-minute intervals in Figure 5, and 15-second intervals in 
Figure 6, with Panel A containing spreads for the halt and estimation period, and Panel B 
containing spreads for firms categorized by short selling levels. Two deviations from estimation 
period levels are substantiated by both examinations. An increase in spreads is noted in the 1-
minute period immediately preceding the event period – a corresponding increase is seen in the 
two 15-second periods prior to the halt. A decrease in spreads occurs approximately 5 minutes 
after the resumption of trading (periods 17 – 20 using 15-second intervals). Differences in the 
spread measurement from estimation period levels are computed for both the 15-second and 1-
minute intervals.  
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Panel A: 1-Minute Spreads 
 
Panel B: 1-Minutes Spreadsby Short Selling Levels 
Figure 5 
Intraday Spreads: 1-Minute Periods 
Median spreads are computed during 1-minute intervals preceding and following the 
resumption of trading on the halt day and during corresponding estimation periods. Results are 
reported for all related stocks (Panel A) and by short selling levels (Panel B) for firms in the 
highest and lowest quintiles of short selling according to halt-day abnormal short selling levels. 
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Panel A: 15-Second Spreads 
 
Panel B: 15-Second Spreads by Short Selling Levels 
Figure 6 
Intraday Spreads – 15 Second Periods 
Median spreads are computed during 15-second intervals preceding and following the 
resumption of trading on the halt day and during corresponding estimation periods. Results are 
reported for all related stocks (Panel A) and by short selling levels (Panel B) for firms in the 
highest and lowest quintiles of short selling according to halt-day abnormal short selling levels. 
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The resulting difference values indicate that median spreads for related firms do not vary 
significantly between event day and estimation periods; nor do they differ between high and low 
levels of short selling activity. Values for 15-second interval are listed in Table 17; the results for 
1-minute intervals, not reported, provide similar findings.   
Table 17 
Spread Differences: 15-Second Periods 
For all stocks and by short-selling levels, the difference between the mean spread on the halt 
day and the estimation period is calculated for each 15-second period. Results are reported for 
only the highest and lowest short selling quintiles, as established by halt-day abnormal short 
selling levels. Differences are tested, using the signed rank test to determine if they are 
statistically difference than zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Period All Related Stocks High Short Selling Low Short Selling 
-20 0.0037 (0.77) 0.0367 (2.76) ** 0.0144 (2.68) ** 
-19 -0.0032 (-0.48) 0.0011 (0.08) -0.0069 (-1.06) 
-18 -0.0007 (-0.11) 0.0061 (0.48) -0.0014 (-0.20) 
-17 0.0099 (1.51) 0.0119 (1.12) 0.0071 (0.79) 
-16 -0.0021 (-0.57) 0.0063 (0.51) 0.0135 (1.89) 
-15 -0.0082 (-2.09) ** 0.0038 (0.33) -0.0084 (-1.08) 
-14 -0.0038 (-0.64) 0.0016 (0.11) 0.0067 (0.76) 
-13 -0.0047 (-1.17) 0.0098 (1.3) 0.0036 (0.35) 
-12 -0.0040 (-0.88) 0.0116 (1.25) 0.0141 (1.44) 
-11 -0.0061 (-1.16) -0.0098 (-0.7) -0.0050 (-0.38) 
-10 0.0020 (0.48) 0.0161 (1.94)* -0.0030 (-0.25) 
-9 0.0038 (0.61) 0.0008 (0.05) -0.0106 (-1.43) 
-8 -0.0012 (-0.24) 0.0148 (0.71) -0.0041 (-0.82) 
-7 0.0083 (1.40) 0.0286 (2.02) * 0.0040 (0.53) 
-6 -0.0020 (-0.41) 0.0006 (0.05) 0.0003 (0.03) 
-5 0.0025 (0.31) 0.0035 (0.47) -0.0089 (-1.69) 
-4 -0.0014 (-0.28) 0.0156 (1.47) -0.0128 (-2.21)* 
-3 0.0080 (0.99) -0.0036 (-0.40) 0.0153 (1.35) 
-2 0.0009 (0.17) 0.0021 (0.17) 0.0028 (0.29) 
-1 0.0012 (0.22) -0.0011 (-0.09) 0.0074 (1.06) 
Halt 0.0018 (0.62) -0.0065 (-1.26) 0.0051 (0.77) 
1 -0.0049 (-0.81) -0.0116 (-0.93) -0.0006 (-0.05) 
2 0.0053 (1.22) 0.0068 (0.95) 0.0071 (0.68) 
3 -0.0015 (-0.28) -0.0117 (-0.87) 0.0173 (1.07) 
4 0.0091 (1.22) 0.0025 (0.22) 0.0162 (1.23) 
5 0.0123 (1.40) 0.0047 (0.41) 0.0187 (1.31) 
6 -0.0042 (-0.73) 0.0059 (1.20) -0.0106 (-2.13) * 
7 0.0013 (0.28) -0.0098 (-1.41) 0.0068 (0.70) 
8 -0.0034 (-0.61) -0.0069 (-0.98) 0.0198 (1.23) 
9 -0.0051 (-1.12) -0.0084 (-0.96) -0.0002 (-0.03) 
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10 0.0034 (0.69) 0.0037 (0.32) 0.0082 (0.70) 
11 -0.0028 (-0.51) -0.0172 (-1.71) 0.0057 (0.47) 
12 0.0049 (0.70) -0.0160 (-1.19) 0.0065 (0.81) 
13 0.0053 (0.71) 0.0035 (0.23) -0.0004 (-0.03) 
14 0.0010 (0.18) 0.0077 (0.50) 0.0069 (0.63) 
15 0.0054 (1.20) 0.0073 (0.72) 0.0175 (1.33) 
16 -0.0075 (-1.22) -0.0119 (-0.88) 0.0007 (0.06) 
17 0.0082 (0.75) -0.0027 (-0.40) 0.0124 (0.92) 
18 0.0048 (0.79) -0.0080 (-0.92) 0.0268 (1.56) 
19 -0.0021 (-0.38) -0.0122 (-1.36) 0.0188 (1.35) 
20 0.0032 (0.42) -0.0043 (-0.30) 0.0116 (0.67) 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
Based on the established positive relation between spreads and both short selling and 
trading halts and the presence of contagion and commonality in order flow for related firms, we 
hypothesize that spreads for informationally related firms will increase surrounding an 
interruption in trading for an industry member. However, our examination of spreads at three 
different time intervals fails to provide support for this assertion; it appears that spreads for our 
sample of related firms are not significantly affected by a trading halt for a contemporary firm or 
by short seller behavior surrounding the interruption in trading. 
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CONCLUSION 
The objective of this research is to determine if informed market participants modify their 
behavior, in regards to short selling activity, for stocks that are informationally related to 
industry contemporaries that experience a halt in trading. Further, our aim is to discover if the 
anticipated increase in short selling substantially affects market quality for these related firms. 
Our investigation is based on the previously established impact of both short selling and trading 
halts on security prices, return variability, and spreads, and the contagion and commonality in 
order flow between industry counterparts identified in previous research. 
Our results provide some evidence that short sellers modify their behavior in regards to 
related firms surrounding halts in trading for an industry member. At the daily level, short sellers 
appear to reduce their activity regarding related firms prior to and following a trading halt – they 
submit fewer trades, resulting in a decrease in short volume during the 5-day pre- and post-halt 
periods. A decrease is short selling activity is also detected at the intraday level, as the average 
trade size, volume, short interest ratio, and abnormal short selling measures decrease prior to the 
halt period. However, an increase in shorting is identified in the 30-minute period immediately 
following the resumption of trading, as the average short trade size, volume, and abnormal short 
selling levels are significantly above estimation period values. Although changes in short selling 
activity were identified prior to the implementation of a halt, the lack of significance in our 
regression equations do not provide the support necessary for us to purport that this activity is 
informationally motivated. 
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Hypothesis 2 is based on the established relation between short selling and returns; it 
suggests that an increase in short selling leads to negative returns for our sample of related 
stocks. Although no significant findings were obtained from the daily examination, results from 
the intraday Chi-square test suggests that related firms with the highest short selling levels earn 
larger gains that sample firms with lower levels of short activity. One possible explanation for 
this result is that related firms derive a benefit (i.e. the competitive effect suggested by Lang and 
Stultz, 1992) when a fellow industry member is subjected to a halt in trading. 
Our examination of volatility for related firms provides evidence that price volatility is 
affected by the halt in trading for an industry member. Intraday results for volume, absolute 
return, and transaction price ranges are generally higher surrounding halts in trading than during 
the estimation period. Short selling levels appear to impact volatility; at the daily level short 
selling activity appears to mitigate volatility, reducing the transaction price and quote range and 
close-to-close and open-to-close volatility metrics. In the intraday periods immediately 
surrounding the halt interval, however, firms with low short selling levels evidence lower 
volume, absolute return, and transaction price range than corresponding estimation period levels. 
In support of Hypothesis 3, stocks with the highest shorting activity demonstrate an increase in 
volume and the number of quote revisions. 
Our final hypothesis predicts that spreads will increase for related firms surrounding halts 
in trading for an industry counterpart. This notion is based on the high levels of information 
asymmetry associated with halts in trading and the corresponding need for wider spreads to 
compensate for losses to informed traders. Our examination of spreads was unable to detect any 
significant deviation from estimation periods or between stocks with different levels of short 
selling activity. 
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This investigation into short selling activity for related firms surrounding halts in trading 
for an industry member provides mixed results. Although a shift in short selling activity and a 
modest impact in market quality is detected in our sample of related firms, our examination fails 
to establish that these changes are informationally motivated. 
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ESSAY 3: 
DOES PREDATORY TRADING OCCUR AROUND TRADING HALTS?
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INTRODUCTION 
Our research examines market activity surrounding trading halts to determine if predatory 
trading occurs. Firms undergoing a trading halt often experience unfavorable market responses, 
including significant price declines and increases in volatility, which may necessitate that a 
trader holding the halted stock liquidates his position. When a constrained trader attempts to 
liquidate, his situation may be recognized by other strategic traders who then engage in predatory 
trading by withdrawing liquidity.  
We make two primary contributions to microstructure literature. First, we establish 
whether predatory behavior is present surrounding interruptions in trading or, as suggested by 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), that trading halts eliminate the opportunity for predation. 
Second, we determine if documented changes in market quality for halted firms are linked to 
predatory trading. Brunnermeier and Pedersen state (page 1852), “Predatory trading is important 
in connection with large security trades in illiquid markets.” Trading halts, which significantly 
impact liquidity, are common in current financial markets; it is therefore important to understand 
more clearly the associated market dynamics.  
 
TRADING HALTS 
Financial markets have regulations that suspend trading under specified conditions. The 
primary purpose of trading halts is to, “provide an opportunity for normal information 
transmission in times of market duress” (Lee, Ready, and Seguin 1994, page 183). These 
interruptions in trading can take the form of price limits, which are implemented when security 
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prices cross boundaries established by market regulators, firm-specific trading halts (either news 
or order-imbalance related) that suspend trading on an individual security for a predetermined 
period, or market-wide circuit breakers that halt trading on the entire market when a designated 
index exceeds a pre-specified level (Kim and Yang, 2004). 
Trading halts produce a significant impact on the market quality of affected firms. 
Madura, Richie, and Tucker (2006) provide an overview of the microstructure literature’s 
findings on the impact of trading halts. They summarize these findings, stating that in general, 
stocks undergoing a trading halt experience abnormal negative returns and elevated levels of 
volume and volatility.  
Several findings from the trading halt literature directly contribute to our current study of 
predation. In the first, Subrahmanyam (1994) analyzes the behavior of market participants prior 
to an impending market-wide trading halt. He hypothesizes that a ‘magnet effect’ is created—
market participants, concerned over the impending inability to trade, modify their strategies and 
advance the timing of their trades to enable submission before trading is suspended. Goldstein 
and Kavajecz (2004) provide empirical support for the magnet effect when they examine the 
trading behavior of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) market participants during the October 
1997 market turbulence.  
The second research contribution is from Lee et al. (1994) who examine NYSE trading 
halts and find that interruptions in trading lead to increases in both volume and volatility. In the 
trading day following a halt, they report that volume is 230 percent greater and volatility is 50 to 
115 percent larger as compared to a control period of continuous trading. Elevated volume 
continues for at least three days and price volatility remains inflated for one full day following 
the resumption of trading.  
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We suggest that the increase in trading volume and price volatility surrounding an 
interruption in trading may be partially attributed to strategic traders submitting predatory orders. 
As Wong, Chang, and Tu (2009, page 39) state, “The only situation when institutions’ trades 
resulted in the magnet effect is when they are trading aggressively against the individuals 
towards the limit bounds.” Lee et al. (1994, page 210) assert, “The effects of halts on volume and 
volatility are clear. However, determining the source of these effects is complicated, since a halt 
is associated with a number of simultaneous factors.”  
Our third finding is provided by Corwin and Lipson (2000) from their investigation of 
order flow and liquidity surrounding trading halts on the NYSE. This research examines spreads 
and limit order book composition to determine the effect of trading halts on liquidity. They find 
that depth near the quotes on the limit order book and for the specialist is abnormally low 
surrounding halts. We consider if this decrease in liquidity is related to the actions of predatory 
trades that withdraw liquidity from the market. 
Offering an alternate view, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) theorize that trading halts 
may instead mitigate the problem of predatory trading. During a halt, traders have the 
opportunity to update their beliefs of an asset’s value; upon the resumption of trading, they are 
able to participate in a batch auction. Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s trading model assumes that 
long-term traders utilize limit orders, distressed traders submit market orders, and predators 
submit market orders to maximize their profit. After all orders are collected, they execute at a 
single price in the auction, after which sequential trading resumes. In this scenario, price 
overshooting is smaller compared to the model without a trading interruption. Providing support 
for Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s assertion, Kim and Yang (2004, page 126) state, “Trading halts 
can help protect traders from incurring heavy losses during periods of extreme illiquidity.”  
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TRADING HALTS AND THE NEED TO LIQUIDATE 
It is necessary to justify why a trading halt, particularly the associated price decrease, 
could create the need for a trader to liquidate his position. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) 
maintain that a trader who uses portfolio insurance, stop loss orders, or other risk management 
strategies may need to liquidate in response to price drops. Similarly, Schoeneborn and Schied 
(2009) suggest that a variety of circumstances, including margin calls or stop-loss strategies, in 
conjunction with large price drops can force market participants to liquidate a large asset position 
quickly.  
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) examine the relation between funding and market 
liquidity. They find that market liquidity is related to volatility – trading more volatile securities 
require higher margin payments. They show that if capital for speculators is abundant enough to 
eliminate the risk of reaching a funding constraint, market liquidity remains high and insensitive 
to changes in capital and margins. However, when speculators reach their capital constraints they 
reduce their positions and market liquidity subsequently declines.  
Attari, Mello, and Ruckes (2005) examine trading strategies implemented against 
financially constrained arbitrageurs. They report that in many financial markets a substantial 
percentage of trading volume is placed by a few large traders and that these traders are 
recognized by fellow market participants. These traders are often arbitrageurs, in the sense that 
their principal activity entails taking large positions to exploit small discrepancies in asset 
pricing. This research purports that a binding capital constraint can cause an arbitrageur to 
liquidate partially or fully their position, however, his trades and the subsequent impact on 
market prices become predictable. By exploiting the arbitrageur’s capital constraint, competitors 
can engage in predatory trading, but only for arbitrageurs with large asset positions.  
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PREDATION 
The effectiveness of predatory trading relies on the relation between liquidity and asset 
pricing. Liquidity describes the ability to trade large quantities of an asset, at a low cost, and 
without significantly influencing prices. Research develops models that demonstrate this relation. 
For example, Pastor and Stambaugh (2001 page 643) purport that order flow produces larger 
return reversals in the presence of decreased levels of liquidity. They state, “Liquidation is 
costlier when liquidity is lower, and those costs are especially unwelcome to an investor whose 
wealth has already dropped …” Easley, Engle, O’Hara, and Wu (2008 page 172) develop a 
dynamic model of trading that describes how trade composition interacts with market liquidity, 
depth, and order flow. They state, “… order flow is informative regarding subsequent price 
movements,” and “… market observers can infer new information regarding the value of the 
asset from the composition and existence of trades.” They purport that when a portfolio manager 
submits consecutive sell orders, the price change resulting from these orders could be significant. 
Similarly, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) develop a liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing 
model and find that an asset’s required rate of return is dependent in part on its liquidity and that 
illiquid securities have high liquidity risk in illiquid markets. They suggest that investors should 
be concerned about a security’s performance and tradability when liquidity “dries up.” 
Additional research explicitly models the relation between liquidity and predatory 
behavior. For instance, Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanthan (2007) develop an equilibrium-trading 
model based on liquidity needs. The model demonstrates how episodes of illiquidity and 
subsequent predatory trading occur during interruptions in the cooperation normally present 
between market participants, which may occur in the case of a large sale. Within their model, 
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predatory traders race distressed traders to the market and quickly sell, eventually reversing their 
trades.  
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) examine predatory trading, which they describe as 
trades that exploit the needs of other investors who are attempting to reduce their positions 
quickly. Within their model, the predatory trader attempts to front-run the distressed trader by 
selling before him and buying back shares after the distressed trader has pushed down the price. 
The combined selling by the predatory and the liquidating trader leads to price overshooting. The 
predator profits by selling his assets at a price higher than the price at which he can repurchase 
them after the distressed trader has left the market. This research demonstrates that predation is 
profitable if the market is illiquid and if the distressed trader’s position is large relative to the 
buying capacity of other traders.  
Schoeneborn and Schied (2009) also suggest that informed market participants are aware 
of market liquidity needs and can extract a profit by engaging in predatory trading. Additionally, 
they suggest that price overshooting is mitigated as the number of predators in the market 
increases. With a large number of predators, the seller’s intentions are impounded into prices 
almost immediately and the price exhibits little additional drift.  
We suggest that informed traders can exploit their informational advantage concerning 
the plight of liquidating traders by initiating either sell market or short sell transactions. 
Examining both short and non-short trading, Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2012) examine 
large “no–news” negative price reversals. They find that aggressive short selling significantly 
increases the impact of price declines. They also find, consistent with predation theory, that price 
reversals are associated with aggressive non-short selling.  
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An empirical example of predation is provided by Cai (2003), who examines trading 
behavior surrounding the 1998 event in which Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) faced 
binding margin constraints and a subsequent need for immediate liquidation. The author finds 
evidence that informed traders, with superior information about customer order flow, exploited 
their informational advantage by front running LTCM’s trades. 
Onayev and Zdorovtsov (2008) also investigate predatory trading in an attempt to 
determine if it occurs surrounding the annual reconstitution of the Russell 3000 Index. These 
researchers purport that predatory trading has the potential to affect which stocks are included in 
the index as well as each member’s weight. If speculative traders are able to predict or affect 
which securities will be entering or exiting the index, they can establish a preemptive position in 
these securities, and later earn significant gains. These researchers find evidence of strategic 
predatory trading in that the resulting membership weights in the index were influenced by the 
manipulation of some securities’ closing prices.  
We purport that a halt in trading and the associated decline in a halted security’s price can 
necessitate that constrained investors liquidate their positions. As the constrained trader begins 
liquidating, other strategic traders recognize the plight of the constrained trader. The strategic 
trader then initiates predatory trading by selling in parallel with the constrained trader. This 
activity leads to order imbalances, price declines, and price overshooting.  
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HYPOTHESES
Research models describe a sequence of events that comprise predatory behavior. 
Predation is centered on the need of a constrained trader to liquidate his position. These models 
predict that once this need is recognized by other market participants, predatory activity begins 
as strategic traders sell in parallel with the constrained trader, causing price declines and making 
liquidation more costly. After the constrained trader leaves the market, the strategic traders 
repurchase the asset, producing substantial price reversals. For example, Attari et al. (2005) 
purport strategic predatory trading can lead to significant distortions in price, and Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen’s (2005) description of predatory trading entails large price reversals. We examine 
order flow and security prices for halted firms surrounding interruptions in trading to determine 
if predatory activity is evident through (1) significant initial price declines, (2) order imbalances 
with a higher percentage of sells for non-short trades, and increased levels of short sales, and (3) 
large price reversals with increased buying pressure.  
 
H1: Securities undergoing trading halts will demonstrate predatory trading by 
experiencing an initial significant price decline.  
H2: Securities undergoing trading halts will demonstrate predatory trading by 
experiencing event-day order imbalances caused by both non-short and short 
selling.  
H3: Securities undergoing trading halts will demonstrate predatory trading by 
experiencing large price reversals.  
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DATA 
We first identify NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) trading halts that occur 
during 2005–2006 by querying the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database via Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS) for stocks with a trading mode of 4, 7 or 11, indicating halts in trading 
for news dissemination, order imbalance, or news pending, respectively. From this set, we 
remove observations where multiple halts occur for the same stock on the same trading day and 
halts that occur outside normal market hours. 
D’Avolio (2002) finds that 16 percent of stocks in the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) data are potentially difficult to sell short. Of these stocks, the majority are in the 
bottom size decile and the prices of over half are under five dollars. They also find 
approximately 10 percent of stocks are never shorted – these are primarily illiquid stocks, for 
which shorting may represent a limited opportunity for profit. These researchers note that 
institutional investors, who lend stocks for shorting, are biased towards large, liquid stocks, and 
that the probability of incurring loan fees in excess of the risk free rate is inversely related to firm 
size and the level of institutional ownership. Accordingly, we, in a manner similar to Christophe, 
Ferri, and Angel (2004), eliminate trading halts for any stock whose average daily price and 
trading volume during 2005 – 2006 was less than five dollars and 100 shares. 
Because our intent is to examine trading activity and market quality prior to and 
following trading halts, we follow the methodology of Corwin and Lipson (2000) and eliminate 
halts that occur before 10:00 a.m. We also eliminate halts with incomplete data or halts that do 
not resolve on the same trading day. 
Rule 202T implemented the suspension of the short sale price test for a pilot list of 
stocks. The resolution was adopted in 2004 – the suspension was in effect from May 2, 2005 
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through August 6, 2007. Diether et al. (2009A) find that although daily returns and volatility 
levels are unaffected for pilot stocks during the test suspension, short selling activity, spreads and 
intraday volatility increases for these stocks. Because the test suspension period covers part, but 
not all of our sample period, to mitigate confounding effects, we remove from our sample any 
firms included in the pilot list of stocks for price test exclusion. 
Finally, we remove observations where more than one trading halt occurs for the same 
firm within our event period. The event period is an 11-trading-day interval beginning five days 
prior to and ending 5 days after the halt day. Christophe et al. (2004) use a multiday pre-event 
period because short sellers may distribute their trading over several days prior to an event to 
disguise private information and because the average loan duration for equity is three days (Reed 
2007). We create an estimation period 30 days prior to the halt to establish normal trading 
behavior, in terms of trading volume and price movement. For our intraday examination, we 
identify the halt period, which begins with the interruption in trading and ends when trading 
resumes. Intraday pre-halt periods are measured backwards from the beginning of the halt, and 
post-halt periods are measured forward from the reopening of trading. 
 
-30                               -5                                -1 0 +1                                    +5 
 Pre-Halt Event Halt Day Post-Halt Event 
Estimation Period   
 
Daily price, trading volume, return, and market capitalization data are obtained from the 
CRSP database. The Regulation SHO database, which was created in response to Rule 202T, 
provides trade size and time stamps for short-selling transactions. TAQ trade and quote data is 
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used to examine intraday activity. Trade data is filtered to remove observations that occur 
outside normal market hours, and transactions with a non-positive prices, or a condition code 
other than zero. Quote data is filtered to retain observations that occur within normal market 
hours and have a positive bid or ask size, price and spread. 
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
After applying data filters to refine our set of events, our remaining sample consists of 78 
trading halts, 55 of which occur on the NYSE. Summary statistics describing these halts are 
presented in Table 1, Panels A through I. Firm names, trading halt mode and SIC code are listed 
in Appendix E. 
Of these halts, sixty percent more occur in 2005 than in 2006 (48 as compared to 30). 
Similar to Christophe et al. (2004), we find that trading halts in our sample occur more 
frequently during the middle of the week – Tuesday through Thursday. These interruptions in 
trading occur in 23 out of the 24 sample period months, without evidence of an obvious seasonal 
pattern. We examine 68 unique firms, 64 of which experience a single halt during the sample 
period, and 4 different firms that experience 2, 3, 4, or 5 halts each. 
The halts in our study are primarily (83 percent) implemented due to pending news. The 
mean duration of all sample halts is just over 41 minutes. Although the duration of trading halts 
reported by Lee et al. (1994); Corwin and Lipson (2000); and Christie, Corwin, and Harris 
(2002) is greater on average and for each halt type, our findings coincide with previous research 
in the ranking of halt types by length: news pending halts have the longest duration and order 
imbalance halts, the shortest. 
160 
 
Summary statistics suggest a substantial variation in the size of sample firms, stock price 
and trading volume with higher average values in 2006 as compared to 2005. The firms in our 
study generally demonstrate positive returns over the two-year period examined. When the 
sample firms are categorized according to year-end capitalization portfolio assignments 
established by CRSP, we find, similar to Christophe et al. (2004) that large firms are more 
heavily represented in our sample - we have fewer firms in the lower market capitalization 
deciles. The dearth of smaller firms may be due, in part, to our data filter that eliminates trading 
halts for any stock whose average daily price during the sample period is less than five dollars. 
We examine short-selling levels for our sample firms during the 2005–2006 sample 
period. For each exchange, we report both short volume as a percentage of the total shares 
shorted and the number of short sale transactions as a percentage of the total number of short 
selling trades. No short transactions for our sample firms/period are reported on the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Alternative Display Facility (ADF), Archipelago (ARCA) and 
the Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX).  
In line with the findings presented by Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009B), approximately 
three-fourths of short volume and short trades for our sample firms are executed on the NYSE. 
Approximately 14 percent of short volume and 13 percent of short trades are placed on the 
NASDAQ market. The average firm in our sample has 379 short transactions per trading day 
with an average daily short volume of just over 200,000 shares. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
This table contains summary statistics for trading halts that occur during 2005 – 2006 for NYSE-
listed firms. Halts have been filtered to remove observations that occur outside of market hours 
or before 10:00 a.m., where more than one halt occurs for a sample firms on the same day, halts 
that do not resolve on the same trading day and multiple halts for the same firm within the 11-
day surrounding halts, halts for Rule 202T pilot stocks, and observations for stocks whose 
average daily price and trading volume during 2005 – 2006 was less than five dollars and 100 
shares.  
Panel A: Halts by Year  
Year Number of Halts Unique Firms  
2005 48 44  
2006 30 28  
Full Sample 78 68  
Panel B: Number of Halts per Year 
Number of Halts in Sample 1 2 3 4 5  
Number of Firms       
2005 42 1 0 1 0  
2006 27 0 1 0 0  
Full Sample 64 1 1 1 1  
Panel C: Halts by Day of Week and Year 
 Day of Week 
Year Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Total 
2005 2 10 13 18 5 48 
2006 4 9 7 5 5 30 
Full Sample 6 19 20 23 10 78 
Panel D: Halts by Month and Year 
 Month 
Year Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2005 4 2 5 7 8 5 4 5 1 3 2 2 
2006 1 2 4 4 1 3 0 3 1 5 3 3 
Full Sample 5 4 9 11 9 8 4 8 2 8 5 5 
Panel E: Halts and Duration by Halt Type 
Trading Halt Type Number of Halts Mean Duration  
News Dissemination (4) 6 0:29:27  
Order Imbalance (7) 7 0:17:29  
News Pending (11) 65 0:44:46  
Full Sample 78 0:41:08  
Panel F: Halt Firm Characteristics  - Average Daily Values 
 Price Volume Return Market Cap 
Year: 2005 (N =44)     
Mean 31.89 735,803 0.0590% 3,880,142 
Max 110.65 5,902,434 0.3331% 65,755,430 
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Min 4.47 1099 -0.1728% 33,149 
Std 23.90 1,295,571 0.1144% 10,371,325 
Year: 2006 (N=28)     
Mean 33.23 1,408,912 0.0438% 4,946,224 
Max 141.33 7,642,372 0.3072% 40,548,995 
Min 6.45 1,187 -0.4135% 111,400 
Std 27.81 1,856,984 0.1346% 9,403,555 
Full Sample (N=72)     
Mean 32.41 997,568 0.0531% 4,294,729 
Max 141.33 7,642,372 0.3331% 65,755,430 
Min 4.47 1099 -0.4135% 33,149 
Std 25.31 1,561,124 0.1219% 9,952,168 
Panel G: CRSP Capitalization-Based Decile 
Decile 2005 2006 Full Sample  
1 0 0 0  
2 2 0 2  
3 4 2 6  
4 4 1 5  
5 5 2 7  
6 6 8 14  
7 2 3 5  
8 9 4 13  
9 4 3 7  
10 8 5 13  
Total 44 28 72  
Panel H: Short-sale Trading Activity Across Exchanges (2005 – 2006) 
 ADF AMEX ARCA BSE CHX NASDAQ NSX NYSE PHLX 
Mean Shares 
Sold Short (%) 
0.00 2.94 0.00 0.53 0.00 14.19 5.67 76.38 0.29 
Mean Short-
sale Trades (%) 
0.00 3.73 0.00 0.64 0.00 12.77 6.77 76.07 0.03 
Panel I: Short-selling Summary Statistics per Stock 
 Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Short Sale Daily Volume 201,427 192,125 72,895 67,124 1,285,773 
Number of Daily Short Trades 379 349 149 128 2,727 
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RESULTS 
The model of predation developed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) describes how 
contemporaneous selling by the distressed and predatory traders leads to price overshooting: a 
substantial initial price decline is followed by a rebound as predatory traders repurchase shares. 
Appendix D contains diagrams that depict the price reaction associated with predation and the 
subsequent change in the value of holdings of the predators and the distressed trader. To 
determine whether halted stocks in our sample show evidence of predation, we examine halt-day 
price movements and attempt to link subsequent returns with the predatory trading behavior of 
market participants. 
 
Initial Price Decline 
Our hypothesis regarding the price behavior of halted stocks purports that: 
 
H1: Securities undergoing trading halts will demonstrate predatory trading by experiencing 
an initial significant price decline.  
 
To identify and measure price declines, we compute, for the halted stocks for 5-minute 
intervals on the halt-day      , a standardized abnormal return measure: 
          
                                       
                      
      (1) 
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Where        represents the return for stock i during interval j on the halt day, 
                               is the average return for stock i during the pre-halt period (days -30 to -1), and 
                        is the stock’s pre-halt return standard deviation. For example, an abret 
value of two indicates that the excess return earned is two return standard deviations greater than 
the return in the corresponding interval during the estimation period. Twelve periods are 
measured backwards from the beginning of the halt and forward from the resumption of trading.  
The abnormal standardized return values are displayed in Figure 1. Preceding the halt, 
abret values appear relatively stable and cluster near zero until two periods immediately prior to 
the interruption in trading, when a measurable increase is noted from 0.04 to 0.45. An extreme 
price movement occurs in period -1, with the abnormal standardized return increasing to 1.30; 
this upward trend continues upon the resumption of trading. Prices experience a steep decline as 
abret values drop from a peak of 1.46 in period +1 to a low of -2.94 in the following period, 
before immediately rebounding to -0.76. The price behavior demonstrated upon the resumption 
of trading closely resembles the pattern predicted in the predatory model: an initial price decline, 
price overshooting and a subsequent recovery.  
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Figure 1 
Abnormal Standardized Return 
Abnormal standardized returns, the difference between the return on the halt day and 
estimation period standardized by the estimation period standard deviation, are computed for 
5-minute intervals on the halt day. Periods are measured backwards from the beginning of the 
halt and forward from the resumption of trading. 
 
Previous research uses stock price synchronicity, the R-squared (R
2
) statistic obtained by 
regressing the return for an individual stock on market returns (the market model), to explain the 
extent to which private information is incorporated into stock prices (Stowe and Xing, 2011). 
Xing and Anderson (2011, page 260), state that this statistic should, “directly mirror the relative 
amount of firm-specific information impounded into stock prices.” Following the methodology 
of Onayev and Zdorovtsoz (2008), we use this regression approach to determine the portion of 
price movement attributable to the periods surrounding a trading halt. At the daily level, we 
regress the return for the pre-halt estimation period on the return earned on the halt day. At the 
intraday level, the return for the halt day is regressed on the return for the 30-minute periods 
prior to the halt and following the resumption of trading. We also examine whether price 
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behavior on the halt day differs from the trading behavior exhibited during the 30-day pre-halt 
estimation period. Coefficient and Adjusted R
2
 values are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Daily and Intraday Regressions 
The daily coefficient and R
2
 are obtained by regressing the return earned in the 30 days prior to 
the halt on to the halt day return. The intraday values result from regressing the halt day return 
on the return earned 30 minutes prior to the interruption in trading and following the resumption 
of trading. Intraday regressions are repeated for the 30-day pre-halt estimation period. T-
statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Dependent Variable Coefficient Adjusted R
2
 N 
Halt Day     
Daily 0.1705 (1.09)  .0497 62 
Intraday Pre 0.1388 (1.41) .2203 52 
Intraday Post 0.3034 (9.61) *** .6060 62 
Estimation Period     
Intraday Pre 0.0013 (1.23) .0084 62 
Intraday Post 0.0031 (2.26) ** .0633 62 
*** and ** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively 
 
The coefficient of determination, R
2
, obtained from our regression model describes the 
proportion of return variability ascribed to the dependent variable: at the daily level, it explains 
the extent to which the halt-day return contributes to the monthly return. If the return for a stock 
is evenly distributed throughout the month, each trading day is responsible for approximately 
4.76 percent of the price contribution (1 ÷ 21 days). The Adjusted R
2
 value of 4.97 percent 
computed for the event day indicates that the halt-day return provides approximately the 
expected contribution towards the month’s return. However, previous trading halt research and 
our examination of abnormal standardized return both suggest that halted stocks experience 
substantial price declines on the halt day.
12
 Finding both extreme intra-day price movements and 
an overall expected daily return contribution suggests that price declines surrounding trading 
                                                          
12
 Refer to Kryzanowski (1979); and Madura, Richie, and Tucker (2006) for examples of the impact of trading halts 
on returns. 
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halts are accompanied by a rebound - stock prices recover to near their original levels by the end 
of the trading day. This result lends credence to the presence of the price decline and reversal 
associated with predation. 
At the intraday level, the R
2
 values describe how the 30-minute period pre- and post-halt 
returns contribute to the return earned on the halt day. Each 30-minute trading period, on 
average, should provide approximately 7.69 percent of price contribution (1 ÷ 13 periods). For 
the estimation period, the contribution in the 30 minutes prior to the trading halt is much smaller 
at only 0.84 percent, but the post-halt period Adjusted R
2
 of 6.33 percent is at a more-anticipated 
level. In contrast, halt-day values are substantially elevated - over 22 and 60 percent of price 
contribution occurs in the pre- and post-halt periods, respectively. This finding corresponds with 
the considerable price movement immediately prior to the halt and following the resumption of 
trading noted in our examination of abnormal standardized return. 
To determine if there exists a causal relation between the trading activity and price 
movement surrounding halts, we compute Granger Causality for 5-minute periods on the halt day 
between short volume, non-short volume, and returns. Periods are measured backward from the 
implementation of the halt and forward from the resumption of trading. Partial canonical and 
cross correlations, which demonstrate significance for up to nine intervals, are used to determine 
the appropriate number of lags to examine. These results are presented in Panel A of Table 3. 
Chi-Square and associated p-values describing the causal relation between non-short 
volume, short volume, and returns are listed in Table 3, Panel B. The null hypothesis of the 
Granger Causality Wald test purports that the value of the dependent variable is influenced only 
by itself; an alpha value indicating statistical significance allows us to reject the null hypothesis 
and establishes that one variable exerts influence over another.  
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Table 3 
Correlations  and Granger Causality  
Granger Causality is computed for each period between short volume, non-short volume, and returns. 
Periods are 5-minute intervals measured backwards from the halt and forward from the resumption of 
trading. Partial canonical and cross correlations are used to determine the appropriate number of lags – 
p-values are reported for nine lags. NS Vol represents non-short volume and S Vol represents short 
volume. 
Panel A: Correlations 
Partial Canonical Correlations Schematic Representation of Partial Cross Correlations 
Lag X
2
 Pr > X
2
 Short Volume Non-Short Volume Return 
1 1313.28 <.0001 *** + +. + + . . . + 
2 148.93 <.0001 *** + - . + . . - + . 
3 80.09 <.0001 *** + . . + + . . . . 
4 34.12 <.0001 *** - - . . . . . . + 
5 27.13 0.0013 *** . . . - . . . . . 
6 20.80 0.0136 ** - . . + . . . . . 
7 27.26 0.0013 *** . + . - . . . . . 
8 6.54 0.6852 . . . . . . . . . 
9 34.92 <.0001 *** + - . - . . . . . 
10 8.83 0.4530 . . . . . . . . . 
11 10.63 0.3022 . + . . . . . . . 
12 11.63 0.2350 . . . . . . . . . 
Panel B: Granger Causality Wald Test 
 NS Vol  
Return 
S Vol  
Return 
Return  
NS Vol 
Return  
S Vol 
NS Vol  
S Vol 
S Vol   
NS Vol 
Lag X
2
 Pr > X
2
 X
2
 Pr > X
2
 X
2
 Pr > X
2
 X
2
 Pr > X
2
 X
2
 Pr > X
2
 X
2
 Pr > X
2
 
1 0.05 0.8256 3.68 0.0550  
* 
0.07 0.7899 1.44 0.2305 254.72 <.0001 
*** 
10.77 0.0010 
*** 
2 0.11 0.9485 5.13 0.0770 
 * 
2.01 0.3658 10.92 0.0042 
*** 
148.69 <.0001 
*** 
12.05 0.0024 
*** 
3 0.13 0.9886 6.50 0.0895 
* 
2.23 0.5256 10.07 0.0179 
** 
124.54 <.0001 
*** 
7.25 0.0642  
* 
4 0.23 0.9938 7.83 0.0982 
* 
3.26 0.5151 13.38 0.0096 
*** 
137.65 <.0001 
*** 
20.27 0.0004 
*** 
5 0.23 0.9988 7.91 0.1615 3.62 0.6047 15.38 0.0089 
*** 
155.74 <.0001 
*** 
22.49 0.0004 
*** 
6 0.88 0.9897 8.24 0.2209 3.69 0.7189 15.37 0.0176 
** 
155.89 <.0001 
*** 
20.16 0.0026 
*** 
7 1.47 0.9833 8.80 0.2670 4.14 0.7631 15.46 0.0306 
** 
170.12 <.0001 
*** 
23.20 0.0016 
*** 
8 1.53 0.9922 8.81 0.3589 5.33 0.7222 15.34 0.0528  
* 
169.53 <.0001 
*** 
23.20 0.0031 
*** 
9 1.62 0.9961 8.75 0.4606 8.65 0.4704 16.48 0.0576  
* 
188.28 <.0001 
*** 
28.87 0.0007 
*** 
+ is > 2 * std error, - is < -2 * std error, . is in between 
***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively  
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We find no indication that a significant causal relation exists in either direction between 
non-short volume and returns. However, it appears that short volume granger-causes returns for 
up to four lagged periods and returns in the previous nine periods influence short volume. A 
significant bi-directional relation for all nine periods is also noted between levels of short and 
non-short trading volume. These relations are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
Granger Causality  
Granger Causality is computed for 5-minute periods on the halt day between short volume, non-
short volume, and returns. Periods are measured backward from the implementation of the halt 
and forward from the resumption of trading. Arrows indicate direction of causality; solid lines 
depict a significant relation while dashed lines demonstrate that no significant relation was 
identified. 
 
Results from the Granger Causality test suggest that short selling activity leads to 
increased price movement and that returns impact the trading behavior of short sellers. When 
viewed in the context of predatory behavior surround trading halts, the initial price decline might 
be explained by the relation between short selling and returns: as returns decrease short selling 
increases, and the increase in short selling leads to further price declines until the distressed 
trader exits that market and predators begin repurchasing the asset. 
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In support of Hypothesis 1, the securities of sample firms evidence behavior that might 
be attributed to predatory trading activity, particularly on the part of short sellers. Prices 
demonstrate, following the resumption of trading, the sharp decline and rebound described in 
predatory models. Intraday price contribution values indicate increased price movement 
surrounding the halt, while the proportional daily price contribution of the halt day in monthly 
returns lends support to the presence of a price rebound. 
 
Order Imbalances 
The trading model of predation presented in previous literature suggests that predatory 
traders initially engage in contemporaneous selling while the distressed trader is attempting to 
liquidate his position, then predators switch roles and begin repurchasing the asset. This trading 
behavior should lead to order imbalances, with higher levels of selling as prices decline and 
increased buying as prices rebound. Brown, Walsh, and Yuen (1997 page 539) state, “… a 
temporal imbalance between buy and sell orders arriving at a market increases the likelihood that 
informed traders are attempting to pre-empt good or bad news ….” Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2002 page 118) find that excess buy (sell) orders drive up (down) security 
prices; they state, “For an individual stock, a large order imbalance could be random or induced 
by either public or private information.”  
Our hypothesis regarding the relation between buy and sell orders for halted stocks 
suggest that: 
H2: Securities undergoing trading halts will demonstrate predatory trading by experiencing 
event-day order imbalances caused by both non-short and short selling.  
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To determine if halted stocks experience a buy-sell order imbalance we first measure the 
buy/sell trading volume and number of trades for 5-minutes periods on the event day. Twelve 
periods (one hour) are measured backwards from the halt and forward from the resumption of 
trading. Trades are classified as buyer or seller initiated using the Lee and Ready (1991) 
algorithm with contemporaneous transactions. The tick test is used to designate trades that 
execute at the mid-point between the bid and ask price. Mean period buy and sell volume and 
number of trades is also computed for the 30-day pre-halt estimation period. 
A discernible difference between halt day and estimation period buy/sell trading activity 
is demonstrated in Figure 3. During the estimation period, both the trading volume and the 
number of trades are relatively constant, with levels of buyer-initiated trades and volume 
surpassing seller-initiated amounts in each 5-minute period (Panels A and B). On the halt day, a 
measurable increase in both trading volume and the number of trades occurs in the three periods 
prior to the interruption in trading. The number of transactions and the resulting volume increase 
remarkably as trading resumes (Panels C and D).  
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Panel C: Halt-Day Volume Panel D: Halt-Day Number of Trades 
Figure 3 
Volume and Number of Trades  
Volume and the number of trades are computed for 5-minute periods relative to trading halts on the halt 
day and during the estimation period (30 days trading days prior to the halt). Trades are classified as buyer 
or seller initiated according to the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm using contemporaneous transactions. 
Periods are measured backwards from the halt and forward from the resumption of trade. 
 
Order flow imbalance is calculated for the pre-halt estimation period and the halt day as 
the difference between the volume (number of trades) of buys and sells, divided by the total 
volume (number of transactions) during 5-minute periods relative to the halt: 
 
Order Flow Imbalancei = (Buysi – Sellsi) / (Buysi + Sellsi)   (2) 
 
We also calculate, for each 5-minute period, the difference between the halt day and the 
30-day pre-halt estimation period for each order imbalance measurement. Values for the 
estimation period, the halt day and differences are listed in Table 4 (trading volume) and Table 5 
(number of Transactions) and are shown in Figure 4 – estimation period, halt day and differences 
in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Order Imbalance – Trading Volume  
Order flow imbalance is computed for the 30-day pre-halt estimation period and the event day as 
the difference between the volume of buys and sells, divided by the total volume over the period. 
The differences in order imbalance ratios are computed between the halt and the estimation 
period. Trades are classified as buyer or seller initiated using the Lee and Ready algorithm and 
contemporaneous transactions. t-statistics are listed in parentheses 
Period Estimation Period Halt Day Differences 
-12 0.0632 (6.16) *** 0.0305 (0.48) -0.0457 (-0.74) 
-11 0.0592 (4.77) *** 0.1234 (1.81) * 0.0572 (0.79) 
-10 0.0842 (6.64) *** 0.0927 (1.33) 0.0039 (0.05) 
-9 0.0856 (7.18) *** 0.1308 (1.92) * 0.0473 (0.69) 
-8 0.0718 (4.62) *** 0.1055 (1.52) 0.0283 (0.39) 
-7 0.0870 (7.06) *** 0.1321 (2.22) ** 0.0372 (0.66) 
-6 0.0904 (6.61) *** 0.0539 (0.69) -0.0273 (-0.33) 
-5 0.0780 (5.52) *** 0.1426 (2.07) ** 0.0623 (0.92) 
-4 0.0653 (5.68) *** 0.0629 (0.92) 0.0027 (0.04) 
-3 0.0848 (5.82) *** 0.0595 (0.86) -0.0402 (-0.60) 
-2 0.0844 (6.57) *** 0.0436 (0.66) -0.0393 (-0.61) 
-1 0.0989 (7.08) *** 0.0919 (1.42) -0.0076 (-0.11) 
Halt       
1 0.0928 (7.05) *** 0.1032 (1.87) * 0.0632 (1.04) 
2 0.0831 (6.70) *** 0.1980 (4.27) *** 0.1112 (2.21) ** 
3 0.0764 (7.52) *** 0.2545 (4.83) *** 0.1574 (2.97) *** 
4 0.0587 (4.01) *** 0.1593 (2.88) *** 0.1118 (2.08) ** 
5 0.0861 (7.06) *** 0.1222 (2.14) ** 0.0497 (0.75) 
6 0.0884 (7.09) *** 0.1004 (1.80) * 0.0172 (0.29) 
7 0.0813 (7.08) *** 0.0720 (1.18) 0.0081 (0.13) 
8 0.0836 (7.32) *** 0.1370 (1.96) * 0.0630 (0.88) 
9 0.0566 (4.40) *** 0.0906 (1.37) 0.0403 (0.60) 
10 0.0779 (8.19) *** 0.1156 (1.72) * 0.0396 (0.56) 
11 0.0792 (5.58) *** 0.1707 (2.80) *** 0.1055 (1.57) 
12 0.0889 (5.81) *** 0.1228 (1.71) * 0.0370 (0.49) 
***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively 
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Table 5 
Order Imbalance – Number of Transactions  
Order flow imbalance is computed for the 30-day pre-halt estimation period and the event 
day as the difference between the number of buy and sell trades, divided by the total number 
of transactions over the period. The differences in order imbalance ratios are computed 
between the halt and the estimation period. Trades are classified as buyer or seller initiated 
using the Lee and Ready algorithm and contemporaneous transactions. t-statistics are listed 
in parentheses 
Period Estimation Period Halt Day Differences 
-12 0.0679 (7.30) *** 0.0597 (1.15) -0.0175 (-0.34) 
-11 0.0720 (7.53) *** 0.1252 (2.34) ** 0.0461 (0.80) 
-10 0.0728 (8.08) *** 0.0531 (0.92) -0.0220 (-0.35) 
-9 0.0841 (9.62) *** 0.0864 (1.64) -0.0006 (-0.01) 
-8 0.0700 (6.51) *** 0.0692 (1.44) -0.0059 (-0.12) 
-7 0.0823 (8.39) *** 0.0832 (1.73) * -0.0007 (-0.02) 
-6 0.0767 (8.02) *** 0.0883 (1.41) 0.0156 (0.24) 
-5 0.0714 (9.11) *** 0.1432 (2.72) *** 0.0733 (1.37) 
-4 0.0653 (6.89) *** 0.0678 (1.41) 0.0016 (0.03) 
-3 0.0759 (7.89) *** 0.1030 (1.92) * 0.0162 (0.29) 
-2 0.0775 (7.50) *** 0.1115 (2.56) ** 0.0369 (0.87) 
-1 0.0845 (8.64) ** 0.1001 (2.05) ** 0.0226 (0.41) 
Halt       
1 0.0714 (6.47) *** 0.1123 (2.66) ** 0.0664 (1.42) 
2 0.0766 (7.90) *** 0.2035 (5.29) *** 0.1336 (3.47) *** 
3 0.0795 (8.01) *** 0.2202 (5.30) *** 0.1437 (3.44) *** 
4 0.0521 (3.77) *** 0.1415 (3.42) *** 0.1001 (2.47) ** 
5 0.0748 (7.67) *** 0.1089 (2.58) ** 0.0426 (0.88) 
6 0.0849 (8.09) *** 0.0957 (2.37) ** 0.0076 (0.18) 
7 0.0865 (7.78) *** 0.0559 (1.36) -0.0161 (-0.38) 
8 0.0850 (10.28) *** 0.1448 (2.85) *** 0.0638 (1.19) 
9 0.0580 (5.67) *** 0.0672 (1.22) 0.0124 (0.22) 
10 0.0725 (7.56) *** 0.1519 (3.33) *** 0.0787 (1.59) 
11 0.0859 (7.51) *** 0.1369 (2.79) *** 0.0602 (1.14) 
12 0.0890 (8.72) *** 0.1094 (2.05) ** 0.0293 (0.49) 
***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively 
 
175 
 
 
Panel A: Estimation Period Order Imbalance 
 
Panel B: Halt-Day Order Imbalance 
 
Panel C: Difference in Halt and Estimation Order Imbalances 
Figure 4 
Order Imbalance 
Order flow imbalance is computed for the 30-day pre-halt estimation period (Panel A) and the 
event day (Panel B) as the difference between the volume (number) of buys and sells, divided 
by the total volume (number of transactions) over the period. The differences in order 
imbalance ratios between the halt and the estimation period are presented in Panel C. Trades 
are classified as buyer or seller initiated using the Lee and Ready algorithm and 
contemporaneous transactions. 
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During the estimation period, order imbalance metrics for both trading volume and 
number of trades are positive and relatively stable for all periods, ranging from 5.21 to 9.89 
percent. Previous studies support the presence of a higher number of buyer-initiated transactions: 
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2002); and Chordia et al. (2002) find, in their examination of daily 
trading on the NYSE, positive order imbalances (buys exceeding sells) for the number of trades, 
shares, and dollar volume. 
On the halt day, order imbalance metrics for volume and number of trades range from 
3.05 to 14.26 percent in the periods preceding the halt. Upon the resumption of trading, both 
measurements increase significantly, with maximum values, occurring in period +3, of 25.45 
percent for trading volume and 22.02 percent for the number of trades; these metrics remain 
elevated for six consecutive post-halt periods. The difference variable demonstrates a 
corresponding significant increase in periods +2 through +4, when the order imbalance is 
approximately 11 to 16 percent higher than on non-halt days. 
Chordia et al. (2002) examine daily order imbalances on the NYSE. They find that order 
imbalance increases following a market decline and selling activity is heightened following 
market rises. We are able to identify this pattern in our results: order imbalance metrics peak in 
period +3 after the negative abnormal standardized return in period +2, and more seller-initiated 
activity (lower order imbalance values) occur in periods +4 though +6 as stock prices rebound 
and abret values increase. 
In all halt-day periods, buyer-initiated activity exceeds the activity initiated by sellers. 
The largest buy/sell discrepancy occurs upon the post-halt continuation of trading. This result is 
in direct opposition to our expectations: an increase in seller-initiated activity is anticipated 
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directly after the halt during the interval when prices decline and positive order imbalances are 
expected to correspond with buyer-initiated activity during the price rebound.  
This unexpected result might be attributed to the manner in which the Lee-Ready 
algorithm categorizes short sales. Asquith, Oman, and Safaya (2010), describe how previous 
studies analyzing the Lee-Ready algorithm report 72 to 93 percent accuracy rates. However, 
these tests are performed prior to the 2001 conversion to reporting market prices in decimals – 
narrower spreads resulting from decimalization potentially make it more difficult to classify 
trades accurately. Additionally, these researchers explain how the uptick rule, which allows 
execution of a short sale only on an uptick or zero tick, may cause short sales to execute at a 
price above the bid-ask spread midpoint and subsequently result in the improper classification of 
short sale transactions as buyer-initiated. Results from this research suggest that the Lee-Ready 
algorithm overwhelmingly classifies short transactions, which represent nearly 30 percent of 
trading volume, as buyer-initiated. Specifically, they find that the Lee-Ready algorithm, using 
contemporaneous transactions, classifies 66.5 percent of short trades as buyer-initiated. When 
differentiating between stocks participating in the SEC Pilot study (Rule 202T), they find, during 
June and December of 2005, between 85.1 and 88.0 percent of short sales for a sample of NYSE 
non-pilot stocks are classified as buyer-initiated.  
To determine if this explanation is applicable to our research, we compute, for both the 
halt day and the 30-day pre-halt estimation period, levels of non-short and short volume, and the 
percent short volume represents of total volume during each of the twelve pre- and post-halt 
periods (shown in Figure 5). The estimation period results demonstrate relatively constant 
values, with short selling activity representing approximately twenty percent of overall trading 
volume (Panels A and B). On the halt day, however, we identify several key differences. During 
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periods -3 through -1, overall trading volume increases while levels of short volume remains 
stable; short selling represents only 11 to 13 percent of trading volume during these intervals. 
Both trading volume and short selling activity increase dramatically as trading resumes – short 
selling represents over 23 percent of trading volume in the first post-halt period. Although 
trading and short volume remain well above pre-halt levels, they show marked decreases in the 
second post-halt period. Short selling appears to experience a more substantial decrease, as the 
percent short selling represents of total volume falls to less than 17 percent. 
  
Panel A: Estimation Trading Volume Panel B: Estimation Shorting Percentage 
  
Panel C: Halt-Day Trading Volume Panel D: Halt-Day Shorting Percentage 
Figure 5 
Short and Non-short Selling Volume and Percent of Trades 
Short and non-short trading volume and the percent short sales represents of total trading volume is 
computed for 5-minute periods on the halt day and during the 30-day pre-halt estimation period. 
Periods are measured backwards from the halt and forward from the resumption of trading. 
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We are able to identify the anticipated inverse relation between short selling levels and 
returns by relying on Granger causality test results: lagged short selling impacts returns. Using 
one period lags, we categorize, for three post-halt periods, short selling levels as high or low, 
depending on their position relative to the approximate 20 percent estimation period average 
established from Figure 5 Panel B. We also note whether abnormal standardized returns increase 
or decrease from the previous period. The results, shown below, indicate that 1) lagged short 
selling levels are low in period +1 as abnormal standardized returns peak, 2) lagged short selling 
increases in period +2 as abnormal standardized returns fall (increased selling activity and 
associated price declines), and 3) lagged short selling is lower in period +3, as abnormal 
standardized returns begin to rebound. This model provides a possible scenario in which short 
sellers engage in predatory activity surrounding halts in trading. 
Period +1 +2 +3 
Short Selling Lagged 1 Period  Low High Low 
Abnormal Return  Increase Decrease Increase 
 
To explore further the role of short sellers surrounding halts in trading, we calculate two 
short-selling metrics. First, abshvol, a standardized short selling measure, is computed for halted 
stocks for 5-minute intervals on the halt day (Shkilko et al. 2012): 
            
                                                 
                        
      (3) 
 
Where          represents the volume of shares shorted for stock i during interval j on the 
halt day,                                       is the average short volume for the pre-halt period (days -30 to -1), and 
                          is the standard deviation of the short volume during the pre-halt 
period. Periods are measured backwards from the halt and forward from the resumption of 
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trading. The abshvol value allows for the identification of substantial changes between the short 
selling behavior exhibited during the estimation period and halt-day short selling. Results are 
listed in Table 6 and shown in Figure 6.  
Table 6 
Abnormal Standardized Short Volume 
Abnormal standardized short volume, the difference between the short volume on the halt 
and estimation day standardized by estimation period standard deviation, are computed for 5-
minute intervals on the halt day. Periods are measured backwards from the beginning of the 
halt and forward from the resumption of trading. t-statistics are listed in parentheses 
Period Abnormal Standardized Short Volume 
-12 1.39 (1.28) 
-11 1.35 (1.15) 
-10 0.59 (1.60) 
-9 1.24 (1.87) * 
-8 1.89 (1.41) 
-7 1.39 (1.43) 
-6 1.65 (1.83) * 
-5 1.67 (1.58) 
-4 2.03 (1.69) * 
-3 1.53 (1.78) * 
-2 1.32 (2.45) ** 
-1 2.18 (2.73) *** 
Halt   
1 19.63 (6.66) *** 
2 11.90 (5.26) *** 
3 12.49 (4.38) *** 
4 12.76 (3.81) *** 
5 10.83 (3.75) *** 
6 7.58 (5.07) *** 
7 9.36 (2.84) *** 
8 5.87 (3.14) *** 
9 8.61 (2.53) ** 
10 5.33 (2.93) *** 
11 3.16 (3.01) *** 
12 3.62 (3.49) *** 
***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively 
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Figure 6 
Abnormal Standardized Short Volume 
Abnormal standardized short volume, the difference between the short volume on the halt 
and estimation day standardized by estimation period standard deviation, are computed 
for 5-minute intervals on the halt day. Periods are measured backwards from the 
beginning of the halt and forward from the resumption of trading. 
 
Abnormal standardized short selling begins to increase four periods prior to the cessation 
of trading, with values approximately two pre-halt standard deviations larger than in the 
estimation period. A large increase occurs in the first post-halt period, as abnormal short selling 
levels climb to 19.63. Abshvol values then decline, but remain elevated above estimation levels 
over the remaining periods examined.  
To quantify short-seller aggressiveness, we follow Shkilko et al., 2012, and calculate 
shimb, an order-imbalance metric the represents the difference between the short volume 
(number of trades) initiated by buyers and sellers scaled by total short sale volume (number of 
trades). The Lee-Ready algorithm, using contemporaneous transactions, is used to classify short 
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trades as buyer or seller initiated. The tick test is used to designate trades that execute at the mid-
point between the bid and ask price. Results are reported in Table 7.  
 
shimbi = (Short Buysi – Short Sellsi) / (Short Buysi + Short Sellsi)  (4) 
Table 7 
Short Selling Order Imbalance 
Short-selling order imbalance (shimb) is computed for each period as the difference between 
short volume (number of trades) initiated by buyers and sellers scaled by total short volume 
(number of trades). 5-minute periods are measured backwards from the beginning of the halt 
and forward from the resumption of trading. t-statistics are listed in parentheses 
Period Trading Volume Number of Trades 
-12 0.3239 (3.29) *** 0.4060 (5.40) *** 
-11 0.4877 (5.46) *** 0.3707 (4.58) *** 
-10 0.2567 (2.52) ** 0.3636 (4.56) *** 
-9 0.3511 (4.35) *** 0.3090 (3.74) *** 
-8 0.2262 (2.47) ** 0.2939 (4.10) *** 
-7 0.4015 (3.91) *** 0.2850 (3.13) *** 
-6 0.1126 (1.04) 0.2177 (2.93) *** 
-5 0.2561 (2.75) ** 0.3358 (4.60) *** 
-4 0.3928 (4.73) *** 0.3941 (6.57) *** 
-3 0.3541 (5.72) *** 0.3777 (8.16) *** 
-2 0.1246 (1.18) 0.2133 (3.02) *** 
-1 0.1357 (1.58) 0.2389 (4.20) *** 
Halt     
1 0.3404 (5.28) *** 0.3604 (7.61) *** 
2 0.2331 (3.18) *** 0.3253 (6.96) *** 
3 0.1834 (2.54) ** 0.2836 (5.37) *** 
4 0.3197 (4.72) *** 0.2970 (7.20) *** 
5 0.2504 (3.43) *** 0.2897 (6.84) *** 
6 0.3686 (5.63) *** 0.2777 (5.09) *** 
7 0.3333 (4.15) *** 0.3229 (6.08) *** 
8 0.3619 (4.52) *** 0.3479 (6.90) *** 
9 0.3019 (3.99) *** 0.3123 (5.69) *** 
10 0.2816 (3.63) *** 0.3467 (6.57) *** 
11 0.4618 (6.60) *** 0.4085 (7.81) *** 
12 0.4309 (6.37) *** 0.3531 (6.11) *** 
*** and ** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively 
 
Shimb values are positive for both metrics and all periods reported, suggesting that more 
short sale volume and transactions are initiated by buyers than by sellers. The shimb value for the 
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number of trades is lower in the two periods preceding the halt and then increases substantially in 
the two periods following the resumption of trading.  
The absence of negative shimb values suggest that the results may be impacted by the 
previously discussed concern that short selling transactions are misclassified as a buyer-initiated 
activity by the Lee-Ready algorithm. Although the accuracy of the classification algorithm is in 
question, we can still gain valuable insight into short seller aggressiveness surrounding trading 
halts by calculating the difference in shimb between the 30-day pre-halt estimation period and 
the halt day. These results are shown in Figure 7 for the five periods preceding the halt and 
following the resumption of trading. 
 
Figure 7 
Short-selling Order Imbalance Differences  
Short-selling order imbalance (shimb) is calculated as the difference between short volume 
(number of trades) initiated by buyers and sellers scaled by total short volume (number of 
trades). The difference between estimation period and halt-day shimb values is computed 
for 5-minute periods, measured backwards from the beginning of the halt and forward from 
the resumption of trading. 
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The shimb difference is positive in periods -4 and -3 for both short volume and number of 
trades; a positive shimb difference indicates a higher proportion of buyer-initiated short activity 
during these periods on the halt day as compared to estimation period levels. These metrics are 
negative in the two periods prior to the implementation of the halt. A negative shimb value 
suggests increased short seller aggressiveness: during these periods on the halt day a greater 
percentage of the short transactions are seller-initiated as compared to the corresponding interval 
in the estimation period. After the resumption of trading, the shimb difference reverts to positive 
values. 
Our findings fail to support Hypothesis 2. Order imbalance levels do not demonstrate the 
expected relation to changes in return predicted by the predatory model. However, this result 
might be attributed to the manner in which transactions, particularly short sales, are categorized 
as buyer or seller initiated by the Lee-Ready algorithm. Using the relation suggested by the 
Granger Causality Wald test, we are able to identify possible predatory behavior with the 
expected pattern of high short selling levels and low returns by lagging short selling activity by 
one period. 
 
Price Reversals 
Predatory trading models predict that after an initial decline, halted stocks will experience 
a measurable price reversal. This rebound in price coincides with the constrained trader’s 
completion of liquidation and subsequent exit from the market, and the repurchasing of assets by 
predatory traders.  
Our hypothesis regarding the price behavior of halted stocks suggests that: 
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H3: Securities undergoing trading halts will demonstrate predatory trading by experiencing 
large price reversals.  
 
We first determine how many sample firms experience significant price declines on the 
event day. Following Shkilko et al. (2012) we compute for the non-halt trading period, the 
average standard deviation of 5-minute cumulative returns from the market open to close. We 
consider that a significant price decline occurs if a security’s halt-day period return decreases by 
two or more estimation period standard deviations. To detect departures from normal trading 
behavior, this result is compared to the number of price declines identified in the 30-day pre-halt 
estimation period. Results are listed in Table 8.  
Table 8 
Stocks with Large Price Declines 
Stocks are categorized on both the halt day and during the 30-day pre-halt estimation period, 
by the number of periods in which they experience large price declines. A large price 
declines is defined as a decrease in a security’s period return by two or more estimation 
period (30 days prior to the halt) standard deviations. 5-minute periods are measured from 
market open to close (78 periods). 
 Number of Stocks 
Number of Periods with Price Declines Halt Day Estimation Period 
0 9 70 
1 14 5 
2 8 1 
3 7 1 
4 7 1 
5 7 0 
6 5 0 
7 3 0 
8 2 0 
9 3 0 
10 3 0 
11 2 0 
12 1 0 
13 3 0 
16 2 0 
19 1 0 
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23 1 0 
Total Number of Stocks 78 78 
Stocks with no large price decline 11.54% 89.74% 
Stocks with large price declines 88.46% 10.26% 
 
On the halt day, over 88 percent of sample stocks (69 of 78 stocks) experience at least 
one substantial price decline. In contrast, a significant price decline can be identified in only one 
tenth (8 of 78) of sample stocks during the estimation period. Only three stocks show more than 
one period with a price decline during the estimation period as compared to 55 stocks on the 
event day. 
Figure 8 shows the proportion of stocks that experience a significant price decline in each 
five-minute period relative to the trading halt. Prior to the halt, between two and eight percent of 
stocks that trade during each period demonstrate large price declines compared to approximately 
35 percent of stocks that trade in periods +1 and +2. The proportion of stocks with large price 
declines remains above pre-halt levels for eight periods (40 minutes) following the resumption of 
trading.  
 
Figure 8 
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Firms with Large Declines – by Period 
The ratio of sample stocks with a large price decline to sample stocks that trade during each 
period is computed. A large price declines is defined as a decrease in a security’s period 
return by two or more estimation period (30 days prior to the halt) standard deviations. 5-
minute periods are measured backwards from the halt and forward from the resumption of 
trade. 
 
The high number of firms demonstrating large price declines immediately following the 
continuation of trading suggests that the initial price behavior associated with predatory trading 
is present for our sample stocks. However, these price declines could occur independently of 
predation; it is necessary to examine the firms that exhibit substantial price declines and 
determine if large price reversals occur. Borrowing from Shkilko et al. (2012), we identify a 
large price reversal if the security’s return rebounds by 60 percent of the initial price decline by 
the close of the trading day.  
Of the 69 stocks that experience substantial price declines on the event day, 20 stocks, 
representing 26 halts, evidence large price declines during periods +1 and +2. Only four of these 
20 stocks demonstrate a large price reversal prior to the end of the trading day. In an attempt to 
uncover differences in the return and short selling behavior of these four stocks as compared to 
stocks that demonstrate substantial price declines in the first two post-halt periods but no 
significant reversal, we compute, for each group, mean cumulative returns and abnormal short 
selling levels for 12 post-halt periods. Abnormal short selling is the percentage difference 
between shares sold short during the event period and the average daily number of shares sold 
short during the estimation period. Results are shown in Figure 9, which makes a separate 
comparison for each metric between reversal and non-reversal stocks. Figure 10 attempts to link 
short selling behavior and returns; it displays these measurements together for each stock group. 
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Abnormal short selling is scaled by a factor ten, for Figure 10, to allow plotting on the same 
graph. 
 
Panel A: Cumulative Returns 
 
Panel B: Abnormal Short Selling 
Figure 9 
Cumulative Returns and Abnormal Short Selling  
Cumulative dollar returns and abnormal short selling are computed on the halt day for firms with 
large price declines in the first two post-halt periods. Five-minute periods are measured from the 
resumption of trading. Large price declines are defined as a decrease in return in excess of two 
average return standard deviations obtained from the 30-day pre-halt estimation period. 
Abnormal short selling is the percentage difference between shares sold short during the event 
period and the average daily number of shares sold short during the estimation period. Results 
are shown for with and without a price reversal of at least 60 percent of the original price decline. 
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Panel A: Firms Without Reversals 
 
Panel B: Firms With Reversals 
Figure 10 
Cumulative Returns and Abnormal Short Selling: Reversals / No Reversals  
Cumulative dollar returns and abnormal short selling are computed on the halt day for 
firms with large price declines in the first two post-halt periods. Five-minute periods are 
measured from the resumption of trading. Large price declines are defined as a decrease in 
return in excess of two average return standard deviations obtained from the 30-day pre-
halt estimation period. Abnormal short selling is the percentage difference between shares 
sold short during the event period and the average daily number of shares sold short 
during the estimation period. Abnormal short selling is scaled by a factor ten to allow 
plotting on the same graph. Results are shown for with and without a price reversal of at 
least 60 percent of the original price decline. 
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From Figure 9, we make two noteworthy observations. Return patterns, shown in Panel 
A, are quite different for each set of firms. The firms with price reversals demonstrate a 
pronounced decline from periods +1 to +2, and a sharp rebound in periods +3 and +4. In 
contrast, the non-reversing firms appear to have a gradual appreciation in price during the first 
four post-halt periods without evidence of extreme price movements. Abnormal short selling 
levels, shown in Panel B, suggest differences as well. Although levels are similar for both groups 
immediately upon the resumption of trading, short selling for the reversal stocks remains 
elevated for three periods and then declines substantially with near estimation periods levels by 
the eighth post-halt period. Short selling levels for the non-reversing stocks appear to be more 
arbitrary and they remain noticeably elevated throughout the periods examined.  
Figure 10 fails to demonstrate for either firm group, a predatory relation between short 
selling levels and returns. For firms with no reversal identified (Panel A), the highest short 
selling levels and lowest returns occur simultaneously in the first post-halt period. For firms 
experiencing reversals, short selling levels are highest immediately preceding the substantial 
price decline in period two. However, short selling remains elevated in the two periods that 
follow, even as the price begins to rebound. This observation is consistent with Shkilko et al. 
(2012), who find that prior to large price reversals; short selling increases as short sellers demand 
liquidity instead of supply it. 
Our examination of price reversals provides only limited support for Hypothesis 3. We 
document reliable evidence that substantial price declines surrounding interruptions in trading 
occur. However, beyond our observations that return and short selling patterns appear different 
for stocks depending on whether they experience a large price reversal, we are unable to 
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establish that the price reversals associated with predatory activity take place for a significant 
portion of our sample of stocks. 
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CONCLUSION 
The model of predation developed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) describes a 
distinct pattern of price behavior: an initial price decline is followed by a substantial reversal. 
Our research intent is to discover if predatory activity occurs surrounding trading halts – if 
strategic market participants take advantage of a distressed trader’s need to liquidate.   
Our investigation identifies that overall, sample stocks experience a substantial decline in 
price immediately following the resumption of trading; this decline appears on aggregate to 
reverse itself by the end of the trading day. Results also demonstrate that short selling and returns 
exert influence on each other, however, the impact of non-short volume on returns is not 
established. Although an increase in trading, both short and non-short volume, is identified 
surrounding our trading halt events, the anticipated shift in buying and selling activity is not 
evidenced, perhaps due to the manner in which transactions, particularly short sales, are 
classified. Price reversals are identified for a fraction of sample stocks, but our research is unable 
to definitively demonstrate that predatory behavior occurs surrounding halts in trading. 
Aitken and Dyl (1990), in their examination of stock behavior subsequent to large price 
changes, find statistically significant reversals in price. They look to previous research to provide 
possible explanations, which might apply to the price behavior of sample stocks in our study. For 
example, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) suggest that irrationality might lead investors to place too 
much emphasis on events and thereby make inaccurate forecasts. Brown, Harlow, and Tinic 
(1988) purport that in an uncertain environment, information is not incorporated immediately 
and investors overreact to what they perceive as bad news. 
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Hauser et al. (2006)
** Informed trading Corwin and Lipson (2000)
Informational Event
Financial Contagion & Commonality
Firm Related Firm
Informational Event Firm
Financial Contagion & Commonality
Related Firm
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Diagram depicting the relation between short selling and trading halts 
 
Short
Selling
Trading
Halts
Short sellers are informed
Price adjustments that occur 
prior to trading halts are 
attributed to information 
leakages and insider trading
Miller (1977), Senchack and Starks 
(1993), Arnold et al. (2005), Chang et 
al. (2007), Boehmer et al. (2008), 
Diether et al (2009)
Hopewell and Schwartz (1978)
Short selling is highest for 
high volatility stocks
Short Seller target specific 
firms during selected 
intervals
Magnet Effect - as the 
probability of an interruption in 
trading increases, market 
participants accelerate the 
timing of their trades - results 
in increased price variability 
and volume. Provides a signal 
to the market of the impending 
halt.
Angel et al. (2003)
Subrahmanyam (1994), Ackert et al. 
(2001), Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004), 
Hopewell and Schwartz (1978)
Short selling surrounding 
informational events is firm 
specific
Trading halts are a firm-specific 
informational event
Christophe et al. (2004), Angel et al. 
(2003)
Hopewell and Schwartz (1978)
Short selling increases prior 
to informational events - 
short selling prior to an 
informational event are 
more likely to be 
informationally motivated
Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996), 
Aitken et al. (1998), Christophe et al 
(2010), Karpoff and Lou (2010)
The short selling - return 
inverse relation is stronger in 
environments with high 
levels of asymmetric 
information and impeded 
public information flow
Trading halts occur in 
environments with high 
information asymmetry
Cohen et al. (2007)
Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (2000), 
Hopewell and Schwartz (1978), Ferris et 
al. (1992), Kryzanowski and Nemiroff 
(1998), Wong et al. (2009), Kryzanowski 
and Nemiroff (2001)
Informed
Volatility
Asymmetry
Firm Specific
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Possible roles of trading halts with predatory behavior (precipitate or mitigate) 
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Predatory 
Selling
Seller 
Liquidation 
Complete - 
Strategic Trader 
Buys Back Asset
Price Declines Price Declines Price Declines Increase Buy Orders
Increased Volatility Increase short selling Large Price Reversal
Increased Volume Increase non-short selling IncreasedVolatility
Increased Volatility
Liquidity Crisis 
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Liquidating
Strategic 
Traders 
Recognize 
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Predatory 
Selling
Trading Halt 
Stops Predatory 
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Efficient Prices
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Value of holdings for the distressed and predatory trader and price behavior during predation 
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List of Sample Firms 
Firm Symbol Mode SIC 
AMERICREDIT CORP ACF 4 Personal Credit Institutions 
ADAMS RESOURCES & ENERGY INC AE 7 Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 
UNITED CAPITAL CORP AFP 11 Electronic Coils, Transformers & Other Inductors 
AGRIUM INC AGU 11 Agricultural Chemicals 
AMERICAN ISRAELI PAPER MLS LTD AIP 11 Paper Mills 
ALPHARMA INC ALO 11 Pharmaceutical Preparations 
BLAIR CORP BL 4 Retail-Catalog & Mail-Order Houses 
BAUSCH & LOMB INC BOL 11 Retail-Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply 
CONAGRA INC CAG 11 Meat Packing Plants 
CAMBREX CORP CBM 11 Services-Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management 
CAMECO CORP CCJ 11 Miscellaneous Metal Ores 
CORUS ENTERTAINMENT INC CJR 11 Radio Broadcasting Stations 
CORUS ENTERTAINMENT INC CJR 11 Radio Broadcasting Stations 
CORUS ENTERTAINMENT INC CJR 11 Radio Broadcasting Stations 
CANTEL MEDICAL CORP CMN 11 Services-Commercial Physical & Biological Research 
CAREMARK RX INC CMX 11 Services-Home Health Care Services 
CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAY CO CNI 11 Railroads, Line-Haul Operating 
COMSTOCK RESOURCES INC CRK 11 Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 
CONTINENTAL MATERIALS CORP CUO 11 Concrete, Gypsum & Plaster Products 
C V S CORP CVS 11 Retail-Drug Stores and Proprietary Stores 
DELUXE CORP DLX 11 Blankbooks, Looseleaf Binders & Bookbindg & Related Work 
DOMTAR INC DTC 11 Paper Mills 
DYNEGY INC NEW DYN 11 Natural Gas Transmission 
ENCANA CORP ECA 11 Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 
ELKCORP ELK 11 Asphalt Paving & Roofing Materials 
ENERGY PARTNERS LTD EPL 11 Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 
EMPIRE RESOURCES INC DEL ERS 7 Wholesale-Metals Service Centers & of fices 
FAIRCHILD SEMICONDUCTOR INTL INC FCS 11 Semiconductors & Related Devices 
FORDING CANADIAN COAL TRUST FDG 11 Trust Services 
FAMILY DOLLAR STORES INC FDO 11 Retail-Variety Stores 
HALLWOOD GROUP INC HWG 11 Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Man Made Fiber & Silk 
IAMGOLD CORP IAG 11 Gold and Silver Ores 
IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP IFC 4 State Commercial Banks 
IMERGENT INC IIG 7 Services-Computer Integrated Systems Design 
QUEBECOR WORLD INC IQW 11 Commercial Printing 
INTERTAPE POLYMER GROUP INC ITP 11 Converted Paper & Paperboard Prods (No Containers/Boxes) 
J E D OIL INC JDO 11 Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 
JONES APPAREL GROUP INC JNY 11 Apparel & Other Finished Prods of Fabrics & Similar Matl 
KADANT INC KAI 11 Special Industry Machinery (No Metalworking Machinery) 
LEVITT CORP FLA LEV 11 Land Subdividers & Developers (No Cemeteries) 
LIONS GATE ENTERTAINMENT CORP LGF 11 Services-Motion Picture & Video Tape Production 
MINERALS TECHNOLOGIES INC MTX 11 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals 
NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL CORP NAV 11 Truck & Bus Bodies 
NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL CORP NAV 11 Truck & Bus Bodies 
NACCO INDUSTRIES INC NC 11 Industrial Trucks, Tractors, Trailers & Stackers 
NOVAGOLD RESOURCES INC NG 11 Gold and Silver Ores 
NUVEEN MASS DIV ADV MUNI FD NMB 7 Trust Services 
NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR CORP NSM 11 Semiconductors & Related Devices 
NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR CORP NSM 11 Semiconductors & Related Devices 
NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR CORP NSM 11 Semiconductors & Related Devices 
NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR CORP NSM 11 Semiconductors & Related Devices 
NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR CORP NSM 11 Semiconductors & Related Devices 
QUANEX CORP NX 11 Steel Works, Blast Furnaces & Rolling Mills (Coke Ovens) 
ONE LIBERTY PROPERTIES INC OLP 11 Real Estate Investment Trusts 
PIONEER DRILLING CO PDC 7 Drilling Oil & Gas Wells 
PARK NATIONAL CORP PRK 7 National Commercial Banks 
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RIVIERA HOLDINGS CORP RIV 11 Services-Miscellaneous Amusement & Recreation 
RETAIL HOLDRS TRUST RTH 4 Trust Services 
BOSTON BEER INC SAM 11 Malt Beverages 
BOSTON BEER INC SAM 11 Malt Beverages 
BOSTON BEER INC SAM 11 Malt Beverages 
BOSTON BEER INC SAM 11 Malt Beverages 
SCHWAB CHARLES CORP NEW SCH 11 Security Brokers, Dealers & Flotation Companies 
SHAW GROUP INC SGR 11 Miscellaneous Fabricated Metal Products 
STONE ENERGY CORP SGY 11 Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 
SIGNET GROUP PLC SIG 11 Retail-Jewelry Stores 
SUNLINK HEALTH SYSTEMS INC SSY 11 Services-Commercial Physical & Biological Research 
TELEPHONE & DATA SYSTEMS INC TDS 4 Radiotelephone Communications 
TEKTRONIX INC TEK 11 Instruments For Meas & Testing of Electricity & Elec Signals 
TENET HEALTHCARE CORP THC 11 Services-General Medical & Surgical Hospitals, NEC 
TODCO THE 11 Drilling Oil & Gas Wells 
TECHNICAL OLYMPIC U S A INC TOA 11 General Bldg Contractors - Residential Bldgs 
TELUS CORP TU 11 Radiotelephone Communications 
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC UNH 11 Hospital & Medical Service Plans 
UNISOURCE ENERGY CORP UNS 11 Electric Services 
UNITED STATES CELLULAR CORP USM 4 Radiotelephone Communications 
WESTMORELAND COAL CO WLB 7 Bituminous Coal & Lignite Mining 
WELLSFORD REAL PROPERTIES INC WRP 11 Real Estate Investment Trusts 
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